













This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 












1 Political Economy of Tax Enforcement - Voting on Evasion Fines 1
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Motivation and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Previous Literature and Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Post Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.1 Government Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.2 The Firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.3 Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.1 Electoral Competition and Tax Enforcement . . . 17
2.2.2 Tax Policy and Enforcement Preferences . . . . . 23
2.2.2.1 Costless Evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.2.2 Constant Average Cost of Evasion . . . 29
2.3 Normative Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4 Binding Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2 A Sleeping Beauty - Media Strength and Politician Selection 53
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.1 Motivation and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.2 Previous Literature and Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.1 Players, Timing and Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
iii
2.2 Equilibrium Concept, Strategies and Beliefs . . . . . . . . 72
2.3 Dictatorial Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.4 Equilibria With Challengers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.4.1 Equilibria With a Passive Media . . . . . . . . . 83
2.4.2 Equilibria With an Active Media . . . . . . . . . 92
2.4.3 Equilibrium Effects of Changes in Payoffs . . . . 101
2.4.4 Information Technology and Incentives for Media
Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3 Electoral Campaigning with Correlated Ignorance 143
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
1.1 Motivation and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
1.2 Previous Literature and Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
2.1 Probabilistic Voting With Correlated Ignorance . . . . . . 155
2.2 Valence and Costly Policy Campaigning . . . . . . . . . . 170
2.2.1 Ambiguity Reducing Policy Campaigning . . . . 186
3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
iv
Declaration
I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by me and that the work
contained in it is my own unless clearly stated and referenced. It has not been




I would like to thank my supervisors Sevi Mora Rodŕıguez and Andrew Clausen
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Abstract
This thesis consists of three stand-alone chapters studying theoretical models con-
cerning a range of issues that take place within the context of political delegation:
tax enforcement, political selection, electoral campaigning.
First chapter studies the problem of a small electorate of workers who cannot
influence tax rates but can influence their local politicians to interfere with tax
enforcement. It develops a two-candidate Downsian voting model where voters
are productivity-heterogenous workers who supply labor to a local firm that can
engage in costly tax evasion while facing an exogenously given payroll tax col-
lected at the firm level. Two purely office motivated local politicians compete
in a winner-takes-all election by offering fine reductions to take place if the firm
gets caught evading. Two results stand out. First, equilibrium tax evasion is
(weakly) increasing in the productivity of the median voter as a result of the
latter demanding a weaker enforcement regime through more aggressive fine re-
ductions. Second, if politicians were able to propose and commit on tax rates as
well, then the enforcement process would be interference-free and the tax level
would coincide with the median voter’s optimal level. These two results under-
line the fact that from voters’ perspective, influencing enforcement policy is an
imperfect substitute for influencing tax policy in achieving an optimal redistri-
bution scheme due to tax evasion being costly. In other words, a lax enforcement
pattern in a given polity can be indicative of a political demand arising as an
attempt to attain a redistributive second-best when influencing tax policy is not
a possibility.
Second chapter turns attention to the role and incentives of media in the
context of ex ante political selection, i.e. at the electoral participation level.
It constructs a signalling model with pure adverse selection where a candidate
whose quality is private information decides on whether to challenge an incum-
bent whose quality is common knowledge given an electorate composed of voters
who are solely interested in electing the best politician. Electoral participation
is costly and before the election, a benevolent media outlet which is assumed to
be acting in the best interest of voters decides on whether to undertake a costly
investigation that may or may not reveal challenger’s quality and transmit this
information to voters. The focus of the chapter is on studying the selection and
incentive effects of changes in media’s information technology. The setting cre-
ates a strategic interaction between challenger entry and media activity, which
gives rise to two main results. First, an improvement in media’s information tech-
nology, whether due to cost reductions or gains in investigative strength always
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(weakly) improves ex ante selection by increasing minimum challenger quality
in equilibrium. Second, while lower information costs always (weakly) make the
media more active, an higher media strength may reduce its journalistic activity,
especially if it is already strong. The intuition behind this asymmetry is sim-
ple. While both types of improvements increase media’s expected net benefits
from journalism, a boost to its investigative strength also makes the media more
threatening for inferior challengers at a given level of journalistic activity. Com-
bining this with the first result implies that the media can afford being more
passive without undermining selection if it is sufficiently strong to begin with. In
short, a strong media might lead to a relatively passive media, even though the
media is “working as intended”.
Third chapter is about electoral campaigns. More precisely, it is a theoreti-
cal investigation into one possible audience-related cause for diverging campaign
structures of different candidates competing for the same office: state of political
knowledge in an electorate. Electorate is assumed to consist of a continuum of
voters heterogenous along two dimensions: policy preferences and political knowl-
edge. The latter is assumed to partition the set of voters into ignorant and in-
formed segments, with the former consisting of voters who are unable to condition
their voting decisions on the policy dimension. Political competition takes place
within a probabilistic voting setting with two candidates, but instead of costless
policy proposals as in a standard probabilistic voting model, it revolves around
campaigning. Electoral campaigning is modelled as a limited resource allocation
problem between two activities: policy campaigning and valence campaigning.
The former permits candidates to relocate from their initial policy positions (rep-
utations or legacies), which are assumed to be at the opposing segments of the
policy space (i.e. left and right). The latter allows them to generate universal
support via a partisanship effect and can be interpreted as an investment into
non-policy campaign content such as impressionistic advertising, recruitment of
writers capable of producing emotionally appealing speeches, etc. The chapter
has two central results. First, a candidate’s resource allocation to valence cam-
paigning increases with the fraction of ignorant voters, ideological (non-policy)
heterogeneity of informed voters and proximity of candidate’s initial position to
the bliss point of the informed pseudo-swing voter.1 The last one results from
decreasing relative marginal returns for politicians from converging to pseudo-
swing voter’s ideal position. Second, even if candidates are otherwise symmetric,
1Pseudo-swing voter refers to the position of the voter who would be the (expected) swing
voter if valence campaigning was not allowed and candidates were able to freely announce any
policy.
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a monotonic association between policy preferences and political knowledge can
induce divergence into campaign structures. For instance, if ignorance and policy
preferences are positively correlated (e.g. less educated preferring more public
good) then the left candidate would conduct a campaign with a heavier valence
focus and vice versa.2 Underlying this result is again the decreasing relative
marginal returns argument: a candidate whose initial position is already close
to that of the informed pseudo-swing voter would benefit more from a valence
oriented campaign. An implication of this is that a party that is known having
a relatively more ignorant voter base can end up conducting a much more policy
focused campaign compared to a party that is largely associated with politically
aware voters.




Political Economy of Tax Enforcement - Voting
on Evasion Fines
Abstract
Motivated by frequent fine reductions, pardons and other tax enforcement
issues widespread in many developing countries, this chapter studies un-
der what conditions a political demand for a weak tax enforcement regime
might arise in an electorate in the context of payroll taxation. For this pur-
pose, I study a two-candidate Downsian policy competition model where
candidates can promise to reduce evasion fines but cannot influence tax
rates. It is shown that in an electorate composed of voters who differ with
respect to their productivities, firm-level payroll tax enforcement becomes
subject to political interference when the given tax policy diverges from
the redistributive tastes of the median voter. It is also shown that the
enforcement regime’s credibility gap, i.e. the difference between de jure
and de facto fine rates is increasing in the productivity of the median voter
and if multidimensional voting was allowed, the political pressure on the
enforcement regime would be completely eliminated and the tax rate would
coincide with median voter’s bliss point. The main point is that from the
perspective of voters, enforcement policy is an imperfect substitute for tax
policy. As long as the tax policy is non-negotiable, a political demand for
a lax enforcement regime may arise as an attempt to attain a second-best
outcome in terms of redistribution.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Summary
One of the persistent issues in developing countries is the prevalence of high tax
evasion and weak tax enforcement. While tax collection issues also exist in devel-
oped countries, what distinguishes the former is the significant difficulties they
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face in mobilizing revenues via direct taxes, which is reflected by the dispropor-
tional share of indirect taxes in their tax mixes.1 A related pattern, especially
relevant for countries in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and
Asia is the widespread under-collection of labor taxes.2 According to Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) estimates, between 20% to 30% of contributions
remained uncollected in CEE countries throughout late 90’s (Gillian et al.(2000)),
while in some Latin American countries the rate of collection remained as low as
40% (Mesa-Lago (1998)). In another study, Saunders and Shang (2001) reports
that nearly 70% of firms in Shanghai engage in some form of payroll tax evasion.
Turkey is one country that should also be mentioned, as its unregistered employ-
ment rate is almost 40% (Karadeniz (2013)) and where until recently payroll tax
collection was the exception rather than the rule (Bailey and Turner (2001)).
There are a variety of reasons leading to tax evasion but two necessary condi-
tions should be satisfied if it were to occur in the first place. First, the potential
punishments should not be fully deterrent, either due to their scale or credibil-
ity issues.3 Second, there should be a positive probability of not getting caught.
These are the twin pillars of tax enforcement: sticks and probability of sticks. The
most usual suspects to lead to a weak enforcement regime would be cost-related is-
sues and agency problems such as rent-seeking bureaucrats. Both can affect audit
probabilities faced by tax evaders, as well as potential punishments. For instance,
limited human resources can constrain the frequency of audits, or litigation costs
can introduce a gap between de jure and de facto penalties. Similarly, corrupt-
ible bureaucrats can provide a limited shelter against audits to some firms or use
discretionary powers to obtain them fine reductions in return for monetary gains.
Normative or extractive considerations can also lead fiscal authorities to design
optimal audit rules or penalty schemes responding to demographic differences,
industry characteristics and firm behaviour, leading to regional or industry-wide
differences in the strictness of enforcement policies. Another possibility, which
have been largely ignored in the theoretical literature until recently, is political
interference. Lobbying mechanisms can play an important role. But as Sandmo
(2005) remarked, an electorate’s resistance against stricter enforcement can also
1Two striking examples of this are Mexico and Turkey who raise nearly 60 percent of their
revenues via indirect taxation, in contrast to an OECD average of 38 percent. This doesn’t
mean that they are good at collecting indirect taxes; just that they are less bad at it.
2By labor taxes, I mean earnings taxes collected at the employee level, i.e. payroll taxes. These
usually consist of social security contributions, but they might also include other country-
specific elements such as TV tax being collected as part of payroll taxes in Turkey.
3Even very high de jure punishments wouldn’t be fully deterrent if the agents did not believe
that they would be strictly carried out.
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create political incentives for such interference and create favourable conditions
for lax enforcement.4 Indeed, casual observation suggests that tax enforcement
and particularly the administration of penalties for tax evaders is quite sensitive
to local election cycles in Turkey, where tax pardons and fine reductions are a
customary part of its politics.
In this chapter, I develop a political economy model of labor tax enforcement
where the strictness of the enforcement regime is determined by voting. There
is a small electorate composed of workers with different productivities supplying
labor and a large local firm who hires them. The firm pays payroll taxes at a level
imposed by the central government, but it can evade some of these by incurring
evasion costs and facing some probability of getting caught and paying fines in
case of an audit. Two purely office motivated politicians compete in a winner-
takes-all election by promising a stricter or a weaker enforcement regime. The
way they do that is by making credible promises of fine reductions, or even tax
pardons in the event that the firm gets caught, through leveraging their contacts
with fiscal authorities. These can be interpreted as formal fine reductions, as
well as informal ones obtained thanks to colluding bureaucrats misreporting the
evaded amount. The enforcement regime that prevails from this picture accom-
modates the median voter’s redistributive tastes, based on a trade-off between
labor revenues and transfers.
The chapter has two main results. First, by voting on their preferred de facto
penalty scheme, voters are essentially choosing an effective enforcement rate: a
measure comprised of a de facto penalty rate and an ex ante probability of an au-
dit, which is decreasing in the productivity of the median voter. This is a familiar
redistribution story, where rich voters (ones with a higher labor productivity in
this case) wish less taxation and poor wants more redistribution. It underlines
enforcement policy as a taxation substitute which is used by voters to have a
say in tax policy even if they don’t have sufficient clout in the policy circles of
the central government. Second, if voters were allowed to vote on both the tax
level and the enforcement policy, then a fully deterrent enforcement regime would
prevail and tax level would coincide with median voter’s optimal choice under no
evasion opportunity. As a corollary, political demand for lax enforcement is al-
ways associated with a divergence from voters’ optimal taxation preferences. This
4The opposite can be true as well, especially if an electorate is divided between evaders and
compliers and the latter is a majority. In a recent paper, Casaburi and Troiano (2013) show
a positive causal relationship between reelection likelihood in local elections and the regional
intensity of a nationwide anti-tax evasion intervention program in Italy, especially in areas
with low tolerance for evasion.
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underlines enforcement as an imperfect substitute for taxation and that if they
could, voters would want to minimize deadweight losses associated with it due to
costly evasion.
1.2 Previous Literature and Contribution
This chapter builds on the tax evasion literature when formulating the firm’s
evasion problem, so this is a good starting point. The seminal paper in this
literature is Allingham and Sandmo (1972), who consider individual income tax
evasion in a very simple setting inspired by Becker’s (1968) classical paper on
the economics of crime. They treat income as fixed and enforcement as a lottery
characterized by a fixed pair of audit probability and penalty rate, and consider
optimal reporting/evasion decisions of a risk-averse agent. Most of the subse-
quent literature builds on this framework, called the taxpayer-as-gambler (TAG)
paradigm by Cowell (2004). Marelli (1984) is the first paper which extends the
TAG framework to firm evasion. He studies simultaneous evasion and production
decisions of a risk-averse monopolist facing an ad-valorem sales tax. Wang and
Conant (1988) apply the same framework to corporate tax evasion, and Yaniv
(1988) considers joint employment and evasion decisions of a perfectly compet-
itive employer facing a payroll tax. All these papers show that firm activity is
independent of the evasion decision (but not vice versa) as long as probability
of audits are fixed, and that the separability breaks down when it becomes a
function of reported activity. Yaniv (1995) later generalizes this result and show
that irrespective of the form of the evaded (linear) tax, as long as the firm evades
by underreporting its tax base or overreporting allowed deductions, separability
result holds. The extension of this framework to the case of risk-neutral firms is
first made by Virmani (1989), who considers evasion and output decisions of a
risk-neutral firm under perfect competition in the presence of concealment costs,
and an audit probability which is increasing in output. He shows that the pre-
vious separability result breaks down and both output and evasion decisions are
jointly determined. Furthermore, firm’s evasion response to increases in penalty
rates become ambiguous. Cremer and Gahwari (1993) apply a similar framework
to optimal commodity taxation. They show that if the audit probability is fixed,
and concealment costs are separable in the evaded amount, then a one-sided sepa-
rability result is recovered, with output depending on evasion but not vice versa.
This allows obtaining clear comparative statics for firm’s decision. This latter
framework is later applied to different market and tax structures; for instance to
profit taxation under monopoly by Eichhorn (2006), or oligopoly by Goerke and
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Runkel (2006). It also constitutes the basis of firm decision in this chapter.
A somewhat related strand to the current chapter is the literature on endoge-
nous enforcement. Kolm (1973) can be considered the initiator of this strand,
where he assumes that fiscal authorities can spend resources to increase audit
coverage and frequency. Subsequent papers gradually shift their focus to opti-
mizing enforcement regimes by designing audit rules or penalty schedules making
the best use of available information and behavioural patterns.5 Sandmo (1981)
considers welfare-maximizing proportional penalty and linear audit probability
choices of a planner for the case of income tax with labor supplying risk averse
agents. Reinganum and Wilde (1985), by limiting attention to cutoff audit rules
as functions of liability declarations in a principle-agent framework, show that
the latter weakly dominate fixed-probability audit rules if the principle aims to
maximize expected tax collection. In another influential paper, using a mech-
anism design approach, Sánchez and Sobel (1993) show that when auditing is
costly, the optimal audit rule for income tax is a function of tax rate and in-
volves at most two cutoffs, dividing the distribution into at most three groups.
In a more recent paper, Bayer and Cowell (2009) focus on the possible role of
industry structure on audit rules. They show that in the context of corporate
taxation and oligopolistic competition, a relative audit rule making use of prior
information on the correlation between likelihood of evasion and size of industry-
wide profit declarations reduces overall tax evasion relative to fixed-probability
rules. There are also an array of papers aiming to endogenize other aspects of
enforcement regimes. Several examples are Yitzhaki and Vakneen (1989), who
study the optimal allocation of tax inspectors according to taxpayer complex-
ity; Hashimzade, Huang and Myles (2010) who show that in case of VAT rebate
fraud, the optimal penalty schedule should be convex in detected overstatement
and Paramonova (2014) who studies the design of optimal information reporting
schemes as part of an endogenous enforcement regime.
A more closely related strand is the literature on the political economy of
redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. Borck (2004) is one of the first pa-
pers in this literature. Voters vote on a redistributive income tax and they each
choose the fraction of their income to declare, taking audit probability and fine
rate as given. He shows that under a weak enforcement regime, poorer workers
can demand a higher taxation compared to no-evasion case as evasion can ben-
efit rich voters disproportionately, which can hinder the progressivity of the tax
5A parallel literature that deals with optimal taxation when enforcement regimes are imperfect
and evasion also exists.
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system. Furthermore, he shows that an increase in enforcement frequency can
actually increase evasion if this latter effect is too strong. Borck (2009) focuses
on preference aggregation problems associated with tax evasion, showing how in-
troduction of an evasion opportunity can cause cycling over tax policies, which
would lead to non-existence of a majority winning tax level. Roine (2006) focuses
on income tax avoidance instead.6 Assuming a fixed cost of avoidance, he arrives
at two conclusions. If the cost of avoidance is high, the standard conflict between
rich and poor prevails. If the cost of avoidance is sufficiently low, then the very
rich and the poor can coalesce to demand a high tax. Traxler (2009) deals with
income tax evasion, but assumes that voters’ marginal evasion costs depend on
incomes. He shows that if marginal evasion costs are decreasing in income, then
taxation preferences are characterized by a standard redistributive monotonic-
ity. If they are increasing, taxation preferences can become non-monotonic, in
the sense that redistribution occurs from middle class to rich and poor voters.
Traxler (2012) studies welfare implications of avoidance opportunities in a stan-
dard voting model of linear income taxes.
Finally, there are two papers that deal with political determination of tax
enforcement: Bárány (2009) and Besfamille, De Donder and Lozachmeur (2013).
Bárány (2009) specifies a model of income tax evasion where voters are heteroge-
nous along two dimensions: income and whether they have an evasion technology
or not. Population is divided into three income groups and voters vote on tax
and fine rates simultaneously, for a given audit probability. Using a probabilistic
voting approach, she shows that a variety of enforcement-tax regimes can arise
under different parameter configurations. These include “tax anarchies”, where
everyone who has the ability to do so evades, and equilibria in which nobody
evades. One main difference from this chapter is that a demand for weak en-
forcement can coexist with voters having the power to influence tax policy. The
reason for this is the fact that the opportunity to evade is a private good which
not everybody possesses. As a result, there is not only redistribution between in-
come groups, but also redistribution within groups, from non-evaders to evaders.
Besfamille et al. (2013) present a structurally similar model to mine with an
industrial organisation focus aiming to explain discrepancies in sales tax evasion
across different industries. Voters are consumers heterogenous in their tastes for
the good produced by firms and voting allows them to influence audit frequencies.
Their results indicate that consumers who have stronger preferences for the good
6Avoidance can be defined roughly as legal evasion, without penalties involved. So it is not
subject to enforcement.
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in question demand a weaker enforcement regime, as stricter enforcement acts as
an additional tax, which is subsequently reflected in firms’ pricing decisions. One
weakness of their paper is that the way they specify voter heterogeneity does not
allow for multidimensional voting unless specific functional forms are imposed.7
This clouds the connection between the given tax policy and enforcement de-
mand, which is one of the main focus points of this chapter. Furthermore, voting
decisions of a consumption-motivated electorate having no influence on tax rates
driving differences in enforcement patterns across industries is a hard story to sell,
unless transaction costs or other factors lead to a clear-cut market dispersion on
a regional basis.
There are several contributions of this chapter. First, it provides a reason-
ably simple framework to think about the political channels which can influence
cross-regional variations in tax enforcement and offers a possible explanation for
frequently observed reductions and pardons of evasion penalties in developing
countries, which can hinder the credibility, and thus the deterrence power of en-
forcement regimes. Second, it contributes to the tax enforcement literature by
endogenizing the credibility of an enforcement regime within a political economy
framework such that the strictness with which the penalties for payroll tax eva-
sion are carried out is determined by political competition. It shows that in the
context of redistributive taxation, a pure voting explanation for weak enforce-
ment always requires some form of non-negotiability of the tax policy as long
as evasion is a public good with externalities. In addition, despite the fact that
possibility of binding constraints are usually avoided in models of redistributive
voting, it is shown that the existence of Condorcet-winning policies is robust to
them, under both single and multidimensional voting.
Next section presents the model. It starts by describing decision problems of
economic actors taking enforcement and tax policies as given. This is followed
by voting decisions of workers and the resulting enforcement policy outcome as
well as a discussion on how this outcome would respond to changes in certain
parameters. A subsection discussing how enforcement preferences of voters relate
to the given tax policy follows this, which also includes the policy outcome that
would prevail under multidimensional voting and the explicit relation between
optimal tax and enforcement policies under two special cases. Next, a subsection
considers normative implications of the policy outcome, which is then followed
by a subsection dedicated to showing the robustness of previous results when it
7They find a similar full enforcement result under CES utilities and quadratic concealment
costs.
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is possible that a subset of workers exit the labor market under some policies.
Final section concludes.
2 Model
The model consists of three stages. At the first stage, there is an election. For
an exogenously given labor tax rate and a probability of tax audit, two identical
local politicians with perfect commitment technologies compete in majoritarian
elections by offering policy platforms on tax enforcement. These correspond to
proportional evasion fines to be paid by the firm (to which the workers supply
their labor) in case it gets caught evading. The interpretation is that while the
electorate is too small to have sufficient political clout for influencing the centrally
imposed tax rate, local politicians can influence de facto penalties by either ob-
taining tax pardons or fine reductions by leveraging their contacts with the fiscal
authority, or influencing auditors so that they misreport the amount evaded in
case the firm is audited.8 Voters are workers having different productivities and
the trade-off they face is between government transfers and labor revenues. In
the second stage, given the election outcome, workers choose optimal amounts of
leisure to consume and labor to supply. Given labor supply decisions of work-
ers, there is a single risk-neutral firm with market power in the labor market (a














Taxes and (if audited)
fines. Redistribution.
Figure 1: Timing and Structure.
8One may argue that politicians can achieve the same ends by offering policy platforms on ex
ante tax breaks, but it is quite likely that there would be institutional obstacles for them to do
so. For instance, while getting formal tax breaks might require a significant consensus within
the fiscal authority, obtaining post-audit fine reductions on the evaded amount can possibly
be achieved with a smaller base of influence. This is not only because the authority to grant
formal fine reductions or pardons might have been left to the discretion of a smaller set of
bureaucrats, but also because these can be obtained by informal means, e.g. making sure that
the auditors misreport the amount evaded to their superiors.
9Model can easily be generalized to other forms of market structures with multiple firms without
qualitatively altering any of the results.
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This captures the big firm small town picture depicted in the introduction. In the
final stage, an audit either occurs or does not occur according to an exogenously
given probability distribution. Depending on the outcome, tax and fine revenues
are collected and distributed to workers on an equal per capita basis. Figure 1
summarizes the timing and the general structure of the model. I start presenting
the model with post election outcomes, as these will form the basis of how the
voters will cast their votes.
2.1 Post Election
2.1.1 Government Revenues
At the final stage, tax and fine revenues are collected and redistribution occurs.
I make two assumptions about auditing technology. First, it is assumed to be
costless and reveals the evasion to auditors if it occurs. The former is not a
substantial assumption, as even if there were costs associated with guaranteeing
a certain frequency of audits and a non-negligible portion of these costs was
reflected to the local electorate, there would likely be no additional costs for
imposing higher penalties. So at the margin, these costs would be irrelevant.
The latter is a simplification and if it were to be dropped, it would simply make
voters ceteris paribus demand a stricter administration of penalties to achieve
the same amount of evasion, which would not alter results ordinally. Second, I
assume random auditing and proportional fines.10
There is a per-unit labor tax denoted by τ . Let α denote the fraction of
employees not reported by the firm.11 If no audit occurs, government revenues
are given by
Rna = τ(1− α)L. (1)
If the firm is audited, government gets the following amount:
Ra = τ(1 + λα)L, (2)
where λ denotes the de facto proportional fine (so λ = −1 would imply either a
full pardon for the evaded amount or that auditors engage in a complete cover-
up). Let pa denote the probability of an audit. Then ex ante, expected revenues
10Voting over more general non-linear penalty schemes to achieve the desired redistribution in
the least distortion inducing way possible would certainly be interesting and possibly tractable
under a probabilistic voting framework. I leave this possibility for future research.
11Strictly speaking, employee-hours not reported by the firm since as will be seen subsequently,
L denotes the aggregate equilibrium labor hours supplied by the workers and hired by the
firm. Henceforth, I will refer to L as employees and employee-hours interchangeably.
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are given by:
E[R] = paRa + pnaRna
= paτ(1 + λα)L+ (1− pa)τ(1− α)L
= τ(1− (1− e)α)L = τeL, (3)
where e = (1+λ)pa denotes the effective enforcement rate, and τe = τ(1−(1−e)α)
denotes the effective tax rate. Differentiating (3) with respect to τ and e by
taking into account the fact that equilibrium tax evasion and employment will
be functions of these allows to disaggregate the response of expected revenues to
changes in tax and enforcement policies.
∂E[R(e, τ)]
∂τ
= (1− (1− e)α)L︸ ︷︷ ︸
+




















While an increase in tax level has a positive effect on expected revenues via in-
creasing extraction from the already existing tax base, it also has a negative
effect by reducing that base through two channels: decreased employment and
increased evasion.12 On the other hand, for a given tax level, a stricter enforce-
ment policy will increase revenues not only because the firm will get caught more
often and pay more fines and outstanding tax liabilities, but also because it will
reduce the amount it evades due to having to pay higher fines in case of getting
caught red-handed. Yet, it also has a decreasing effect via reducing employment
as it leads to a higher effective taxation. For very low levels of tax (τ → 0),
(4) should be positive and (5) should be zero. For very high levels of tax, the
crowding-out effect will be too strong (limτ→∞ L(τ) = 0) and no revenues will be
collected. This suggests a τ -Laffer curve for revenues, although it doesn’t have
to be single-peaked as this would ultimately depend on functional forms. On the
other hand, as e → 1, (5) will go to zero.13 Furthermore, as e → 0, evasion will be
high (particularly for large values of τ), which suggests that in (5), the left term
would dominate the right term. Yet, whether E[R] will be strictly increasing, or
decreasing for some e ∈ (0, 1) will ultimately depend on τ , as well as functional
12The signs of evasion and employment responses to policy changes follow from the discussion
in the next subsection.
13This follows from the fact that as e → 1, both α(e) and ∂L∂e goes to zero. See the next
subsection for the former and the appendix for the latter.
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forms.
I now turn attention to the second stage, when the firm and workers make
their hiring, evasion and labor supply decisions simultaneously.
2.1.2 The Firm
There is a single local firm with monopsony power in the labor market. It has no
say in the policy process.14 It produces a single good with its price normalized to
1 (numéraire good) to sell in a competitive national market using a single-input
non-increasing returns technology y(L). It takes an upward sloping inverse-labor
supply function w(L) and a per-employee (hour) tax τ as given and chooses the
optimal number of employees to hire.15 In addition, the firm can evade some of
its tax liabilities by underreporting a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the labor it utilizes
and get higher profits as long as it isn’t audited. However, evasion is subject to
a cost, which can be captured by a function c̃(α,L). Costly evasion might seem
counterintuitive. For instance, if λ = −1, i.e. if the firm knows that it won’t pay
the evaded amount even if it gets caught, why would it engage in an effort to cover
its tracks? It can be justified with the existence of a default cursory examination
requiring the firm to undertake some concealment costs unless it is willing to face
an audit with certainty without any scope for fine reductions. For instance, a
large disparity between firm’s output and its reported employment might raise
a red flag with the central fiscal authority, grabbing the attention of a large
set of people, which can make sure that the firm is audited and undermine the
influence of local politicians on penalties.16 For evasion costs, I adapt a common
functional form from the indirect tax evasion literature popularized by Cramer
& Gahwari (1993): c̃(α,L) = c(α)αL, with c(·) being convex and increasing and
c(0) = c′(0) = 0. Linearity of evasion costs in the evaded amount ensures a one-
sided separability for the firm’s problem, which leads to clear-cut comparative
statics on hiring and evasion decisions.
Given evasion and hiring decisions of the firm, if no audit occurs, the firm’s
ex post profits can be written as follows.
πna = y(L)− [w(L) + τ(1− α) + c(α)α]L. (6)
14So it cannot lobby and its profits are redistributed to a subset of voters with measure zero.
15It is possible to specify taxation as a fraction levied from wage payments but since wages
won’t differ across individuals (see next subsection), this wouldn’t affect the results as long
as the concealment cost function is modified slightly so that the one-sided separability result
holds.
16So despite political interference, the firm might still need to do certain things “by the book”.
In any case, I provide an analysis with costless evasion later on.
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If the firm is audited, its profits would reflect politically influenced fines it has to
pay.
πa = y(L)− [w(L) + τ(1 + λα) + c(α)α]L. (7)
The firm is risk-neutral, so ex ante, it will maximize its expected profits:
max
(L,α)∈R+×[0,1]
E[π] = paπa + pnaπna
= y(L)− [w(L) + τ ]L− (c(α)− (1− e)τ)αL
= y(L)− [w(L) + τe + c(α)α]L, (8)
where τe and e are as defined previously.
Notice that if the firm is choosing a positive amount to evade, then it must
be true that c(α)αL < (1− e)ταL. So even though evasion is costly, these costs
will not dominate (expected) cost savings from paying less taxes. It follows that
evasion opportunity, when combined with lax enforcement will translate into an
increased employment via higher equilibrium wages. Lax enforcement is critical
for this increase, as if e ≥ 1, the firm would simply pay all of its tax liabilities.
Lemma 1 (Fully deterrent effective enforcement): If e ≥ 1, then α = 0.
Proof: For any α ∈ (0, 1] with L > 0, c(α)αL− (1− e)ταL > c(α)αL > 0
as long as e ≥ 1. So the firm can increase its profits by setting α = 0. 
Assuming continuity of y(L), w(L) and c(α), the problem defined in (8) has
a solution, even though the feasible set of choice variables seems non-compact.
Proposition 1 (Existence of a profit maximizing choice): Firm’s profit
maximization problem has a solution under previous continuity assumptions.
Proof: With continuity assumptions, the objective function becomes continuous.
Furthermore, there is an upper limit on L, given by the total time endowment in
the economy. This limit can be expressed as L = ρ̂, where ρ̂ is the average time-
endowment (productivity) and the equality follows from the fact that population
is of measure one (see next section). So the choice set is essentially compact, and
the existence of a maximizing pair (L, α) follows from Weierstrass’ theorem. 
Assuming that an interior solution exists, following equations describe first-
order necessary conditions for it.
y′(L) = w′(L)L+ w(L) + τ + (c(α)− (1− e)τ)α, (9)
c(α) + c′(α)α = τ(1− e). (10)
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As long as e < 1, interior optima can be guaranteed by a sufficiently low τ , along
with two border conditions, namely: limL→0 [y
′(L)− (w′(L)L+ w(L))] > 0 and
limL→L [y
′(L)− (w′(L)L+ w(L))] < 0. Henceforth, I also assume that the solu-
tion is unique.17,18
From (9) and the previous discussion, it can be immediately seen that firm’s
evasion response to a lax enforcement regime softens the impact of taxes on em-
ployment, resulting in an higher equilibrium wage then would prevail under no
evasion opportunity at the same level of taxation. The following proposition gives
the comparative statics for employment and evasion decisions.
Proposition 2 (Comparative statics for firm’s choices): Assume that
w(·),c(·),y(·) are twice continuously differentiable. Then at an interior maximum,













Proof: Follows from an application of the implicit function theorem to (9) and
(10). Details are provided in the appendix. 
These signs are intuitive. On the one hand, an increase in effective enforcement
or tax level increases effective taxation, which increases marginal cost of the
firm, leading it to hire less. On the other hand, while an increase in effective
enforcement rate reduces evasion because it either reflects a higher probability of
getting caught or a higher penalty in case of getting caught, an increase in tax
level makes it more attractive by making evasion more cost-efficient.
2.1.3 Workers
Supply side of the labor market is populated by a continuum of workers with





. Productivities are “time endowments”, which
the workers can allocate between labor and leisure.
17If the concavity and convexity conditions stated in the next footnote holds along with con-
tinuous differentiability of y(·),w(·) and c(·), then (9) and (10) are also sufficient conditions
for an interior global optima.
18Uniqueness is important but not crucial for the remainder of this chapter. It can be guaranteed
by assuming strict concavity of y(·), strict convexity of c(·) and convexity of w(·). The latter
requires imposing a restriction on the third-derivative of worker’s utility. This would guarantee
the strict concavity of the objective function and make sure of the existence of a unique
maximizer. It is important because it ensures that at the election day, each policy is mapped to
a unique outcome. It is not crucial because from Berge’s Maximum Theorem, maximizers will
be upper-hemicontinuous in policies so one can invoke a continuous ϵ-approximate selection
theorem and base voting decisions on that selection.
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Workers have quasilinear utilities, linear in the numéraire good with its price
normalized to one. Quasilinearity is a convenience assumption. By eliminating
income effects, it ensures an upward sloping labor supply and allows the incentives
governing redistributive motives to be isolated down to individual productivities.
As a corollary to the latter, it also helps with preference aggregation later on,
making sure that individual preferences can be ranked according to gross incomes
independently of the redistribution policy, a condition called Hierarchical Adher-
ence by Roberts (1977). This is essentially Persson and Tabellini’s (2000) take on
the seminal Meltzer and Richard (1981) model of labor supply. More productive
workers are not only better at earning labor income, but also have more leisure
time to spend. Yet due to quasilinearity, everybody allocates the same amount of
time to leisure, implying that more productive workers end up with higher labor
revenues and thus more consumption. Uniformity of leisure across workers also
helps with the political preference aggregation problem mentioned previously.
Following describes the choice problem faced by a worker with productivity ρ
for a given wage w and expected (per capita) government transfers E[R].
max
(x,ℓ,h)∈R3+
u(x, h; ρ) = x+ v(h)
s.t. x ≤ wℓ+ E[R] (12)
ℓ+ h ≤ ρ,
where x denotes consumption of the numéraire good, h denotes leisure and ℓ de-
notes labor. The interpretation is that while labor supply and leisure enjoyment
take place at the second period, consumption (or the consumption associated
with public transfers) takes place at the third period. Due to risk-neutrality of
the firm and quasilinearity of worker preferences, risk-attitude of workers and
timing of numéraire consumption are irrelevant. Notice that the social transfer
system functions on the principal of pure local financing. This is a simplification.
One could assume that revenues are pooled and distributed according to some re-
gional transfer function g(E[R]). As long as g(·) is strictly increasing, qualitative
conclusions of this chapter would remain intact.19 Another simplification is the
anonymity of workers, and thus irrelevance of who gets underreported. Within
this framework, this is justified by the specification of productivity, which guar-
19Of course, if g(0) is strictly positive and large enough, then the electorate might show political
support for a very low effective taxation, i.e. very weak tax enforcement. This is likely to be
an important source of cross-regional variation in the prevalence of tax evasion, especially in
countries with high political interference to tax enforcement.
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antees an equal hourly wage across all workers.20
Proposition 3 (Existence and uniqueness of a utility maximizing choice):
If v(·) is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave, then the problem in
(12) has a unique solution for each (w,E[R]).
Proof: The objective is continuous and the constraint set is compact, so from
Weierstrass’ theorem, a solution exists. Strict concavity of v(·) implies strict qua-
siconcavity of u(·), so the solution is unique. 
Since v(·) is strictly increasing and u(·) is strictly increasing in x, both constraints




ũ(h; ρ) = w [ρ− h] + E[R] + v(h)
s.t. h ≤ ρ. (13)
There are two types of potential corner solutions associated with (13). First
one involves the worker spending all of her time working, second one involves her
not working at all.
v′(0) < w =⇒ h = 0 and x = wρ+ E[R]; (14)
v′(ρ) > w =⇒ h = ρ and x = E[R]. (15)
The first one of these is not very interesting and can easily be eliminated with the
sensible assumption limh→0 v
′(h) = ∞. On the other hand, second one requires
more stringent assumptions to eliminate and is interesting because it implies that
some policy choices might lead to some low productivity workers being completely
dependent to the social transfer system.21 For the remainder of this chapter up
until the end, I will ignore corner solutions as their existence do not alter the
qualitative conclusions. At the end of this section, I will return to them and
show that the political equilibrium is robust to possibility of “downward” corners
20Nevertheless, this would be an interesting extension, as it would not only open up a new
redistribution channel from formal workers to informal workers, but would also have the
potential to reverse the progressivity of the tax-transfer system. See the conclusion for a
discussion.
21One can assume limh→ρ v
′(h) = 0 to make sure no worker ever supplies zero labor, but
this would imply satiation; an assumption “hard to swallow”. Alternatively, one can simply
assume that ρ and ρm (median’s productivity) are high enough so nobody ends up at the
corner after elections. Answering the question “how high?” requires exact functional forms.
See Barnett et al. (2014) for an answer to the case with linear income taxes and isoelastic
utilities.
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where some people do not supply any labor.
Assuming that the solution is interior, then it is characterized by the following
first-order condition.
v′(h) = w. (16)
Since v(·) is strictly concave, its derivative is strictly increasing and hence invert-
ible. So the solution can be expressed as a function of the wage and transfers as
follows.
h(w) = v′−1(w);











ℓρ(w) dF (ρ) =
∫ ρ
ρ
(ρ− h(w)) dF (ρ)
= ρ̂− h(w), (18)
where ρ̂ is the average time endowment.22 So aggregate labor supply is equal to
aggregate labor endowment minus aggregate time spent on leisure. Next lemma
shows that aggregate labor supply is upward sloping.
Lemma 2 (Upward monotonicity of the aggregate labor supply): L(w)
is continuous, differentiable and L′(w) > 0.
Proof: Continuity and differentiability follows from twice continuous differentia-








where the second equality follows from (17), third equality follows from the inverse
function theorem and the inequality follows from strict concavity of v(·). 
Since L(w) is strictly increasing, it is invertible and w(L) is strictly increasing as
22And also the total time endowment, as the population is of measure one.
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well. Given the inverse labor supply function, tax level and enforcement policy,
the monopsonist determines the equilibrium employment as described previously.
This will in turn determine social transfers.
This concludes the discussion of post-election outcomes, given the enforcement
regime arising from electoral competition. In the next section, voters will declare
policy preferences taking into account the outcomes described in this section, and
politicians will offer policy platforms taking into account those preferences.
2.2 Election
2.2.1 Electoral Competition and Tax Enforcement
Since τ is set by the central government and outside the political reach of local
politicians, voters’ (workers’) aim is to influence effective taxation via their local
politicians’ influence on tax enforcement. Given the random audit rule of the tax
authority (pa), enforcement is in turn influenced by obtaining credible concessions
to the legally imposed penalty rate (λ) either via authorized fine reductions or
pardons, or through influencing auditors to collude and misreport the detected
evasion. Without loss of generality, I assume that e = (1+λ)pa = 1, i.e. enforce-
ment policy is fully deterrent on the paper. From the discussion in the previous
section, it should be clear that voting on λ is equivalent to voting on e.





is equivalent to choosing e ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: Follows directly from the definition e = (1 + λ)pa and the fact that e is
the relevant variable affecting firm’s decision and revenues from (3) and (8). 
For any λ resulting from the political process, λ− λ should be interpreted as the
“credibility gap” in the enforcement regime. Whereas λ = −1 corresponds to
full pardon for evasion, λ = λ corresponds to no political interference, hence no
credibility gap.
Political competition manifests in the form of two-candidate representative
democracy. Politicians only care about winning the election and commitment is
costless. It can be described in three stages.
1. Local politicians announce and commit to policies λA, λB (with corresponding
eA, eB) respectively.
2. Voters pick the policy that gives them the highest utility.
3. Winning politician assumes the office and implements the announced policy.
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This is a standard Downsian electoral competition framework. Whether this elec-
tion game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium will in turn depend on whether
there is a Condorcet winning policy.23
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium existence in the Downsian policy competi-
tion game): If the set of Condorcet-winning policies Ec ⊂ [0, 1] is non-empty,
and in case of a tie both politicians win with equal probability, then there exists a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium where the candidates announce eA, eB ∈ Ec and
win with equal probability.
Proof: Suppose Ec is singleton and let ec ∈ Ec. If eA ̸= ec and eB ̸= ec, then
one of the candidates announce ec and win the election. If eA ̸= ec and eB = ec,
then candidate A can announce ec to increase its winning chance from 0 to 1
2
and
vice versa. If Ec is non-singleton, then with a similar reasoning, one concludes
that any profile where politicians announce policies from Ec is a Nash equilibrium
which results in them winning with equal probability.24 
Voters’ policy calculus will be based on their indirect utilities, given the post-
election outcomes discussed previously. That is, they will take into account that
they will be optimizing their labor supplies after the election. Recognizing that
these outcomes will depend on policies, the indirect utility of a voter with pro-
ductivity ρ can be written as follows.
V (e, τ ; ρ) = max
h∈R+
{w(e, τ) [ρ− h] + E[R(e, τ)] + v(h)}
= w(e, τ) [ρ− h(w(e, τ))] + E[R(e, τ)] + v(h(w(e, τ))), (20)
where w(e, τ) ≡ w(L(e, τ)).25
If (20) is single-peaked in e, then workers’ optimal policies (bliss points) under
different productivities can be monotonically ordered, and any deviation to any
direction from these optimal policies would decrease voter utilities monotonically.
This would allow one to establish the existence of a unique Condorcet winning
policy by a separation argument, which would coincide with the bliss point of the
median voter. However, at this level of generality, (20) can easily fail to be single-
23A Condorcet winning policy is a stable policy in the sense that it beats every other alternative
in pairwise voting with majority support, assuming that the voters are voting sincerely.
24If Ec is non-singleton, then their elements are sometimes called weak Condorcet-winners.
By definition, when two weak Condorcet-winning policies are put against each other, they
produce a tie. Equal chance tie-breaking can be achieved through independent randomization
by voters with equal probabilities in case of indifference.
25Since I am assuming slack downward labor supply constraints at any policy choice, the con-
straint h ≤ ρ can be ignored.
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peaked and instead, say, could be characterized by multiple local maxima.26 In
that case, deviations from bliss points would no longer decrease voter utilities
monotonically, so it becomes a possibility that the bliss point of the median voter
is beaten by another policy because that policy is not only closer to the global
maxima of the voters at one side of the median, but is also closer to the local
maxima of the voters at the other side of the median.27 So instead, I will show
that preferences satisfy single-crossing condition over the policy space [0, 1]. This
is a property not of the individual preferences as in single-peakedness, but rather
of the set of preferences, concerning how they are ordered with respect to each
other and in particular, whether that ordering is monotonic.
Lemma 4 (Single-crossing and the existence of a Condorcet winning
policy): Suppose that enforcement preferences satisfy the single-crossing condi-
tion for any given tax policy:
If e′ > e and ρ′ > ρ or if e′ < e and ρ′ < ρ, then
V (e′, τ ; ρ′) ≥ V (e, τ ; ρ′) =⇒ V (e′, τ ; ρ) ≥ V (e, τ ; ρ).
Then a Condorcet winning policy exists and coincides with an effective enforce-
ment rate that maximizes indirect utility of the median voter.
Proof: If the above condition is satisfied, then letting e(ρm) denote an optimal
policy of the median voter, against any alternative e > e(ρm), e(ρm) is weakly
preferred by all workers with ρ ≥ ρm and against any alternative e < e(ρm), e(ρm)
is weakly preferred by all workers with ρ ≤ ρm.28 
In other words, single-crossing requires that if a worker prefers a weaker (stricter)
alternative when comparing two enforcement regimes, then all workers with higher
(lower) productivities should prefer the weaker (stricter) alternative as well. This
ensures that for any alternative against her optimal policy, median’s type divides
the productivity line into supporters and non-supporters.
In a seminal paper, Roberts (1977) shows that in the case of linear income
taxation, single-crossing boils down to two conditions: increasing progressivity
26Why can that be the case? A worker might dislike a small increase in the effective tax level
resulting from a small reduction in penalty rates due to concavity of the production function
and the curvature of worker’s utility combined with the convexity of evasion costs leading to
a pronounced downward response in wages. Yet further reductions might be more palatable
if they don’t lead to large shifts in equilibrium employment.
27A median voter theorem, since it relies on a separation argument, always requires the unan-
imous support of either all the voters to the left or to the right of the median against any
alternative.
28Because median is median, its right and left each constitute half of the population.
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and hierarchical adherence. The first one refers to the set of feasible tax sched-
ules being completely ordered with respect to Lorenz dominance and as shown
by Hemming & Keen (1983), amounts to the requirement that after-tax incomes
should be single-crossing in tax and gross incomes.29 The second one refers to a
property of voter heterogeneity, and requires that to be separable in a fashion en-
suring that voters can be ranked according to their gross incomes independently
of the redistributive policy. Here, workers are essentially voting over non-linear
income tax schedules with the penalty rate playing the role of the taxation pa-
rameter, the form of non-linearity is induced by the shapes of leisure utility,
production function and evasion cost, and gross incomes are nothing but labor
incomes that would prevail under no enforcement (full pardon).
Gans and Smart (1996) show that insights of Roberts (1977) are true for any
voting decision over sets of non-linear tax schedules and that they are equivalent
to preferences satisfying the single-crossing condition in Lemma 4. So in essence,
Lemma 4 is equivalent to enforcement regimes being rankable according to Lorenz
dominance, and workers’ gross labor incomes being rankable independently of the
enforcement policy. Using Milgrom and Shannon’s (1994) equivalence result be-
tween the single-crossing condition and the Spence-Mirrlees condition for cross-
partial derivatives, Gans and Smart (1996) also provide a sufficient condition
for Lemma 4 to hold. In the current model, the requirement is that marginal
rates of substitution between effective enforcement rate and public transfers are






Figure 2: Increasing Marginal Rates of Substitution.
29This makes sure that for any two tax schedules, Lorenz curves do not cross.
20
Lemma 5 (Increasing marginal rates of substitution): Indirect utilities
described in (20) satisfy Spence-Mirrlees condition of type-monotonic marginal
rates of substitution in (e,E[R]) plane for any τ .
Proof: Holding E[R] constant, V (e, τ ; ρ) is differentiable in e at any τ and ρ, due
to differentiability of w(·), h(·) and v(·). It is also differentiable in E[R]. So using
the envelope theorem, marginal rate of substitution between e and E[R] can be
expressed as follows.





[ρ− h(w(e, τ))] , (21)
for e < 1. Differentiating (21) with respect to ρ, one gets the following.
∂
∂ρ









from proposition 2 and lemma 2. If e = 1; α = 0 so ∂L(e,τ)
∂e
= 0 and thus the
marginal rate of substitution between e and E[R] is zero for any ρ. 
All the discussions so far culminate in the following lemma.
Proposition 5 (Electoral outcome): Electoral competition has a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, where both politicians announce and commit to the optimal
penalty rate λm = e
m
pa
− 1 of the median voter and win with 50% chance.
The optimal penalty rate of the median voter will be pinned down by the en-
forcement policy that maximizes her indirect utility. Due to continuity of indirect
utilities in e and compactness of the policy space, such an optimal policy exists
due to Weierstrass’ theorem. In case its not unique (multiple global maxima),
any one of these policies can emerge from the electoral competition.
em ≡ e(ρm) = argmax
e∈[0,1]
V (e, τ ; ρm). (23)
Using the envelope theorem, median’s optimal policy will be characterized by the
following first-order condition as long as em < 1.
∂w(em, τ)
∂e
[ρm − h(w(em, τ))] + ∂E[R(e
m, τ)]
∂e
≤ 0 (= 0 if em > 0). (24)
Notice that any interior maximum requires the enforcement policy to be chosen at
the increasing portion of the expected social transfer curve, because ∂w(em,ρ)/∂e <
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0. If such a portion did not exist than the solution would necessarily be at em = 0.
A too high τ also makes em = 0 and therefore λm = −1 possible. In addition,
em = 1, and thus λm = λ would be a possibility, if no e ∈ [0, 1) were to satisfy
(24) due to, say, τ being set at a too low level with respect to median voter’s
redistributive tastes.
So far, it has been established that any “credibility gap” in the enforcement
regime arises due to political competition among opportunistic local politicians
and that it can be tracked down to median worker’s policy preferences. What
determines those policy preferences? A first fact arises directly as a consequence
of Lemma 3.
Lemma 6 (Increasing credibility gap in audit frequencies): An increase
in the frequency of audits (pa ↑) increases the credibility gap (λ− λm ↑).
The more effort the central government puts into detecting evasion, the more ag-
gressive voters become in pursuing ex post penalty reductions in order to achieve
their preferred effective enforcement rates.
A second fact is ensued by lemma 5. Because marginal rates of substitution
are increasing, a worker with a higher time endowment requires greater social
transfers for a given amount of increase in effective taxation due to stricter en-
forcement. Put differently, as a worker becomes more productive, her marginal
disutility from stricter enforcement (due to lower wages) increases. This should
imply that the credibility gap is increasing in median worker’s productivity.
Proposition 6 (Increasing credibility gap in median productivity):
λ− λm is increasing in ρm.
Proof: Because ∂V (e,τ,ρ)/∂E[R] = 1, (21) implies the following.






for e < 1. From theorem 6 in Milgrom and Shannon (1994), this implies that
V (e, τ ; ρ) is supermodular in (−ρ, e), which, from theorem 4 in Milgrom and
Shannon (1994), implies that the optimal effective enforcement e(ρ) is increasing
in −ρ, i.e. decreasing in ρ. It follows that ∂(λ−λm)/∂ρm > 0.30 
In addition, if e(ρm) = 0 or e(ρm) = 1, then infinitesimal changes in the produc-
30If the problem in (23) have multiple global optima, then supermodularity implies that set of
optimizers are decreasing in strong set order. That is, for ρ > ρ′ let E(ρ), E(ρ′) denote the
set of optimal enforcement policies for ρ and ρ′. Then E(ρ) < E(ρ′) in the sense that the
smallest (largest) element in E(ρ) is smaller than the smallest (largest) element in E(ρ′).
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tivity of the median worker has no effect on the credibility gap. In the former
case, all workers with ρ > ρm prefers full pardon, whereas in the latter case, all
workers with ρ < ρm prefers a fully deterrent enforcement regime with no credi-
bility gap.
At this point, a natural question arises: How does enforcement preferences
respond to changes in the given tax level? Unfortunately, at this level of gen-
erality, it is impossible to answer this question with precision, neither using the
implicit function theorem on (24), nor using a monotone comparative statics
approach as in the above proposition because they both require signs on cross-
partials. However, there is an inherent connection between the given tax policy
and voters’ enforcement demands due to the fact that they both serve the same
redistributive purpose. Next subsection explores this idea further.
2.2.2 Tax policy and enforcement preferences
Consider a hypothetical situation in which local politicians can commit to setting
tax levels and the firm has no evasion technology. Assuming that the increasing
portion of the Laffer curve is active, a marginal increase in the tax level increases
social transfers. This increase is financed in part by the firm, in part by the work-
ers themselves, the extent of which will depend on the tax incidence.31 Whatever
the incidence is, “richer” workers (those having a higher time endowment) end up
losing more relative to poorer workers, which makes redistribution less palatable
for them. In the end, all workers have optimal tax levels reflecting their motiva-
tions to appropriate from the firm and the workers richer then themselves, and
strength of that motivation depends on their marginal losses during this process,
which in turn depends on their productivities.
Now consider the actual situation. For a given tax policy, voters can achieve
more or less redistribution by calling for stricter or looser enforcement, and
marginal changes in the penalty rate will have a similar effect to marginal changes
in the tax level. However, two reasons suggest that having an influence on the
enforcement regime is not a perfect substitute for having a direct influence on
the tax policy. First, the highest effective taxation attainable by influencing en-
forcement is bounded above by the given tax level. This would be relevant if the
labor tax was set at a level lower than median worker’s preferred level. Second,
31More accurately, compared to the perfect competition, monopsonist bears the full tax burden
(net of deadweight losses) because it optimizes w.r.t. wage. However, there is an excess burden
due to increased deadweight loss. The extent to which this is borne by workers is captured
by the marginal loss in labor revenues due to the reduction in wages. This loss reflects not
only the relative elasticities as in perfect competition (a more inelastic labor supply implies
a higher burden for workers), but also the curvature of the labor supply function.
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for lax enforcement to reduce effective taxation, the firm has to engage in tax
evasion by underreporting the number of its employees. Since this involves con-
cealment costs, it creates an additional source for deadweight losses, which must
be partially borne by the workers. This would be especially relevant if the given
tax policy implied an excessive redistribution according to the median worker.
This reasoning hints that if voters were given a chance to influence both tax
and enforcement policies, they would make sure to not bother themselves with
extra costs associated with evasion and instead they would implement their pre-
ferred redistribution scheme by influencing the tax policy alone. This is indeed
the case. Proving it requires two results. First one involves the nature of the
policy trade-off faced by workers and shows the hegemony of wages and trans-
fers when the worker is comparing two policies. It is proven by taking potential
binding labor constraints into account as the result will also be useful in the
last section. Second one is about multidimensional voting and makes sure that
voting on both tax and enforcement policies lead to a cycling-free preference
aggregation, which ensures equilibrium existence for the multidimensional Down-
sian policy competition game. Even though each individual voter might prefer
complete elimination of costs associated with lax enforcement, median voter’s
preferred tax policy would differ from the rest. This difference would imply that
some voters might prefer a policy pair characterized with a weaker enforcement
regime in combination with the median voter’s tax policy, despite the costs asso-
ciated with it. So one cannot readily limit attention to unidimensional policies
just by looking at individual preferences in isolation.
Proposition 7 (Unambiguously Preferred Policies): Consider a worker
with productivity ρ and two policies β and β′ at which the worker supplies
non-zero labor (β ≡ (e, τ)). If w(β′) > w(β) and E[R(β′)] > E[R(β)], then
V (β′; ρ) > V (β; ρ).
Proof: Appendix. 
While this result seems obvious, it should be kept in mind that a policy that
yields both lower wage and transfers also results in higher leisure utility. Yet in
the margin, this extra utility is nullified by the reduction in labor revenues due
to lower labor supply, which is the essence of the (multidimensional) envelope
theorem.
Next, I show that multidimensional voting does not lead to cycling and that
the set of optimal policies for the median worker coincide with bidimensional
Condorcet-winning policies.
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Lemma 7 (Condorcet-winning bidimensional policies): Let βm denote an
optimal tax and enforcement pair for the median worker and β be an arbitrary
suboptimal one. Then βm gets majority support against β.
Proof: From the indirect utility of the median worker, if βm is an optimal choice
for the median, then the following inequality must hold.
v(h(βm)) + E[R(βm)] + w(βm) [ρm − h(βm)]
> v(h(β)) + E[R(β)] + w(β) [ρm − h(β)] .
Rearranging this, one gets the following inequality.
ρm ≷ v(h(β))− v(h(β
m)) + E[R(β)]− E[R(βm)] + w(βm)h(βm)− w(β)h(β)
w(βm)− w(β)
.
It follows that if w(βm) > w(β), then βm wins with the unanimous support of
the workers in [ρm, ρ] and if w(βm) < w(β), βm wins with the unanimous support





Lemma 7, along with proposition 4 implies that a two-policy election would re-
sult in commitment to median worker’s optimal tax and enforcement pair. This
is due to preferences being affine with respect to productivity, a condition called
intermediate preferences by Grandmont (1978). In essence, this allows projecting
the bidimensional policy conflict into a unidimensional space by summarizing it
within a single measure: ρw(β). This measure is monotonically indexed by pro-
ductivities, which allows for the separation argument necessary for establishing
the existence of Condorcet-winners.
I now show that in any Condorcet-winning policy pair, the enforcement regime
should be fully deterrent, i.e. there should be no credibility gap.
Proposition 8 (Fully deterrent enforcement regime under tax setting):
Allowing politicians to commit on both the tax level and penalty rates results
in a fully deterrent enforcement regime, along with a tax level optimal for the
median voter.
Proof: From lemma 7 and proposition 4, the outcome of the election will be
determined by the following problem.
max
(e,τ)∈[0,1]×R+
V (e, τ ; ρm).








(ce, τe) : ce = c(α(e, τ))α(e, τ) &
τe = τ(1− (1− e)α(e, τ)) & (26)
(e, τ) ∈ [0, 1]× R+
}
.
To see that this is indeed the case, just notice that any effect that a pair (e, τ)
has on the indirect utility of a worker operates via its effect on w(·) and E[R(·)].
These are in turn determined by the following.
y′(L) = w(L) + w′(L)L+ τe + ce, (27)
E[R] = τeL. (28)
Any pair (ce, τe) uniquely pins down the labor demand (which determines w(L)),
which in turn (along with τe) determines expected transfers. Yet worker is not
unconstrained in her choice of (ce, τe). First, there is a functional dependence
between them which arises due to concealment costs and firm’s optimal choice
of evasion taking that cost into account. Second, given that functional relation,
choice of (ce, τe) is limited by the allowable range for (e, τ). These are all embed-
ded into the constraint set Γ. Now for a given τe, any ce > 0 would make the
voter worse off by giving him both a lower wage and a lower expected revenue
by reducing employment. This follows from proposition 7. It follows that the
only case where the voter might potentially choose a ce > 0 is if such choice was
required for an otherwise infeasible τe. But there is no such τe, as any τe that is
feasible with ce > 0 can also be chosen by setting ce = 0. This choice corresponds
to setting e = 1, i.e. λ = λ and picking τ ∈ R+ in an unrestricted fashion.
Once the choice of a fully deterrent enforcement regime is established, median
worker’s problem reduces to the following.
max
τ∈R+
Ṽ (1, τ ; ρm). (29)
The choice of τ will influence w(·) and E[R] via two equations.
y′(L) = w(L) + w′(L)L+ τ, (30)
E[R] = τL. (31)
So the environment reduces to a standard political economy setting of redistribu-
tive taxation under no evasion opportunity and full tax collection. Although the
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choice set in (29) is non-compact, it is possible to compactify it. Previously, it
was assumed that limL→0 [y
′(L)− (w′(L)L+ w(L))] > 0. So let τ be the tax level
satisfying limL→0 [y
′(L)− (w′(L)L+ w(L))] = τ . Then the worker would never
choose a τ > τ , hence the choice set is effectively [0, τ ]. So from Weierstrass’
theorem, (29) has a solution. 
Proof of proposition 8 is in essence a revealed preference argument. For any ef-
fective taxation τe, Ṽ (0, τe) > Ṽ (ce, τe) should hold true for any ce > 0. So if
a policy pair (ce, τe) with lax enforcement (and thus with positive concealment
costs, corresponding to (ce, τe)) was picked, (0, τe) should have been infeasible.
But there is no such (0, τe), so full enforcement always prevails. From this result
follows the next corollary.
Corollary 1 (Lax enforcement follows unpopular taxation): If tax level
coincides with median voter’s preferred level under a setting with no evasion,
then fully deterrent enforcement prevails.
Therefore, a political demand for a weak enforcement regime is always associated
with a divergence of tax policy from its no-evasion optimal level for the electorate.
An argument analogous to the one made in proposition 6 establishes that this
optimal level is decreasing in the productivity of the worker. It follows that there
will almost always be some political demand for lax enforcement and the fate
of the local credibility gap will hinge on whether such divergence occurs for the
median voter.
Proposition 8 and its corollary also underlines penalty rate as an imperfect
control for tax policy. Consider some worker with productivity ρ and let τ ∗ denote
her optimal tax policy under no evasion. Suppose τ > τ ∗. Relaxing the enforce-
ment regime from full deterrence (reducing the penalty rate from λ), allows the









But this comes at a cost of partially internalizing the distortion associated with
concealment costs. Although the effect of these costs never dominate the reduc-
tion in effective taxation, they still hinder it to an extent preventing the voter
from reaching her optimal pair (w(τ ∗),E[R(τ ∗)]).32 So the voter’s choice of ex
post penalty rate for a given tax level can be thought as a constrained optimum
32If the worker sets the penalty rate so that τe = τ
∗, then she would still obtain E[R(τ∗)] but
a lower wage due to ce > 0.
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for the underlying redistribution problem.
I now turn attention to the effect of a change in tax level to enforcement
demand. Although the general case with increasing per-unit concealment costs
remains elusive, it is possible to get functional-form free comparative statics un-
der two special cases. This is done by exploiting the limited isomorphism between
e and τe, which offers a tractable framework to map the changes in tax level to
changes in the enforcement demand when the per-employee cost of underreporting
(ce = c(α)α) can be held constant or is linear in α.
2.2.2.1 Costless Evasion
I start by rewriting the optimality condition governing firm’s evasion decision.
c(α) + c′(α)α = τ(1− e). (33)
Suppose that c(α) = 0 for all α. If τ > 0 and e < 1 (λ < λ), then α = 1, i.e the
firm evades all of its tax liabilities, and revenues are collected only if an audit
occurs. Let τm∗ > 0 denote median worker’s preferred tax level under no evasion,
i.e. her solution to the problem in (29). First, suppose that the given tax level
is higher: τ > τm∗. Then the worker would demand a weak enough enforcement




suppose that the given tax level is lower: τ < τm∗. First thing to notice is that
the range of effective tax levels implementable by influencing the enforcement
regime is [0, τ ], as e is relaxed from 1 to 0. There are two possibilities. First,
Ṽ (τ ; ρm) > Ṽ (τe; ρ
m) for any τe ∈ [0, τ). In this case, e = 1. This is possible
if Ṽ (·; ρm) is single peaked in τ or there are local maxima in [0, τ) but they all
yield a lower indirect utility compared to τ . Second, it is possible that there is
a local maximum τm∗∗ ∈ [0, τ) which yields a higher indirect utility compared
to τ . In this case, worker would relax the enforcement regime until she obtains
τe = τ
m∗∗, i.e. e = τ
m∗∗
τ
< 1. Now consider the effect of a small increase in τ to
the enforcement demand e. If e = 1, then it has no effect. If e < 1, then either to
reach the globally optimal tax policy, or to reach the second-best locally optimal
tax policy, worker would further relax the enforcement regime. This discussion is
summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 8 (Costless evasion comparative statics for τ): If there are no
concealment costs, then the credibility gap λ−λm is non-decreasing in τ (strictly
increasing if λm < λ).
So under costless evasion, local enforcement regime weakens in response to in-
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creased taxation.
Next special case considers constant per-unit concealment costs and it still
yields tractable comparative statics. The argument is similar, albeit a little more
complicated.
2.2.2.2 Constant Average Cost of Evasion
Suppose that c(α) = k for all α. Then the firm will engage in full evasion if
τ(1 − e) ≥ k and no evasion otherwise. Again let τm∗ > 0 denote the median
worker’s preferred tax level under no evasion and suppose τ ̸= τm∗. If k > τ ,
then no matter how weak the worker sets the enforcement regime, she can’t get
the firm to evade. In that case, she will be indifferent towards any enforcement
regime. Suppose instead k ≤ τ . First thing to notice is that Ṽ (0, τm∗; ρm) is no
longer obtainable because if the voter gets the firm to evade, she has to face the
lower wage consequences of costly evasion. Second, the strength of enforcement
regime that the worker can set is bounded above by 1− k
τ
. Any e above that, and
the firm ceases to evade. So the range of effective taxation policy under reach
by influencing the enforcement regime and nudging the firm towards evasion is
[0, τ−k]. Also notice that the voter would never set τe = τ−k by letting the firm
evade because that would be equivalent to taxing the firm at a rate τe+ce = τ and
getting E[R] = (τ − k)L in return. Instead, she could set a strong enforcement
regime with e > 1 − k
τ
, making sure that evasion costs are zero, and hence the
firm is still taxed at a rate τ but she is getting E[R] = τL. Now the question is:
is there a τe ∈ (0, τ − k) such that the following holds?
Ṽ (k, τe; ρ
m) > Ṽ (0, τ ; ρm). (34)
If there is not, then the median worker demands an enforcement regime strong
enough to prevent evasion, and ∂e/∂τ = 0. If there is, then denoting it by
τm∗∗k ∈ (0, τ − k), she will set e = τ
m∗∗
k /τ, in which case ∂e/∂τ < 0. This dis-
cussion is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 9 (Constant cost evasion comparative statics for τ): If per-unit
concealment costs are constant, then the credibility gap λ−λm is non-decreasing
in τ (strictly increasing if em < 1− k
τ
).
The intuition behind these two results is clear. As long as the median voter
is picking a weak enforcement regime, she is declaring a preference towards less
redistribution. In the second case, she is even willing to absorb deadweight losses
associated with concealment costs for it. Since an increase in the given tax level
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increases redistribution for the given enforcement policy, she reduces redistribu-
tion by decreasing the penalty rates. The second case is also useful to show the
limited effectiveness of influencing the enforcement regime in compensating the
value loss from being unable to decide on tax policy. The best deal the swing
voter can get by doing so is:
max
{
Ṽ (0, τ ; ρm), max
τe∈[0,τ−k]
Ṽ (k, τe; ρ
m)
}
≤ Ṽ (0, τm∗; ρm). (35)
Unfortunately, the usefulness of this approach runs out of steam once c(α)
start varying continuously with the fraction underreported. Intuitively, lemmas
8 and 9 should still be true in the general case as long as an increase in tax
level translates into more redistribution. If the worker is making an interior
choice for the enforcement regime, she is declaring a preference towards a lower
redistribution compared to the one implied by the imposed tax policy under
no evasion. For this, she is willing to internalize some of the costs associated
with deadweight losses stemming from ce > 0. Her choice also implies that
locally, instead of a slightly higher redistribution and lower costs (a greater e), she
prefers a slightly lower redistribution.33 This can be true only if at that slightly
higher redistribution, marginal utility from lower redistribution dominates the
marginal disutility from higher deadweight losses. Now consider a slight increase
in τ holding the enforcement choice constant. If this implies a slightly higher
redistribution, then the voter should find herself in an analogous situation, willing
to reduce redistribution by relaxing the enforcement regime slightly at the cost of
incurring slightly higher deadweight losses. However, it is no longer clear whether
an increase in τ implies a higher redistribution. Because voters are not choosing




A typical exercise in spatial voting models of policy determination is to show how
the electoral outcome diverges from the outcome that would be picked by a social
planner. Take a standard social welfare function assigning equal weights to each
worker and assume that instead of having a voting outcome, a planner sets the
enforcement regime at the first stage by maximizing that welfare function.34
33 ∂E[R]
∂e > 0 at the optimal enforcement choice and
∂ce
∂e < 0 because
∂α
∂e < 0.
34Note that producer surplus is not included in the welfare objective. This can be justified






v(h(e, τ)) + E[R(e, τ)] +
∫ ρ
ρ
(ρ− h(e, τ))w(e, τ)dF (ρ)
}
. (36)
Assuming an interior solution, the planner’s optimal enforcement policy should
satisfy the following.






where ρ̂ corresponds to the average worker’s productivity. So relative to an egal-
itarian planner outcome, the voting outcome differs to the extent of the produc-
tivity difference between median and average workers. This is a standard result.
From proposition 6, this implies that voting results in a weaker enforcement and
a higher credibility gap under a left skewed distribution (ρm > ρ̂) and a stricter
enforcement and lower credibility gap under a right skewed distribution (ρm < ρ̂)
compared to (36).
However, both of these outcomes are constrained-Pareto efficient, as the me-
dian voter outcome coincides to a planner outcome where the planner simply
maximizes a Benthamite social welfare function putting all the weight to the me-
dian worker. Instead, if the planner had more power, he could obtain a welfare
improvement over both outcomes by implementing an unconstrained Pareto ef-
ficient outcome. To see this, just note that under any social weighting function
G(·), and any given tax level τ̃ , planner’s problem for optimal enforcement can





v(h(e, τ)) + E[R(e, τ)] +
∫ ρ
ρ
(ρ− h(e, τ))w(e, τ)dG(ρ)
}
. (38)
Giving the power of tax-setting to the planner would be equivalent to dropping
the constraint τ = τ̃ , which would unambiguously increase (38), hence the name
unconstrained Pareto efficient.35 From proposition 8, we know that this increase
would stem from the elimination of deadweight losses associated with conceal-
ment costs, as the solution would involve a fully deterrent enforcement regime.
In fact, if the planner had even more power, he could have gone further by adopt-
ing a less distortionary form of taxation. For instance, one possibility would be
to impose a neutral profit tax combined with a fully deterrent enforcement, and
35This improvement in social welfare due to a reallocation from a constrained Pareto efficient
outcome to an unconstrained Pareto efficient outcome does not necessarily correspond to a
Pareto improvement because some workers might end up worse off during the process. Yet,
it is an efficiency gain in the sense that the outcome is no longer at the interior of the utility-
possibilities set (when the set is defined by allowing both e and τ to vary), but on its frontier.
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to redistribute the receipts according to the optimal trade-off between wages and
expected transfers.36
I now turn attention to potentially binding non-negative labor supply con-
straints (equivalently, upward leisure constraints) and their implications for the
preceding analysis.
2.4 Binding Constraints




such that v′(ρ̃) = w.
This is the indifferent worker whose leisure constraint h(w) ≤ ρ just binds and
she supplies no labor at w, i.e. ρ̃ = h(w). Since v(·) is strictly concave, v′(·) is









implies v′(ρ) > w, which implies that the marginal benefit of leisure exceeds its
marginal cost even though all the available time is spent on it. Taking this into




ℓρ(w) dF (ρ) =
∫ ρ
h(w)
(ρ− h(w)) dF (ρ)
= (1− F (h(w))) {E[ρ|h(w) < ρ ≤ ρ]− h(w)} . (39)
From lemma 2, we know that the strict concavity of v(·) implies h′(w) < 0. So
an increase in workers’ wages will increase their labor force participation. Fur-
thermore, it is straightforward to show that the aggregate labor supply is strictly
increasing.
Lemma 10 (Upward monotonicity of total labor supply with binding
constraints): L(w) is continuous, differentiable and L′(w) > 0 with binding
constraints.
Proof: Continuity and differentiability follows from twice continuous differentia-
bility of v(·), which carries over to v−1(·) and smoothness of F . Using Leibniz




h′(w) dF (ρ)− h′(w)(h(w)− h(w))f(h(w))
= −h′(w)(1− F (h(w))) > 0, (40)
where the sign in (40) follows from h′(w) < 0. 
36See Cahuc and Laroque (2014) for optimal taxation in monopsonistic markets.
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Since L(w) is strictly increasing, it is invertible and from the inverse function
theorem, w′(L) > 0. The rest of the analysis covering post-election outcomes
remains the same.37
At the election day, voters choose their optimal policies by maximizing indirect
utilities as usual. But their maximization problems should now take into account









{w(e, τ) [ρ− h] + E[R(e, τ)] + v(h)}
}
. (41)
Proposition 9 (Existence of a maximum): Optimal policy choice problem
described in (41) has a solution.
Proof: Utility function is continuous in (h, e, τ, ρ). Moreover, the correspondence
ρ 7→ [0, ρ] is continuous and compact-valued, so from Berge’s maximum theorem,
V (e, τ ; ρ) is continuous in (e, τ, ρ). Since the policy space is compact ([0, 1]), the
result follows from Weierstrass’ theorem. 
For a given tax level τ , consider the worker with productivity ρ having the
indirect utility described in (41). If v′(ρ) < w(1, τ), then this worker will supply
a positive amount of labor for any e ∈ [0, 1]. If, on the other hand, there exists
some ecρ(τ) ∈ [0, 1] such that v′(ρ) = w(ecρ(τ), τ); then for any e > ecρ(τ), worker
will exit from the labor market, because proposition 2 is still valid and hence w(·)
is decreasing in e.38
Lemma 11 (Comparative statics for the cutoff policy): Suppose that at
the given tax level τ , there exists a cutoff policy ecρ(τ) ∈ [0, 1], above which the
worker with productivity ρ exits the labor market. Then ecρ(τ) is increasing in ρ
and decreasing in τ .
Proof: If such cutoff policy exists, then the following equation should hold at
that policy.
v′(ρ)− w(e, τ) = 0. (42)
37Guaranteeing a unique interior solution for the firm’s problem becomes harder, as h′′(w) > 0
(which implies w′′(L) > 0 assuming no binding constraints), which is obtainable via a sign
restriction to the third derivative of v(·) in the previous case is no longer enough. One also
requires H(h(w)) < h
′′(w)
(h′(w))2 , where H(·) is the hazard rate of F . Yet, as before, this is not a
necessary condition but a rather strong sufficient condition. Moreover, as long as the solution
is interior, previous comparative statics results remain unchanged.





the comparative statics in lemma 11 carry over to λρ(τ).
33
From the implicit function theorem, (42) defines e as a function of ρ and τ on a













where the signs follow from strict concavity of v and proposition 2. 
A worker who is more productive requires a lower wage (and therefore a stricter
enforcement) to exit the labor force. This results from the way the productivity
is specified, which implicitly defines leisure as the “outside option”, the marginal
utility of which falls with productivity at the boundary. Furthermore, an increase
in tax level reduces the prevailing wage. For any worker, this reduces the required
wage reduction for exiting the labor force, which implies that workers would cease
supplying labor at a weaker enforcement regime.
Assuming the existence of a cutoff policy ecρ(τ), (41) can be rewritten to get a
cleaner view of the incentives that might lead a voter to pick a policy that would












E[R(e, τ)] + v(ρ)
}}
. (43)
First, notice that if the worker decides to pick a policy leaving her supplying
zero labor, than that policy should correspond to the enforcement regime that
is maximizing the expected transfers alone. This policy can be at e = 1, but
if it is not in [eρ(τ), 1], then the worker should necessarily pick a slack policy.
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Second, rewrite the first-order condition associated with the first component of
(46), again using the envelope theorem.
∂w(e, τ)
∂e
[ρ− h(w(e, τ))] + ∂E[R(e, τ)]
∂e
≤ 0 (= 0 if em > 0). (44)




, then the solution to (43) neces-




. If there exists an interior solution in(
0, ecρ(τ)
)
, than that can indeed be the optimal policy, but it should be contrasted
39Henceforth, I refer to policies leading to positive (zero) labor supply as slack (binding) policies.
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, if one exists in this set. In any
case, the lower ρ is, the more likely that the voter would pick a binding policy.
This is due to Lemma 11, which implies a smaller range for e before worker’s
constraint starts binding, and the fact that ∂w/∂e < 0 getting multiplied by a
smaller number leaves more scope for (44) being positive. This can be seen as
the logical continuation of the previous result, with higher productivity workers
being more sensitive towards their wages, and lower productivity workers caring
more about transfers.
Under potentially binding constraints, the existence of a Condorcet-winning
policy becomes slightly more involved. To see why this is the case, notice that the
indirect utility of any worker might become non-differentiable with respect to e at
the policy where her leisure constraint starts binding (e = ecρ(τ)). This is because
that policy would likely correspond to a kink in her value function. This implies
that the argument of Gans and Smart (1996), which relies on ordering marginal
rates of substitution at each policy to establish the single-crossing property, runs
into technical problems. At any policy, if the set of voters supplying zero labor
is of non-zero measure, then not only the marginal rate of substitution will be
undefined for the indifferent worker, but marginal rates of substitution will jump
as one moves to a slightly lower productivity. Now even if the median worker
doesn’t pick a binding policy, the policy she picks can leave other voters outside
the labor market. Even if this were not the case, a Condorcet-victory requires
median’s optimal policy to beat every other policy, including policies possibly
binding for others. So at the heart of the complication lies the potential need
to compare binding policies against slack policies and vice versa. The following
proposition shows that despite this complication, median worker’s optimal policy
is a Condorcet-winning policy and thus constitute an electoral outcome.
Proposition 10 (Unidimensional MVT with binding constraints): Let
em denote an optimal effective enforcement rate for the median worker. Then em
is a Condorcet winning policy.
Proof: Appendix. 
Although the proof is long, its intuition is simple. Any policy that leads to some
workers exiting the labor market should divide the productivity interval into two
connected parts, with the left part composed of workers supplying no labor and
vice versa. This threshold is increasing in enforcement rate, because a stricter







Figure 3: Single-Crossing Indifference Curves with Binding Constraints.
Thus for any two workers, not only the more productive worker will have a higher
marginal rate of substitution at any policy where they both supply a positive
amount of labor, but will also require a stricter enforcement before exiting the
labor market. This makes sure that kinks are also ordered in a monotonically
increasing fashion, which ensures that the single-crossing condition is not violated.
Figure 3 provides a demonstration. In fact, a similar argument also holds for the







Figure 4: Optimal enforcement policies with binding constraints.
Proof of proposition 10 reveals some additional facts. First, if a worker with
productivity ρ̃ decides to pick a binding policy, then all workers with ρ < ρ̃ pick
40In that case, zero-leisure kinks would occur at the same policy for all workers.
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binding policies. On the other hand, if ρ̃ picks a slack policy, then all workers with
ρ > ρ̃ pick slack policies. Furthermore, if a worker picks a binding policy, then she
is picking the policy that maximizes expected transfers. On the contrary, optimal
slack policy is type-dependent and strictly decreasing in productivity as long as
it is interior. The missing link in this picture is the ordering between binding
and slack policies. Proposition 11 shows that the optimal binding policy should
be no less than optimal slack policies and figure 4 depicts preferred enforcement
rate as a function of labor productivity.
Proposition 11 (Anatomy of binding and slack policies): Assume a unique
solution for the policy problem and let e∗b(τ) denote the policy that maximizes
expected transfers. A worker with ρ finds e∗b(τ) optimal only if it is a binding
policy for her and if she finds a binding policy optimal, it should be e∗b(τ). Let ρI
denote the highest productivity worker who finds it optimal to pick a binding pol-




into two connected parts, with ρ ≤ ρI picking e∗b(τ)
and ρ > ρI picking slack policies. Furthermore, letting e(τ ; ρ) denote the optimal
policy of a slack policy picker, e∗b(τ) ≥ supρ∈(ρI ,ρ] e(τ ; ρ). Moreover, ∂e(τ ;ρ)/∂ρ < 0
for any ρ ∈ (ρI , ρ]. Finally, e∗b(τ) = ecρI (τ).
Proof: Appendix. 
It follows that the marginal effect of a productivity increase on the credibility
gap will critically depend on the productivity of the median worker, specifically
on whether she prefers a binding or a slack policy. Notice that e∗b(τ) = 1 is pos-
sible (and will be the case if expected transfers are single peaked in e), in which
case if the median had sufficiently low productivity, enforcement regime would
be completely free of political interference.
Corollary 2 (Upward type-monotonicity of the credibility gap with
binding constraints): λ − λm is non-decreasing in ρm. More specifically, let
ρI(τ) be the highest type that would pick a binding policy. If ρ
m < ρI(τ), then
∂(λ−λm)
∂ρm




Corollary 2 is just an extension of proposition 6. In addition, proposition 8 also
holds under potentially binding constraints. To see this, first note that neither
the proof of proposition 7, nor the parts of the proof of proposition 8 establishing
full-deterrence assumed all-slack policies. The only part which assumed labor
force participation by all workers under any policy was lemma 7, which estab-
lished the existence of a Condorcet-winning policy pair under multidimensional
voting.
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Incorporating the constraint into the indirect utility of the worker, a first look
might suggest that multidimensional preference aggregation breaks down under
potentially binding policies.
V (e, τ ; ρ) = v(min {ρ, h(e, τ)}) + E[R(e, τ)] + w(e, τ) (ρ−min {ρ, h(e, τ)}) .
(45)
As can be seen from (45), indirect utility is no longer affine in ρ. Yet, as the fol-
lowing proposition shows, a multidimensional Condorcet-winner exists and cor-
responds to the optimal choice of the median worker.
Proposition 12 (Bidimensional MVT with binding constraints): Let
(em, τm) denote an optimal effective policy pair for the median worker. Then it
is a Condorcet winning policy and em = 1.
Proof: Proposition 8 and appendix. 
The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 10, with few differences arising
from the fact that a marginal rates of substitution ordering argument in the differ-
entiable portions of value functions can no longer be used.41 The intuition behind
the result is slightly more convoluted, but not much more. If one limits attention
to the set of slack policies, then (45) has the intermediacy property, which still
allows projecting the bidimensional conflict into a unidimensional space by sum-
marizing it within a single measure: ρw(e, τ). Holding w constant, this measure
is monotonically indexed in ρ. On the other hand, for each given w, decisions
to pick a binding policy are summarized within a single measure that also varies
monotonically with ρ: ρ − h(w). Finally, holding ρ constant and varying (e, τ)
(the effect of which propagates only through the equilibrium wage) there is a
monotonic relationship between these two measures. This latter monotonicity
makes sure that these two measures act as a single monotonically ordered (in ρ)
measure, which allows projecting the entire policy conflict into a single dimen-
sional space and invoking the necessary separation argument.
It follows that all of the main results are valid under potentially binding
constraints, and that when the voters are given the power to vote over tax pol-
icy, they still choose to eliminate deadweight losses associated with concealment
costs. They then choose their optimal tax level, which can be high enough to
leave some people (including themselves) outside the labor force, living purely off
social transfers.
41In fact proposition 12 implies proposition 10. Yet the proof of proposition 10 itself has the
additional benefit of implying unidimensional type-monotonicity of enforcement choices.
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3 Conclusion
This chapter developed a pre-election politics model of payroll tax enforcement
where the strength of the enforcement regime is undermined by local politicians
responding to their electorate’s redistributive demands by interfering with the
post audit penalty administration process in return for electoral support. The
motivation was to construct a political economy framework to explain the preva-
lence of weak tax enforcement regimes, especially in developing countries, and
the accompanying patterns of widespread evasion and informality. The proposed
mechanism that weakens the enforcement regime is the inability of the fiscal au-
thority to commit to not granting fine reductions or even tax pardons, which
nudges the firm towards more evasion by shortening the stick that it would face
in the event it gets caught. This is a common phenomenon in developing coun-
tries such as Turkey for which the model provides a potential explanation if one
infers that the pre-election pervasiveness of such fine reductions and pardons is
associated with a political bargaining process akin to the one described in this
chapter. Although the model is built around payroll taxes, its essence would
remain intact if one were to consider an alternative form of firm-level taxation,
as long as voters’ livelihoods were at stake and they were facing a similar redis-
tributive trade-off.42
Several conclusions have arisen from the model. First, voter demand for lax
enforcement, and therefore equilibrium tax evasion is increasing in the productiv-
ity of the median voter. This is the familiar “richer voters demand less distribu-
tion” story in disguise. A strengthening of the enforcement regime corresponds to
a higher effective taxation on workers’ labor revenues, therefore those who sup-
ply more effective labor time desires less of it. The implication is that assuming
a common tax level, enforcement regimes faced by firms in polities where gross
labor earnings are higher should be subject to higher credibility gaps, as mea-
sured by the difference between de jure and de facto fine rates. Second, electoral
demand for a weak enforcement regime always arises as a political response to
not being able to influence tax policy. If local politicians were in fact able to
commit on both tax and enforcement policies, then voters would always pick a
fully deterrent enforcement regime and no credibility gap would occur in political
equilibrium. Third, from the perspective of the voters, enforcement policy is an
imperfect control for implementing an optimal redistribution scheme. Not only
42The first version of this chapter was built around a non-neutral profit tax and the results
were similar.
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it can’t be used to increase the effective taxation above the imposed level and
therefore might constrain some voters to a lower redistribution then they would
prefer, it also comes with deadweight losses in case the firm is undertaking a
costly effort to conceal its evasion. Fourth, even though the generality of the
model prevents an inference regarding the effect of an increase in the given tax
level on the enforcement demand, an argument is made that enforcement demand
should be usually non-decreasing in tax level, and it is shown that this is indeed
the case under two special cases. While this might seem counterintuitive at first,
particularly if the tax was set at a level implying a lower-than-optimal redistribu-
tion for the worker, it should be kept in mind that as long as the voter prefers a
weak enforcement regime to a fully deterrent enforcement regime, she is declaring
a preference towards less redistribution than implied by the given tax level. It
follows that a tax increase, particularly if it implies more redistribution, should
imply an even weaker enforcement preference. Finally, it is shown that the re-
sults of the model are robust to allowing for the possibility of workers preferring
policies that would lead some of them to exit the labor market. Corner solutions
are usually avoided in models of redistributive voting.
Policy inferences from models at this level of generality should always be taken
with a grain of salt. Taking the story of the model literally would lead one to
conclude that the best way to solve the problem of politically-weakened enforce-
ment would be to take the path of fiscal disintegration, allowing each polity to set
its own tax policy. However, to come up with such policy recommendation, one
needs to reconsider the problem in a broader framework, integrating wider wel-
fare implications of interregional transfers, spillovers etc. A case can also be made
for stronger centralization of enforcement-related services, as it can be easier for
local politicians to influence the enforcement policy when its administration is
undertaken by a local agency. One can even consider the establishment of an
autonomous tax collection agency subject to some performance metric.43 Again,
these claims should be scrutinized in the context of more comprehensive models
(incorporating agency elements in this case), besides being investigated empiri-
cally.
There are several promising ways to extend the analysis in this chapter. First,
payroll tax evasion usually involves a collusive agreement between an employee
and an employer. The reason for that is, especially in the case of social security
contributions, the identity of the employee whose employment was underreported
43This is one of the standard inclusions to IMF’s blueprint of recommendations to developing
countries. See Crandall (2010).
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matters. This chapter got around that difficulty by assuming anonymous workers
and equal per capita social transfers. While the second assumption is not very
substantial as long as the tax-transfer system is progressive, the first one can
be important because dropping it would imply the emergence of a redistribution
channel from formal workers to informal ones. One way of thinking about this
involves assigning different hourly wages to different workers by specifying a dif-
ferent form of productivity, as well as allocating differing outside opportunities.
Next step can be to consider incentive-compatible (for workers) underreporting
strategies for the firm, e.g. underreporting below a certain productivity level.
An interesting possibility to consider would be the informality of workers with
relatively high productivities due to, say, some form of an incentive compatible
rent-sharing agreement between the firm and workers. This has the potential of
reversing the progressivity of the tax system, and breaking the limited isomor-
phism between enforcement and tax level. Second, the formal burden of payroll
taxes are usually distributed among workers and firms according to legally set
rates and the idea that the legal apportionment of tax burden having an effect
on the enforcement preferences of voters has intuitive appeal. Yet, the model at
its current form would not leave any room for such an effect to operate because
the incidence is fully determined by the shapes of utilities and the production
function. One way of assessing the potential impact of this would be to introduce
bargaining elements in the process of wage determination.44 Third, lobbying can
be an important source of political interference and its effect can act in conjunc-
tion with that of the voting. Thinking in very simple terms, a firm such as the
one in this chapter would always want the weakest possible enforcement regime.
So if it were allowed to effectively lobby, this would introduce a further upward
pressure on the credibility gap. Finally, the model in this chapter studied a single
electorate in isolation and it was assumed that local politicians were able to exer-
cise a perfect influence on the fiscal authority. It is usually the case that different
electoral districts carry different clout levels with the central government. This
would be an important factor in limiting local politicians’ ability to interfere with
the enforcement regime, if such interference required a certain degree of collusion
with the central fiscal authority. Taking this into account would not change much
if the focus remained on a single local electorate, but it would be an additional ex-
planation for cross-regional enforcement variations. A more interesting approach
would be to consider the problem of an incumbent national party who cares about
maximizing the number of local electoral victories by either its own candidates
44See for instance, Chae (2002)
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or candidates who are somehow more aligned with it. The incumbent would be
limited in its ability to arrange such collusion to the extent of its hold in the bu-
reaucracy and by the strength of checks and balances so it would have to behave
selectively. This can, for instance, imply that swing polities, ceteris paribus, are
characterized by weaker enforcement regimes. These possible extensions are left
for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 (Comparative statics for firm’s choices): Due
to continuous differentiability assumptions; the implicit function theorem implies
that (9) and (10) define two continuously differentiable functions L(e, τ) and
e(e, τ) on an open neighbourhood around the given (e, τ). Totally differentiating
the system in (9) and (10) and using the first-order conditions, one obtains the
following. [
y′′(L)− (2w′(L) + w′′(L)L) 0







(1− (1− e)α) dτ + τα de
(1− e) dτ − τ de
]
. (46)
A locally unique interior maximum implies y′′(L) − (2w′(L) + w′′(L)L) < 0 and


























where the signs follow straightforwardly. 
Proof of Proposition 7 (Unambiguously Preferred Policies): Think of β
as a pair of enforcement policy and tax level: (e, τ). The total change in the
indirect utility of the worker with productivity ρ resulting from a policy change
of β to β′ can be expressed as follows.
V (β′; ρ)− V (β; ρ) =
∫
χ





ℓρ(β̃)∇w(β̃) · dβ̃ +
∫
χ
∇E[R(β̃)] · dβ̃, (48)
where the first line follows from the fundamental theorem of line integrals and the
second line follows from the envelope theorem. χ represents a smooth oriented
curve starting at β and ending at β′. Now let κ : [a, b] → χ denote an arbitrary
bijective parametrization of χ with κ(a) = β and κ(b) = β′. (48) can be rewritten





∇E[R(β̃)] · dβ̃. (49)
Using the mean value theorem for integrals and fundamental theorems of calculus
and line integrals, this can be rewritten as follows.
ℓ(β′′) [w(β′)− w(β)] + [E[R(β′)]− E[R(β)]] > 0, (50)
where 0 < ℓρ(β
′′) < ρ is the individual labor supply (ρ − h(β′′)) at some policy
on the path χ. It follows that V (β′; ρ) > V (β; ρ).
Implicit in this argument is the existence of a smooth curve χ joining β and
β′, on which the value function is continuously differentiable everywhere. This is
true for the single dimensional case, because there is a cutoff wage below which
a worker with endowment ρ does not supply any labor. Given that the wage
decreases monotonically with e, this implies a cutoff e above which the worker ρ
doesn’t work. This means that any enforcement policy in-between two enforce-
ment policies where the endowment constraint is slack is a slack policy itself,
and differentiability is an issue only at the policies at which the labor constraint
just starts binding. It is also true for the multidimensional case. To see this,
just notice that the wage decreases monotonically both in τ and e. This implies
that on the (e, τ) space ([0, 1] × R+), for each ρ, there exists a decreasing locus
of policies, with slack policies lying below it and binding policies lying above it.
This implies that the space of slack policies for each worker is path-connected. 
Proof of Proposition 10 (Unidimensional MVT with binding constraints):
Proof is by exhaustion. Let em denote the optimal effective enforcement rate of
the median voter.
1. Suppose that em is a binding policy for the median. This implies ρm ≤
h(em) ≡ h(w(em)) and therefore everybody with ρ ≤ h(em) (including the me-
dian) spends all their available times in leisure, i.e. hρ(e
m) = ρ for all ρ ≤ h(em).
Hence, they constitute a majority. This also implies that expected transfers are
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maximized at em because once the leisure constraint becomes binding, the only
consideration is expected transfers.
First, pick any e′ > em. Then w(e′) < w(em) and thus h(e′) > h(em), which im-
plies more people would end up with binding constraints. All voters whose con-
straints were previously binding would still have binding constraints and therefore
pick em; the revenue maximizing policy. Since they constitute a majority, e′ gets
beaten.
Next, pick any e′ < em. There are two cases two consider. First, if ρm ≤ h(e′) <
h(em), then the above argument still holds and e′ gets beaten by voters whose
constraints are binding under both policies. Second, consider the case where




have binding constraints under both policies
so they pick em. On the other hand, voters who are in [h(e′), ρm) have binding
constraints under em but supply a positive amount of labor under e′. These would
support em only if the following inequality held.
E[R(em)] + v(ρ) ≥ E[R(e′)] + v(h(e′)) + w(e′)(ρ− h(e′)). (51)
We know from median voter’s optimal choice that the following holds.
E[R(em)] + v(ρm) ≥ E[R(e′)] + v(h(e′)) + w(e′)(ρm − h(e′)). (52)
(51) would imply (52) for all ρ ∈ [h(e′), ρm) if the following condition was satisfied.
v(ρm)− v(ρ) ≤ w(e′)(ρm − ρ). (53)






≤ v′(h(e′)) = w(e′), (54)
where the final equality follows from the fact that h(e′) is the worker just at the
corner. So all ρ ∈ [h(e′), ρm) prefers em over e′ and em wins.
2. Suppose that em is a slack policy for the median. This implies h(em) < ρm.
First, pick any e′ > em. If h(e′) ≤ h(em); then e′ gets beaten by the votes of
every worker to the right of the median. This is because the value functions of
all to the right are differentiable for any e ∈ [h(e′), h(em)] as these are workers
who make interior choices in that range. This implies that their marginal rates of
substitution exist and are ordered in an increasing fashion, which we know implies
that if a worker with a lower type (ρm) picks a lower policy (em), then all workers
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to the right of that worker picks that lower policy as well. Now suppose instead
h(e′) > ρm. Consider first the workers in (ρ
m, h(e′)]. From median’s choice, we
know that the following inequality holds.
v(h(em)) + E[R(em)] + w(em)(ρm − h(em)) ≥ v(ρm) + E[R(e′)]. (55)
For a unanimous political support at this range, we need the following inequality
to hold for any ρ ∈ (ρm, h(e′)]:
v(h(em)) + E[R(em)] + w(em)(ρ− h(em)) ≥ v(ρ) + E[R(e′)]. (56)
This inequality holds for the relevant range as the following sufficient condition
(which makes sure that (55) implies (56)) is implied by concavity of v(·) and
optimality of leisure choices.
v(ρ)− v(ρm)
ρ− ρm
≤ v′(ρm) = w(em); ∀ρ ∈ (ρm, h(e′)] . (57)
Next, consider workers in (h(e′), ρ]. Since they are making interior choices under
both policies, they would pick e′ if the following inequality held.
v(h(em)) + E[R(em)] + w(em)(ρ− h(em))
≥ v(h(e′)) + E[R(e′)] + w(e′)(ρ− h(e′)). (58)
Let ϵ > 0 be an arbitrarily small number. Because w(em) > w(e′), evaluating (58)
at the indifferent type h(e′) and adding w(em)ϵ and w(e′)ϵ to left and right-hand
sides respectively, we get the following.
v(h(em)) + E[R(em)]+w(em)(h(e′) + ϵ− h(em))
≥ v(h(e′)) + E[R(e′)] + w(e′)(h(e′) + ϵ− h(e′)). (59)
Since the voter within an epsilonic distance to the right picks em over e′ and since
all the value functions are differentiable at any ρ ∈ [h(e′) + ϵ, ρ], one can invoke
the marginal rates of substitution ranking argument and the fact that ϵ > 0 was
arbitrary to conclude that all workers in (h(e′), ρ] would support em over e′. This
proves that em beats e′ with the support of all voters to the right of the median.





. These have binding constraints under both policies and
therefore pick em because E[R(em)] > E[R(e′)] (see proposition 7). Next, consider
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workers in (h(em), ρm). These workers have slack constraints under both policies
and differentiable value functions at any e ∈ [e′, em]. Hence, increasing marginal
rates of substitution makes sure that they pick em over e′. Finally, consider the
workers on (h(e′), h(em)]. These are workers with binding constraints under em
and slack constraints under e′. From the above argument, we know that for any
ϵ > 0, the following holds.
v(h(em)) + E[R(em)] + w(em)(h(em) + ϵ− h(em))
> v(h(e′)) + E[R(e′)] + w(e′)(h(em) + ϵ− h(e′)). (60)
Since ϵ > 0 was arbitrary and since w(e′) > w(em), it follows that the following
inequality holds as well.
v(h(em)) + E[R(em)] + w(em)(h(em)− h(em)) = v(h(em)) + E[R(em)]
≥ v(h(e′)) + E[R(e′)] + w(e′)(h(em)− h(e′)). (61)







Now, using concavity of v(·) and the fact that E[R(em)] > E[R(e′)], the following







Upon rearranging, (63) becomes:
v(ρ) + E[R(em)] ≥ v(h(e′)) + E[R(e′)] + w(e′)(ρ− h(e′)). (64)
It follows that em gets the support of all ρ ∈ (h(e′), h(em)] and beats e′ by the
unanimous support of all voters to the left of the median. Since all possibilities
are exhausted, the proof is complete. 
Proof of Proposition 11 (Anatomy of binding and slack policies): If
a worker with ρ finds a binding policy optimal, then she is not receiving any
wages, so the policy she picks must maximize expected revenues, which is what
e∗b(τ) does. If she finds e
∗
b(τ) optimal but this is a slack policy for her, then
∂E[R(e∗b (τ),τ)]/∂e = 0, so (44) is strictly negative, contradiction. ρ > ρI pick-
ing slack policies follows from the definition of ρI and ρ ≤ ρI picking e∗b(τ)
46
follows from the proof of proposition 10. Suppose e∗b(τ) < supρ∈(ρI ,ρ] e(τ ; ρ).
Then from proposition 7, any slack policy picker in (ρI , ρ] would be better off
picking e∗b(τ), because this is a slack policy for her (by definition of ρI), a
contradiction. Pick any ρ ∈ (ρI , ρ], then V (e, ρ; τ) is differentiable in e so
∂e(τ ;ρ)/∂ρ < 0 follows from proposition 6. Finally, suppose ecρI (τ) > e
∗
b(τ). Then
e∗b(τ) is a slack policy for ρI , contradiction. Suppose instead e
c
ρI
(τ) < e∗b(τ). Let
e∗(τ ; ρ) denote the optimal policy for any worker. Then e∗(τ ; ρI) = e
∗
b(τ), so
e∗(τ ; ρI) − ecρI (τ) > 0. e
c
ρI
(τ) is continuous from lemma 11 and e∗(τ ; ρI) is con-
tinuous in ρ from Berge’s maximum theorem, so one can find a sufficiently small
ϵ > 0 such that e∗(τ ; ρI + ϵ) − ecρI+ϵ(τ) > 0.
45 But this is a contradiction, as
e∗(τ ; ρI + ϵ) should be a slack policy for ρI + ϵ. 
Proof of Proposition 12 (Bidimensional MVT with binding constraints):
Proof is again by exhaustion and similar to the unidimensional case. Few differ-
ences arise because marginal rates of substitution ordering argument is no longer
valid. Let βm ≡ (em, τm) be the optimal policy pair for the median voter.
1. Suppose βm is a policy under which median voter’s constraint binds. This
implies ρm ≤ h(βm). Pick any alternative β ′ .
First, suppose that β
′
produces a corner solution for the median. Since expected
transfers are maximized under βm, all workers to the left of the median prefer
βm because they all have binding constraints under both policies.
Second, suppose that β
′
produces an interior solution for the median. Then we
must have h(β
′






. These are the
workers with binding constraints under both policies and therefore pick βm. Now






. They would support βm if the following







v(ρ) + E[R(βm)] ≥ v(ρ) + E[R(β ′)] + w(β ′)(ρ− h(β ′)). (65)
Median voter’s revealed preference would imply (65) if the following held for all
ρ in the relevant range.
v(ρm)− v(ρ) ≤ w(β ′)(ρm − ρ) (66)










45Because ρ 7→ [0, 1] is a continuous and compact-valued correspondence and V (e, τ ; ρ) is con-
tinuous, the solution correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. Any single-valued upper hemi-






ρm − h(β ′)
≤ v′(h(β ′)) = w(β ′). (67)
It follows that βm beats β
′
with the unanimous support of all voters to the left
of the median.
2. Suppose that median’s constraint is slack at βm. This implies h(βm) < ρm.
Pick an alternative β
′
.
First, suppose that h(βm) ≤ h(β ′) < ρm. Since the median and every worker to
the right of the median have slack constraints under both policies, intermediacy
of preferences within that range implies that βm beats β
′
with the support of the
right.









. These workers would choose βm if the following condition held.
v(h(βm)) + E[R(βm)] + w(βm)(ρ− h(βm)) ≥ v(ρ) + E[R(β ′)]. (68)
Given median’s revealed preference, this condition is implied by the following.
v(ρ)− v(ρm) ≤ w(βm)(ρ− ρm). (69)




≤ v′(ρm) = w(βm). (70)






. Even though median voter’s constraint binds
under β
′
, the following must still be true:
v(h(βm)) + E[R(βm)]+w(βm)(ρm − h(βm))
≥ v(h(β ′)) + E[R(β ′)] + w(β ′)(ρm − h(β ′)). (71)
To see this, just note that the following describes median voter’s optimization
problem given that she has chosen a policy where she supplies non-zero labor.
max
β∈R+×[0,1]
V (β; ρm) = v(h(β)) + E[R(β)] + w(β)(ρm − h(β))
s.t. h(β) ≤ ρm. (72)
If (71) didn’t hold, then the constraint in (72) should have been binding and
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βm should have been yielding a binding policy for the median. Moreover, since
w(βm) > w(β
′
); I can add w(βm)(ρ−ρm) to the left-hand side and w(β ′)(ρ−ρm)
to the right-hand side of (71) to obtain:
v(h(βm)) + E[R(βm)]+w(βm)(ρ− h(βm))
≥ v(h(β ′)) + E[R(β ′)] + w(β ′)(ρ− h(β ′)), (73)






. It follows that βm beats β
′
with the unanimous support
of all voters to the right of median.
Finally, suppose h(β
′
) < h(βm) < ρm. Since this implies w(β
′
) > w(βm), from





, whose constraints are binding under both policies, pick βm over β
′
.
Moreover, since workers in (h(βm), ρm] have slack constraints under both poli-
cies, from the intermediacy of preferences under such situation and the fact that
w(βm) < w(β
′
), these prefer βm as well. Finally, a concavity argument analogous
to the one made in the proof of the unidimensional case shows that βm is sup-






and thus beats β
′
by the unanimous support
of all workers to the left of the median. Since all possibilities are exhausted, the
proof is complete. 
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Chapter 2: A Sleeping Beauty - Media Strength
and Politician Selection
Abstract
This chapter develops a signalling game of pure adverse selection with
costly political participation, rational voters and an altruistically benevo-
lent media having a costly and imperfect technology of investigation for a
dual purpose: to understand political selection effects of a stronger media
and to assess the impact of improvements in media’s technology on the
intensity of its journalistic activities. Two results stand out. First, im-
provements in investigation costs and journalistic strength reduce adverse
selection by increasing media’s threat of exposing low quality challengers.
Second, while reductions in investigation costs always lead the media to
be more active in equilibrium, strength gains can lead to increasing media
passivity, especially if its investigative technology is already strong relative
to the extent of potential adverse selection. This last result underlines
a possible “paradox” of good journalism: if the media is already posing a
strong threat of exposure, then it does not need to use it as often to achieve
the desired outcome.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Summary
The well functioning of a democracy hinges on its ability to establish two types of
institutions: those that provide proper incentives to make sure that those who get
in power govern properly once they are in power, and those that allow its citizens
to choose the most willing and able. The former refers to the problem of moral
hazard and the importance of accountability.1 The latter refers to the importance
of selection. Notice the distinction between “willing” and “able”. As noted by
Besley (2006), this distinction goes (at least) back to the ideas of Madison in The
1Accountability can be supplied via many channels. Two obvious examples are (informed)
voting and checks and balances.
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Federalist Papers (“virtue” and “wisdom”), and embodies the implicit assump-
tion that agents possess or lack intrinsic moral characteristics which make them
more or less suitable for public service. There is also a tradition going back to
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) arguing that morality issues are in essence incen-
tive issues and selection concerns should focus exclusively on the ability of agents.
This chapter deals with selection in this ability/competence sense. Although the
job definition of a politician is usually not as straightforward as a job definition
of a firm employee, I assume that there is a summary statistic that translates to
better public service (in my case, higher public good), reflecting the quality of a
politician.2
Politician selection may depend on many factors: organization of political
parties, size of government, degree of political competition, public remuneration,
etc. For example, Besley (2004) and Caselli and Morelli (2004) show that a com-
bination of fixed public pay and performance-contingent outside options can lead
to a particularly toxic form of adverse selection by excluding high quality people
and only attracting low quality candidates to political life. This sort of selection
issues can be mitigated by interventions such as allowing for moonlighting, or
they might simply not arise in a threatening form due to factors such as imper-
fect substitutability of private/public sector skill sets, or already-availability of
a politician class accommodating a wide range of skills with a sufficiently strong
stake in the quality of public services. A second sort of selection issue can appear
in the form of non-excludability of low quality politicians, particularly if non-
public service related office benefits/rents are high compared to costs of political
participation. This is the setting considered in this chapter and it is when the
media can shine as the fourth estate. By providing valuable screening services
too costly to be undertaken at an individual level, media can help with elections
to operate as “filters” as termed by Cooter (2003).
In case the media assumes the role of screening for low quality politicians, it
can use a variety of tools to acquire and disseminate office-relevant information
about a candidate. For instance, it can use its contacts or reporters to acquire
background information or track record for a candidate, or obtain informed opin-
ions about candidates using its network of political experts.3 Regarding dissem-
2There is some evidence supporting this. For instance, Congleton and Zhang (2013) estimate
a statistically significant and positive impact of US presidents’ human capital on economic
growth.
3For example, a candidate in a mayoral election might have previously served as a public official
in some state institution or as a provincial governor in a relatively small polity. Even if the
candidate is previously untried in public service, media can retrieve performance relevant in-
formation such as education or assess the candidate’s competence via phone interviews and/or
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ination, it can produce news shows contrasting the candidate(s) and possibly a
relatively better known incumbent or even arrange an interview with the goal
of “exposing” the incompetence of a candidate.4,5 When combined with costly
electoral participation, this sort of media screening can improve selection by dis-
couraging low quality politicians from running for office, as an increased likelihood
of being exposed would reduce their chance of an electoral victory. On the other
hand, the media would usually be limited by the strength of its journalistic re-
sources in discovering such office-relevant information. Furthermore, when the
idea of a media outlet providing this sort of service is taken to its logical extrem-
ity, say, an altruistic agent who exclusively cares about the welfare of its fellow
citizens and thus acts as the “extended arm” of voters, a hypothetical possibility
appears. If the media becomes sufficiently strong in its ability to sort out the
good apples from the bad apples, then the mere threat of exposure can be enough
to deter incompetent candidates from political entry without requiring media to
engage (as) actively in political journalism. This argument can also be extended
to situations involving more than selection issues and can even be considered
as a complementary explanation for the commonly perceived decline in political
journalism in the West.6
To bring these ideas together, this chapter builds a signalling model com-
bining costly electoral participation, endogenous media investigation and voting.
It is a pure adverse selection model, so there are no pre-election ideological or
post-election policy-wise differences. The outcome of the election is a public
good, the quantity of which is assumed to be increasing in the competence of
the office holder. As such, the model should be interpreted as reflecting elections
where competence is the (almost) only concern (e.g. mayoral elections), or as
approximating political environments where competence is one of the primary
concerns.7 The setting features a single candidate whose quality (competence)
experts judging the coherence of the candidate’s project proposals and arguments.
4Of course, being able to disseminate such information requires an electorate that has a rela-
tively unhindered access to mediums of dissemination (TV, newspapers, etc.) and a certain
level of public trust to the media outlet in question. The former can in fact be an alternative
interpretation for media strength (which is mainly used as capturing media’s investigation
powers in this chapter) as discussed in footnote 18. The latter problem is swept aside by the
assumption of an altruistic media and the common knowledge of this fact, but should no doubt
constitute one of the next steps in extending the analysis.
5For particularly humorous examples of incompetence exposure via interviews, see the TV series
Newsroom, especially episodes concerning Tea Party.
6See for instance Lloyd and Toogood (2014).
7Of course ideological differences can play a large role in undermining selection and create all
sorts of problems leading to media bias. This dimension is ignored for the sake of tractability
and sharpening the main point of the chapter. See the models of Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita (2008) and Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn (2008), which are discussed in the next
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is private information, who decides whether to challenge an incumbent (whose
quality is commonly known) by paying participation costs and who cares about
the public good as well as office rents; a “watchdog” media which can undertake
a costly investigation that may or may not reveal the challenger’s quality before
the elections; and a set of voters rational in their beliefs and interested in electing
the most competent politician. Note that the incumbent is not actually a player
but simply a payoff parameter. The model is presented in more detail at the be-
ginning of section 2 but some of the modelling assumptions are worth going over.
The existence of an incumbent as described above serves three purposes. First,
it captures the idea that in elections, it is usually the case that there is a well-
known incumbent who faces competition from a relatively less known challenger
for whom electoral participation at least involves the initial PR costs. Second, it
makes sure that the office never remains empty.8 Third, it provides a reference
point which allows an intuitive characterization of the consequences of adverse
selection. Allowing only for a single candidate challenging against the incumbent
simplifies the presentation and the model can easily be extended to incorporate
multiple candidates as explained subsequently.9 The choice of an altruistic media
with limited investigation powers provides a simple framework for studying selec-
tion effects of a stronger media, as well as emphasizing the hypothetical possibility
outlined in the previous paragraph. Finally, allowing voters to be sophisticated
in their beliefs (in a Bayesian sense) serves the dual purpose of underlining the
relevance of media in selection even when the voters do a relatively good job in
it by modifying their voting strategies, and preempting potential criticisms con-
cerning irrational voters. As discussed before concluding, this assumption can
indeed imply too much voter rationality, but dropping it would only increase the
relevance of media selection as well as leaving the conclusions qualitatively intact.
The chapter has two main results. First, whenever adverse selection is present,
an improvement in media’s information technology, whether it involves cost re-
ductions or gains in investigation strength, always (weakly) improves selection
by increasing the minimum quality of an equilibrium challenger. Basically, when
voters are rational in their beliefs, media’s task becomes sparing voters from a
retrospective mistake of electing an inferior challenger, and as the threat of expo-
subsection.
8Since the sender is signalling by challenging or not, this is a possibility if there is no default
incumbent. An election with no contestants should be rare but uncontested incumbents can
occur from time to time, e.g. Wrighton and Squire (1997) document that it is especially
common in US House elections.
9For a more thorough discussion of the assumptions including how they could be relaxed and
how would their modification affect the results, see pages 117-119 before the conclusion.
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sure becomes strong, the more reluctant inferior candidates become to challenge.
Second, while cost reductions always make the media more likely to engage in
political journalism, a gain in investigative strength has a non-monotonic effect
on journalistic activity in equilibrium, reducing it if the media is already rel-
atively strong. Yet, this decrease never becomes strong enough to undermine
media’s deterrence. This is in line with the previous discussion and underlines
the possibility that even if the media appears “asleep”, it can still be doing its
job.
1.2 Previous Literature and Contribution
This chapter stands at the intersection of two distinct but somehow interwoven
strands of literature: political economy of mass media and political selection. I
start with the former, which can be roughly divided into three substrands: cap-
ture, coverage and slant.10
Capture literature deals with consequences of manipulation attempts to me-
dia’s information stream by other actors using incentive tools such as bribes or
threats. The most famous paper in this literature is by Besley and Prat (2006).
Their model is a pure adverse selection one with a politician being either good or
bad in the productivity sense. There are multiple symmetrically informed media
outlets which (all at once) can receive a perfectly informative signal about the
incumbent with some probability, only if the incumbent is bad. This probability
is analogous to media’s investigation strength in this chapter, albeit media in-
vestigation occurs automatically and costlessly in their model. If media outlets
observe the signal, they receive a bribe offer from the incumbent. They than ei-
ther suppress the signal in return for bribes, or transmit it to voters in return for
journalistic benefits which are decreasing in the number of media outlets. This is
followed by voters either retaining the incumbent, or replacing him with a random
politician drawn from a readily available pool. Their results indicate that while
selection is improved with media strength, possibility of capture is independent
of it and rather depends on the relative magnitudes of office rents and journalistic
benefits. More precisely, an improvement in media strength improves selection
only if the media is not captured and media won’t be captured if office rents don’t
cover the necessary amount for bribing the entire industry. This allows them to
conclude that a more pluralistic media industry is harder to capture, and thus
it is beneficial for selection. Other than obvious differences in media’s motives
and possibility of bribes, there are two important differences between their model
10Prat and Strömberg (2011) provide a thorough survey for this literature.
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and the model in this chapter. First, information acquisition is not contingent
on media’s decision and there is no signalling by politicians to guide this decision
if it were. Second, selection occurs at the incumbency level once the politician
is in the office, i.e. media determines ex post selection.11 Corneo (2006) devises
a model where capture can originate from an heterogenous electorate which con-
sists of agents differing in their ownership shares for some efficiency-enhancing
prospective public project, the initiation of which depends on a voting outcome.
Media can either be opportunistic or idealistic, and is privately informed about
the social costs (externalities) associated with this project. If it turns out to
be opportunistic, it can then collude with a subset of voters in a rent-sharing
deal to manipulate public beliefs. It can do so despite the rationality of voter
beliefs due to uncertainty regarding its type. His results indicate that a higher
wealth (ownership share) concentration can facilitate media capture, but this can
be welfare-enhancing depending on the initial wealth distribution. While quite
different in its focus, his depiction of the media is quite similar to the one in this
chapter, in that it shares a common concern (payoff) with voters. In fact, when
their media is an idealist, its incentives are analogous. Petrova (2008) studies a
very similar problem (inequality and capture) in the context of taxation. Instead
of a matching based collusion initiated by an opportunistic media, she takes a
lobbying approach where rich voters can coalesce to buy the media off. One inter-
esting result she derives is that an electorate with an easier access to media can
decrease media freedom by increasing the likelihood of capture. In a more recent
paper, Gehlbach and Sonin (2014) study government capture for a mobilization
purpose in the context of an autocratic regime with a monopolistic media as in
Besley and Prat (2006), i.e. caring about journalistic benefits (advertisement
revenues) and government “contributions”. A captured media manipulates (mo-
bilizes) an electorate by misreporting the state of nature to nudge it towards a
certain action. They show that while a stronger mobilization motive can encour-
age the government towards following a more aggressive capture strategy, higher
journalistic benefits can incentivize it to nationalize the media altogether.
There are also papers that study how voters’ ability to monitor elected offi-
cials and therefore political outcomes respond to media coverage, assuming that
the latter is governed by market dynamics. Prat and Strömberg (2005) combine
11Political selection may originate from two mechanisms: ex post selection, i.e. the process by
which politicians are evaluated once they are in the office and retained or replaced as seems
fit, or ex ante selection, referring to the elimination of subpar candidates at the election stage,
or even inducement of self-selection upon them so that they don’t run for office in the first
place. So far, the literature on the political economy of mass media have exclusively focused
on selection in the former sense and this chapter is about the latter.
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a probabilistic voting model featuring an informed/uninformed voter dichotomy
with an industrial organization approach assuming a monopolistic media endowed
with an increasing returns technology. Voters are segregated into multiple groups
and they can be targeted with public goods using a combination of group transfers
and group-specific politician abilities. Media (a newspaper) decides on how much
coverage to allocate across different issues (group transfers) basing on certain
group characteristics. Voters can purchase the newspaper to find out (stochas-
tically) about the amount of transfers they received, and the probability of this
is increasing in media’s coverage. This allows them to update their beliefs on
incumbent’s competence regarding their own group, which determines their de-
cision to retain or replace the incumbent with a random untried candidate. This
setting allows them to deduce a wide array of predictions, among which the most
important are: larger groups and groups consisting of voters more valuable to ad-
vertisers receive more coverage to their issues, which makes the incumbent more
accountable towards these groups.
Finally, several studies deal with political consequences of ideological bias in
media, also called media slant to underline the distinction from settings where
the bias in reporting arises due to some form of capture and favours a specific
group. Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn (2008) study a model where such bias
arises due to polarization in audience preferences: they assume that leftist voters
like to receive positive news about left-wing politicians and negative news about
right-wing ones, and vice versa. They assume that there exists two media outlets
operating in left and right markets respectively and show that profit maximizing
behaviour lead them to suppress negative facts about politicians associated with
their respective markets, where the politicians differ along an intrinsic corruption
dimension. Voters, despite being ideologically biased towards the kind of news
they receive, care about corruption regardless of ideology and can deduce the
nature of media’s suppression. This leads them to rationally disregard media
suppression and expect the politician to be as corrupt as the average politician.
Their results indicate that this sort of demand-driven slant can negatively affect
selection: a candidate more corrupt than average can be elected and a candidate
less corrupt than average may fail to get elected due to their ideological labels.
Duggan and Martinelli (2011) take a supply-side approach to media slant. There
is an incumbent with a known policy position and a challenger whose policy
stance is unknown. Policy positions are pairs of public good levels and tax rates,
and they are taken as fixed. Their focus is on media’s problem, which provides
information to its audience on challenger’s position by projecting it onto a single
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dimensional space. This captures the idea of cognitive limitations on readers’
front which necessitates the media to transmit the news in an easily digestible
form. The way it does the projection (specifically, its slope) represents media
slant, which is optimally determined (from media’s perspective) depending on
whether the media is pro-incumbent or pro-challenger. While media’s strategy
does not have any selection or accountability effects due to politician behaviour
being exogenous, it still have welfare consequences because it affects voter deci-
sions. In particular, they show that a partisan media may be better for voters
compared to an objective one.
Regarding political selection, earlier models focus on ex post selection and
assume that candidates are passive players, fulfilling the role of an exogenous
outside option for voters.12 Banks and Sundaram (1990) consider an infinitely
repeated game of elections with quality-heterogenous politicians where the politi-
cian in the office produces an output at each period.13 Output is stochastic and
only depends on politician’s type which takes values from a finite set, i.e. incum-
bents do not act. At each period, a representative voter decides whether to retain
the incumbent or replace him with a randomly chosen challenger basing on the
history of incumbent’s output realization. They show that voter’s optimal pol-
icy is belief-stationary, and that it is characterized by a cutoff rule representing
the output level at which the voter is indifferent between retaining and replacing
the incumbent. Cutoff rules based on voter indifference are a common theme
in selection literature and holds in this chapter as well unless the media is ac-
tive in equilibrium, in which case voters strictly prefer replacing the incumbent.
This emphasizes the welfare benefits (from voters’ perspective) of having a media
caring about selection. Coate and Morris (1995) consider a two-period model
combining elements of moral hazard and adverse selection to study the problem
of inefficient transfers to special interest groups. Their politicians can either be
good or bad, where the former only cares about voters and the latter cares about
the special interest group more than they care about voters. There is a single
project financed by tax receipts which generate a net public benefit in the good
state of the world and a net loss in the bad state. The project generates benefits
for the special interest in both states so it represents an inefficient transfer from
voters to the special interest group in the bad state. Politicians not only have
private information about their own types, but also about the probabilities of
these states and this latter introduces a moral hazard aspect to their model. In
12See Besley (2005) for a decent survey of this literature.
13They also build a two-period model combining selection and moral hazard in Banks and
Sundaram (1998) exhibiting similar results.
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addition, voters possess initial reputations (priors) about politicians and they can
update these for the incumbent but not for the challenger. Although their main
focus is accountability, i.e. the disciplining effect induced by voters’ reelection
rules to the behaviour of the bad incumbent, their results have selection implica-
tions. In particular, they show that if challenger’s reputation is high relative to
incumbent’s initial reputation, voters replace bad incumbents more often despite
the disciplining effect improving bad incumbents’ behaviour to a certain extent.
However, taking reputation priors as given, their approach still treats challengers
as exogenous outside options.
The first steps towards endogenizing the outside option posed by challengers
came from Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). Dubbed
citizen-candidate models, they endogenize political entry by studying the prob-
lem of citizens who can either stay out of politics and vote, or run for office and
implement their favourite policies as well as receive office benefits in case they
win. Their main concern is to endogenize the number of candidates competing in
equilibrium. So in both papers, all citizens are allowed to run for office and the
heterogeneity is along the policy-preference dimension. A common simplification
made when applying the citizen-candidate framework to selection problems is to
limit potential challengers to a subset of the electorate (the politician class). One
of the first such applications is made by Besley (2004), who considers a model of
political entry intending to capture the first sort of selection issue mentioned in the
previous subsection (i.e. exclusion of good candidates). In his setting, politicians
differ in two dimensions: morality (corrupt/honest, or in Besley’s terms “disso-
nant” and “congruent”), and opportunity costs (foregone private sector wages).
There is a continuum of both corrupt and honest potential challengers and elec-
toral participation is costless, besides the foregone private sector wage which is
a concern only if the challenger wins. Winner is assumed to be determined by
a random selection among the pool of participants in case voters decide to re-
place the incumbent. Since challenging is costless, politicians challenge if their
expected office benefits exceed their opportunity costs. Former consist of public
wages for both types and rents on top of those for corrupt types. As a result, the
opportunity cost above which politicians do not challenge is higher for corrupt
types. This implies that if morality does not influence private sector productivi-
ties, then a larger fraction of corrupt politicians will challenge. Consequently, an
increase in politician wages improves average honesty of the challenger pool, with
the improvement being stronger if the population distribution initially favours
honesty. Besley (2004) also considers an extension by adding a political compe-
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tence dimension positively correlated with outside options. He finds that average
challenger competence can go both ways in response to an increase in public re-
muneration because it provides a relatively stronger entry incentive to honest but
weak politicians. Caselli and Morelli (2004) consider a citizen-candidate model
of large elections (continuum of public positions) focusing on the competence of
elected body. Their results concerning selection effects of public remuneration
are similar to Besley (2004). They also study the effects of an informative pre-
elections signal when combined with costly electoral participation: each type of
challenger (low and high) sends a binary signal about his type after challenging
but before voting takes place. The signal is correct with a certain probability and
knowledge of this probability allows voters to update their priors. This signal is
interpreted as campaign quality. They show that an increase in signal accuracy
increases average challenger quality by discouraging bad politicians from running
for office. This result is akin to the impact of media strength in my model, where
a comparable signal is produced at the media’s discretion. Although Caselli and
Morelli (2004) use a citizen-candidate framework, potential challengers do not
take their own competence into account when deciding to run for office. The
reason for this is the existence of a continuum of political positions and the de-
pendence of the public good on the average quality of the elected body. Messner
and Polburn (2004) consider the problem of ex ante selection for competence in
the context of a single-office election where two candidates decide on whether
to run for office simultaneously. Candidates care about net office benefits, as
well as the quality of the politician who gets elected. These considerations en-
ter candidates’ payoffs in an additively separable fashion which is very close to
the specification used in this chapter except for the fact that their costs repre-
sent opportunity costs rather than actual participation costs. They assume that
politician qualities are common knowledge so voters’ problem is trivial. How-
ever, they assume that opportunity costs are private information and that these
are stochastically greater for the good candidate, with the average difference ex-
ceeding the gain in public good due to his competence advantage. This ensures
that bad candidates are more likely to challenge in equilibrium, which is a result
similar to the papers discussed above. But when they consider the effects of an
increase in public wages, they find that it can worsen selection. In essence, the
only benefit of political life for the good type is a higher public good. But due
to opportunity costs, this alone does not justify running most of the time. Since
higher public wages increase the likelihood of a low type challenging, it also in-
creases high type’s incentives to free ride. Poutvaara and Takalo (2007) study a
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selection model which distinguishes itself from previous ones by one feature: a
continuum of competence levels (distributed uniformly). They also assume that
challenging is costly and challengers send an informative but inaccurate signal
about their types as in Caselli and Morelli (2004), but modified to suit an infinite
type space. Their results imply that candidates use a cutoff rule and lower par-
ticipation costs, as well as higher office benefits lead to a deterioration in ex ante
selection by attracting worse challengers. These results are similar to ones ob-
tained in my model and they are a byproduct of an infinite type space, as well as
the presence of candidates with partial public good motivations. Finally, a recent
paper by Estache and Foucart (2013) combine challenger entry with ex post se-
lection, focusing on the role of two types of institutions: auditory and judiciary.
For a given rule of punishment, two politicians differing in competence decide on
whether to run for office to implement a preset policy in case they get elected. If
they both run, one of them is randomly picked as the winner. Once the politician
is in the office, he implements the policy and decides on whether to engage in
theft. In particular, a high quality politician can mimic a low quality one (which
has a higher cost of implementing the policy) and pocket the difference. This is
followed by the auditor receiving an imperfect signal regarding the cost of imple-
mentation. If the signal indicates high cost, the judiciary then receives a similar
signal on the source of inefficiency and punishes the politician if the signal indi-
cates theft. Their results indicate that auditors and judiciary are complements
and if both of them are sufficiently accurate, there exists an optimal punishment
rule (a constitution) that solves both the selection and moral hazard problems,
i.e. only high quality candidates challenge and they never steal.
A common element of the models in the previous paragraph is the lack of a
strategic feedback mechanism between challengers and agents who have a stake
in selection. This is an important dimension that underlies the non-trivial me-
dia response to gains in journalistic strength in my model. There is a literature
dealing with this aspect of the political selection process, which can be dubbed
the strategic challengers literature.14 One of the earliest papers in this literature
is by Banks and Kiewiert (1989), who focus on the problem of two potential
challengers from the same party with differing qualities simultaneously decid-
ing on whether to face an incumbent of the opposing party in the primaries, or
to wait one term and run in open elections after the incumbent retires. They
assume that the probability of an electoral victory is increasing in quality, as
14In fact, models in this literature can be seen as variants of the citizen-candidate model but
this literature appeared chronologically earlier and followed an epistemologically distinct de-
velopment.
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well as a previous victory (and decreasing in a previous loss). The risk for the
high quality candidate in waiting for incumbent’s retirement is that if the weak
candidate were to challenge and win, he would never be able to assume office,
as being from the same party precludes him from competing against his weak
colleague. While many different entry patterns are possible depending on politi-
cian qualities, they show that a larger quality gap between potential challengers
lead to weak candidate challenging in primaries and strong candidate waiting for
open elections. This implies (holding incumbent quality constant) that a larger
quality difference between candidates can increase the likelihood of a weak candi-
date assuming the office, undermining political selection. In Epstein and Zemsky
(1995), ex ante selection is steered by an incumbent wishing to face the weakest
(quality-wise) challenger possible. Incumbent has a limited amount of resources
which he can allocate between two activities: fund raising and governing. The
combination of these determines incumbent’s electoral strength. They assume
that the probability of the incumbent getting reelected increases in his electoral
strength and decreases in the quality of the challenger. A strong incumbent is
better in raising funds, he has greater electoral strength for a given amount of
funds raised. Potential challengers can only observe the amount of funds raised
by the incumbent, and thus they have to deduce electoral strength before deciding
on whether to challenge. They show that if costs of challenging relative to office
benefits are neither too high nor too low, two types of equilibria might prevail:
a separating one where no deterrence occurs, and a pooling one where the low
quality incumbent raises a lot of funds to mimic the strong incumbent, deterring
high quality candidates from challenging. Furthermore, the prevalence of the
pooling equilibrium becomes more likely if the incumbents have more resources.
From this, they deduce that a larger “war chest” can undermine political selec-
tion. Goodliffe (2005) builds a repeated elections model where these war chests
are endogenously determined and arrives at similar conclusions. More specifi-
cally, he assumes that war chests build up over time, carrying over from funds
raised in previous elections. One implication of that is, ex ante selection can
deteriorate over time if low quality politicians manage to win several elections
consecutively. All these models assume a reduced form specification for voting
and look for the origins of selection elsewhere. Gordon, Huber and Landa (2007)
consider a model with a single rational voter and quality-wise heterogenous can-
didates. Candidates have private information regarding their own competence
as well as the incumbent’s competence, where the latter is unobservable to the
voter except for a noisy signal. Challenging is costly and allows the voter to
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not only update his prior for candidates but also revise his beliefs concerning
the incumbent. This is argued to be capturing the idea of politicians having
inside information on other politicians. Their results indicate that a challenger
entry always results in a downward revision in voter beliefs for incumbent qual-
ity, which they interpret as a force countering incumbency advantage stemming
from incumbent’s office performance giving him an informational edge. Notwith-
standing, they show that a higher incumbent signal not only improves selection
but also decreases turnover, i.e. increases incumbency advantage. Their dually
asymmetric information structure lets them endow their candidates with the abil-
ity to mount a strong challenge reversing the incumbency advantage, and allows
them to analyze selection effects of incumbent performance. At the same time,
it requires them to impose distributional monotonicity conditions for equilibrium
existence and prevents them from studying equilibrium transition patterns due
to the difficulty it induces on establishing continuity properties. In addition, they
consider the case where the voter can engage in costly private learning to discover
both politicians’ types with certainty. Their reason for limiting the number of
voters to one is that with a larger set of voters, a strong free-riding incentive
arises, preventing learning to take place as the probability of being pivotal be-
comes negligible. Their set of equilibria under that scenario is akin to the special
case of full media strength in my model, except for differences in cutoffs due
to different information structures. Most notably, the voter indifference result
also seen in Banks and Sundaram (1990) always holds in Gordon et al. (2007),
and it fails in my model precisely when the media is active and constrained by
its journalistic strength. As mentioned in the previous subsection, ideological
differences can play a role in undermining selection. Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita (2008) construct a model where politicians instead differ in two (fixed)
dimensions: quality and policy positions. Voters care about both issues in a
quasi-linear manner. Politicians transmit a (normally distributed) noisy signal at
the pre-election stage, and the incumbent transmits an additional signal before
the pre-election stage. This gives the incumbent an informational advantage if he
is competent. Observing the incumbent’s signal, a party decides on whether to
recruit a challenger among its ranks to face the incumbent, but without knowing
the quality of its choice. When both signals realize, voters update their beliefs
and elections take place. Besides showing that an improvement in signal qual-
ity (measured by reductions in the variance of noise) leads to an improvement
in selection (i.e. a decrease in the likelihood that a high quality incumbent will
be replaced by a low quality challenger), they also show that party polarization
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(in terms of policy positions), electoral polarization and stronger partisanship
all contribute negatively to political selection. Finally, a more recent paper by
Dewan and Hortala-Vallve (2013) considers the impact of campaign asymmetry
between an incumbent and a challenger. Their model differs from the previous
ones by assuming that there is a challenger who is already participating to the
election, but that this challenger can either choose a safe campaign or a high pro-
file campaign, where the latter is more likely to signal his competence (succeed)
only if he is competent to begin with. The incumbent faces the same choice in
the policy dimension, but with the assumption that when he is competent, he
has a greater advantage when choosing a high risk high reward policy (so policy
choice is incumbent’s campaign technology). They show that compared to the
case where challenger campaigning is uninformative, giving the challenger the
technology of an informative campaign can actually worsen selection by causing
the incumbent to engage too aggressively in implementing the high risk policy,
leading to him being replaced by an inferior challenger more frequently.
Contributions of this chapter are twofold. First, it attempts to bridge the
gap between the literatures of political economy of mass media and strategic
challenger entry by studying the selection consequences of costly electoral partic-
ipation under imperfect media monitoring. From the standpoint of the former, it
uses media screening to endogenize the outside option that voters face when decid-
ing on whether to retain the incumbent. It emphasizes media’s ex ante selection
role, rather than ex post selection as is usually assumed. From the standpoint of
the latter, it outsources the task of selection to a strategic media and studies the
selection effects of a stronger or weaker media in the context of media-challenger
interaction. Second, by characterizing the journalistic incentives of an idealized
media with limited screening powers in a setting of political selection, it shows
that the media can appear silent but still be doing its job in the background if
its journalistic expertise and resources are strong enough so that it can detect
low quality politicians with relative ease. This might constitute a complementary
explanation for the contemporary decline in political journalism, one that doesn’t
need to invoke explanations involving capture or hegemony of commercial inter-
ests.
Next section presents the model. It starts by introducing players, timing,
payoffs, equilibrium concept and so on. After deriving some general results, it
proceeds to presenting equilibria under different parameter configurations. Pre-
sentation of equilibria starts with less interesting configurations (no adverse se-
lection, etc.) and gradually progresses to more interesting ones where media is
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actively involved in selection, with an intermission to refine some trivial equi-
libria where the incumbent always remains uncontested. Next, concentrating on
parametric regions where selection issues are present, continuity and transition
properties of the equilibria are studied, with a particular focus on selection and
media incentives. Final section concludes.
2 Model
The model is a multi-stage game with observed actions and incomplete informa-
tion. More accurately, it is a signalling game of pure adverse selection intended
to capture the effects of strengthening the media on ex ante politician selection
and media incentives when the quality of the latter is all that matters and the
task of the former is limited to finding out about it. There is an incumbent whose
type is common knowledge, and a candidate (potential challenger) whose type
is private information decides whether to challenge the incumbent in a partly
citizen-candidate, partly opportunistic spirit. The former means that candidates
care about the public good, which solely depends on the quality of the politician
in the office. The latter implies that they also care about office rents. Challenging
is costly so it acts as a signal which is received by two receivers who act consec-
utively. First one is an intermediary receiver: a benevolent media monopolist
who decides whether to undertake a costly investigation that may or may not
reveal challenger’s type and the result of which can credibly and fully disclosed.
Second one is a group of decisive receivers: a set of voters who decide on whom
to vote for, either based on the initial signal or in a mechanical manner due to
the uncertainty resolution provided by the media.
2.1 Players, Timing and Payoffs
There is no moral hazard and no policy conflict. Politicians differ in the number
of units of public good they produce if elected, which is assumed to be perfectly
observable and is interpreted as politician’s quality.15 At the beginning of the




is given and is common knowledge. There





according to a commonly known distribution F with a con-
15Assuming the potential policy conflict away serves to emphasize the adverse selection dimen-
sion and dropping it would require significant alterations to the model, starting with media’s
position. One should also keep in mind that there are important elections in democracies
in which competence and organizational ability of candidates are at the center stage, e.g.
mayoral elections.
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tinuous and full-support density f .16 Candidate cares about the public good, as
well as an office utility rent r she would receive if elected. Challenging requires
undertaking a fixed and non-recoverable utility cost cE that can be interpreted
as some fixed campaign cost. Both the office rent and the candidacy cost affects
candidate’s utility in an additively separable fashion for simplicity. If the candi-
date decides not to challenge, then the game ends with the incumbent staying in
the office. If she decides to challenge, then both the media and voters observe
this and the game continues. First, an intermediary receiver; a “benevolent”
media acts.17 Caring only about the quality of the politician, the media decides
whether to undertake an investigation by incurring an additive cost cI . Investi-
gation is a costly lottery that has a fixed probability Ψ of being successful. If
it is successful, its result is costlessly transmitted to voters fully eliminating the
uncertainty (e.g. it is bundled with TV content and everybody watches TV). If
it fails, it generates no informative signal and nothing is transmitted to voters
(e.g. media provides a neutral coverage of the elections). Ψ can be interpreted as
media’s journalistic strength, reflecting the extensiveness of its sources, quality of
its political analysts etc.18 It captures the quality detection (screening) power of
the media and has the leading role in this chapter. Following the media stage, a
continuum of voters (decisive receivers) who cannot abstain and who exclusively
care about electing the best politician vote either in an informed, or in an unin-
formed fashion. Because the probability of a single voter affecting the outcome of
election is nil, each individual voter will be indifferent in any equilibrium. I focus
on equilibria characterized by sincere voting, which is an assumption commonly
made in voting literature.19 Since there is no policy conflict, this implies that all
voters vote identically. All players are assumed to be risk-neutral. The timing
16No restriction is imposed on θ, θ, i.e. θ, θ ∈ R with θ < θ. Restricting them to be non-
negative would be more suitable for a public good interpretation, whereas allowing them to
take negative values permits for a potential public bad interpretation.
17Media can be interpreted either as an altruistic media outlet, or a stable coalition of altruistic
media outlets who came up with an incentive-compatible cost sharing agreement to deal with
potential free riding issues.
18Alternatively, media investigation can be successful with certainty and Ψ can be interpreted
as the probability of the truth being transmitted to a decisive measure of voters. For instance,
a very simple model of nonstrategic TV watching assuming no across-voter information trans-
mission can be specified along the following lines. Assuming a continuum of measure 1 sincere
voters who cannot abstain; each voter watches TV before the elections if ϵ > δ (both stochastic
and realizations of which are unknown to the media), where ϵ is some idiosyncratic entertain-
ment benefit with distribution Gϵ and δ is some common cost with distribution Gδ. Then the
probability of more than half being aware of the true quality ordering at the time of voting




2 )) = Ψ.
19Sincere voting implies that voters vote as if they had an infinitesimal chance of being pivotal.
This is also called conditional sincerity. See Alesina and Rosenthal (2000).
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structure of the game is summarized below.




according to a distri-
bution F .
2. (t=1) Candidate decides whether to challenge (C̃ = 1) by incurring a fixed
cost cE > 0 or to stay out (C̃ = 0). If she stays out, then the game ends
and all players get the payoff θi.
3. (t=2) At the beginning of the period, media decides whether to investigate
(I = 1) or not to investigate (I = 0) challenger’s quality by incurring a
fixed cost cI > 0. If undertaken, investigation concludes at the end of the
period; successfully revealing θc with probability Ψ, or failing to generate
an informative signal with probability 1−Ψ.
4. (t=3) At the beginning of the period, elections occur and voters either
retain the incumbent (Rj = 1) or replace her with the challenger (Rj =
0), where the subscript j ∈ {0, 1} refers to voters’ informational status
depending on media’s previous decision and outcome of the investigation
if undertaken (j = 1 if uncertainty is resolved). At the end of the period,
winner is determined and the public good, and thus the payoffs realize.
The following table gives players’ ex post payoffs depending on the outcome.
Candidate Media
Voter
Challenge Don’t Investigate Don’t
Incumbent Remains θi − cE θi θi − cI θi θi
Challenger Wins θc + r − cE θc − cI θc θc
Table 1: Ex Post Payoffs
Let C̃, I, R0, R1 ∈ [0, 1] be the (possibly mixed) actions taken by the candi-
date, media and voters respectively, with notations in line with the timing scheme
described above.20,21 Below, I give the ex ante payoffs of players, which are the
20If mixed, they correspond to probabilities of respective actions, e.g. I = 0.3 correspond to a
thirty percent probability of media investigation.
21Notice that there are two ways for the voter to remain uncertain about challenger’s type:
either the media remains passive, or it conducts an investigation but it fails. These occurrences
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decision-relevant payoffs representing their expected prospects at the moment of
choosing their actions.
Candidate: Consider a candidate with type θc. If she decides not to challenge,
then her payoff is the commonly known incumbent quality, i.e.
Vc(C̃ = 0; I, R0, R1 | θc) = θi. (1)
If she challenges, then her ex post payoff will depend on the outcome of the
election. So ex ante, given risk neutrality, candidate’s (expected) payoff from
challenging will be the average of the payoffs given in the first column of table 1,
weighted by probabilities of loss and victory respectively. Victory is contingent
on the realization of three mutually exclusive events: either the media does not
investigate and voters blind-vote for the challenger, or the media does investigate
but it fails and voters blind-vote for the challenger, or the media does investigate
and the investigation successfully reveals challenger’s quality and voters support
the challenger knowingly. The probability of one of these occurring is given as
follows.
(1− I)(1−R0) + I(1−Ψ)(1−R0) + ΨI(1−R1)
=1−R0 +ΨI(R0 −R1). (2)
So the expected payoff of the candidate from challenging is given by the following
expression.
Vc(C̃ = 1; I, R0, R1 | θc) = [1−R0 +ΨI(R0 −R1)](θc + r)
+ [R0 +ΨI(R1 −R0)]θi − cE. (3)
Allowing for mixed actions, the expressions in (1) and (3) can be summarized
into the following expected payoff function, which will constitute the basis in the
candidate’s electoral participation decision.
Vc(C̃; I, R0, R1 | θc) = C̃Vc(C̃ = 1; I, R0, R1 | θc)
+ (1− C̃)Vc(C̃ = 0; I, R0, R1 | θc). (4)
correspond to different continuations and hence lead to different parts of the game tree. Since
voters can observe whether the media has attempted an investigation or not, one might argue
that these distinct continuations should be taken into account with an additional subscript.
However, as the media has no additional information unavailable to the voters, the equilibrium
concept I employ makes sure that they lead to identical beliefs and hence they are “decision-
wise identical” occurrences. This point is further clarified in the next subsection.
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Media: Given that the candidate has decided to challenge (which I indicate with
“C = 1”, to distinguish from the possibly mixed candidate action C̃) and taking
into account the follow-up actions of the voters, media’s (expected) payoff in case
it decides not to investigate is given by the following.
VM(I = 0;R0 | C = 1) = R0θi + (1−R0)EM [θc | C = 1], (5)
where EM [·] denotes media’s expectation of candidate’s type given the fact that
the candidate decided to challenge.22 If it decides to undertake the costly in-
vestigation, its (expected) payoff will not only depend on the subsequent voter
behaviour, but also on the outcome of the investigation.
VM(I = 1;R0, R1 | C = 1) = ΨEM [R1θi + (1−R1)θc | C = 1]
+ (1−Ψ)VM(I = 0;R0 | C = 1)− cI . (6)
As before, allowing for mixing, media’s payoff function can be written as follows.
VM(I;R0, R1 | C = 1) = VM(I = 1;R0, R1 | C = 1)I
+ (1− I)VM(I = 0;R0 | C = 1). (7)
Voters: If a voter faces no uncertainty at the time of voting, then retaining or
replacing the incumbent yields θi or θc with certainty. So voter payoff given a
successful media investigation is as follows.
V 1v (R1 | θc, C = 1) = R1θi + (1−R1)θc. (8)
If on the other hand the media did not investigate or its investigation failed, then
the following describes voters’ expected payoffs.
V 0v (R0 | C = 1) = R0θi + (1−R0)Ev[θc | C = 1], (9)
where the last term denotes voters’ expectations regarding challenger’s compe-
tence level.
Given these expected payoff functions which depend on actions, next subsec-
tion introduces the equilibrium concept, (optimal) strategies (history-contingent
actions) and the resulting belief system which pins down the expectations in (5)
and (9).
22This will depend on media’s beliefs regarding challenger’s type, which will be explained in
detail in the next subsection.
71
2.2 Equilibrium Concept, Strategies and Beliefs
The equilibrium concept employed is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (henceforth
PBE), as defined by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).23 PBE requires that given
beliefs, each players’ strategies should comply with sequential rationality. That
is, given beliefs, actions of each player at each information set should maximize its
expected payoff taking strategies of other players as given. Beliefs should satisfy
several conditions.24 First, in a signalling model such as this, they are defined
over the type space, they are defined at each information set for each player,
and they are common across symmetrically informed players.25 Second, beliefs
should be derived from prior beliefs and equilibrium strategies using Bayes’ Rule
“whenever possible”. Formally, a PBE of the current model is a strategy profile
(C̃(θc), I
∗, R∗0, R1(θc)) such that:
C̃(θc) ∈ arg max
C̃∈[0,1]
Vc(C̃; I





0, R1(θc) | C = 1), (11)
R∗0 ∈ arg max
R0∈[0,1]
V 0v (R0 | C = 1), (12)
R1(θc) ∈ arg max
R1∈[0,1]
V 1v (R1 | θc, C = 1), (13)
and a measurable belief system with a density satisfying:
β(θc | C = 1) =
P(C = 1 | θc, C̃(θc))f(θc)∫ θ
θ






23Strictly speaking, their definition of PBE covers finite games but with a continuous type space,
the only practical difference is the application of a continuous Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Finiteness is important for existence of equilibria, which can fail in some infinite games as
shown by van Damme (1987). Since I show and study the equilibria, this is of no concern for
this chapter. In addition, Manelli (1996) has shown that signalling games having a compact
and infinite type space but finite message and action spaces such as the one presented here
always have a PBE.
24These can be found in a more concise form in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), page 332.
25Beliefs regarding types stand in contrast with beliefs regarding nodes as in sequential equi-
librium. Beliefs being defined for all players at every information set implies that even if a
player does not move at a given information set, he/she still has beliefs at that information
set. The way Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) formalize this idea consists of assuming that all
players “act” and hold beliefs after any history but those that do not really act at a given
information set have empty action sets for any history leading to that particular information
set. The final one implies in the current context that media and voters should have common
beliefs after any history.
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at histories on the equilibrium path.26 Notice the lack of a subscript indicating
whether the belief belongs to the media or the voter. This is a direct consequence
of common beliefs requirement and holds true off the equilibrium path as well. An
immediate implication of this is that in any equilibrium, expectations in (5) and
(9) are equal. Regarding beliefs at histories off the equilibrium path, “whenever
possible” implies several explicit restrictions, but two of them are especially rel-
evant for the current model. First, they should be updates of beliefs at previous
histories, and second is what Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) call the “no signalling
what you don’t know” condition, which stresses that the updating process should
not be influenced by actions of other players (nor should it be influenced by any
other randomization uncorrelated with types about which beliefs are formed) as























Figure 1: Simplified Extensive Form Representation.
To better understand the implications of these restrictions, consider the exten-
sive form representation depicted in figure 1 with two types for simplicity. With
a slight notational abuse, C refers to the candidate, N refers to nature, M and
V refer to media and voters respectively. For sake of brevity, actions are denoted
with 1 (challenge, investigate, retain the incumbent) and 0 (don’t challenge, don’t
investigate, replace the incumbent), and payoffs are excluded. In addition, a suc-
cessful investigation is denoted by 1 and a failed investigation is denoted by 0.
26Of course this formula is valid only if the set of challengers is of non-zero measure. In my
model, there are possible equilibria with only θ challenging with positive probability. In that
case, β(θc | C = 1) would be degenerate at θ. It is possible to capture both degenerate
and non-degenerate cases with a more general measure-theoretic notation using Lebesgue
integration but I skip this.
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, then notice that (14) is undefined. Under such
scenario, PBE imposes no restrictions on the beliefs at the first non-singleton
information set (the one at which the media moves). Once they are determined
however, PBE requires these beliefs to be carried over to subsequent non-singleton
information sets (ones at which uninformed voters move) without change, because
neither the pre-investigation media knows anything unknown to voters, nor the
outcome of the investigation depends on challenger’s quality.27 Similarly, if in a
PBE there exists some subset of types who challenge with positive probability,







: C̃(θc) ∈ (0, 1]
}
.
is non-empty, then all the beliefs at the three non-singleton information sets de-
picted in figure 1 are identical and are uniquely pinned down by (14), even though
one of the information sets at which voters act will be off the equilibrium path
when the media is playing a pure strategy.28 A corollary of this belief identi-
calness in non-singleton information sets is that when constructing a PBE and
considering voter strategies, one does not need to distinguish between different
histories leading to voters remaining uninformed. The decision-relevant contin-
gency from voter’s perspective is whether the uncertainty persists or is resolved,
as the differences in the manner by which the uncertainty persists do not lead to
different beliefs and hence different expected payoffs. This is captured by sub-
scripts 0 and 1 in (12) and (13).
Before moving on to presenting various equilibria, it is possible to cover more
ground regarding strategies using the requirement of sequential rationality, which
is valid under any PBE. Starting from the last stage, I do so below.
Voters: If media investigation is successful in revealing challenger’s quality, vot-
ers would simply pick the best politician.
R1(θc) ∈

{0} , (θc > θi)
[0, 1] , (θc = θi)
{1} , (θc < θi)
. (15)
27This would no longer be true, say, if investigation success depended on the quality gap between
the incumbent and the challenger, capturing the idea of easier sorting when quality difference
is large.
28Note that with continuum of types, only the number of singleton information sets in the
extensive form representation are affected, i.e. the number of non-singleton information sets
is still three.
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{0} , (E [θc | C = 1] > θi)
[0, 1] , (E [θc | C = 1] = θi)
{1} , (E [θc | C = 1] < θi)
, (16)
where the expectation will depend on beliefs that are pinned down uniquely from
(14) if possible, and specified appropriately to support the equilibrium under con-
sideration if not. Note that the subscript v in Ev is dropped due to commonality
of beliefs.
Media: Inducting backwards, media’s expected payoffs can be rewritten as fol-
lows after plugging in for the sequentially rational informed voting strategy.
VM(I = 0;R
∗
0 | C = 1) = R∗0θi + (1−R∗0)E [θc | C = 1] , (17)
VM(I = 1;R
∗
0, R1(θc) | C = 1) = ΨE [max {θi, θc} | C = 1]
+(1−Ψ) {R∗0θi + (1−R∗0)E [θc | C = 1]} − cI . (18)




0, R1(θc) | C = 1) = I [ΨE [max {θi, θc} | C = 1]− cI ]
+ (1−ΨI)VM(I = 0;R∗0 | C = 1). (19)
After plugging in for the sequentially rational blind-voting strategy using (16) and
rearranging, one can easily deduce that media’s sequentially rational investigation

























E [θc | C = 1] ≥ θi and E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] > cIΨ
)
, (20)
where expectations are again pinned down using (14) if possible. The form of the
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investigation policy is quite intuitive. The marginal benefit of conducting a suc-
cessful investigation is the expected quality gain from exposing inferior politicians
who would be elected if voters were allowed to vote in an uninformed manner.
For instance, if θi > E [θc | C = 1], then voters blind-vote for the incumbent, so
incumbent is the politician who would be elected, and who would be the inferior
one only if θc > θi. So the marginal benefit of a successful investigation under
that scenario is E [max {0, θc − θi} | C = 1]. Taking into account the fact that the
investigation might fail, its expected marginal benefit is therefore this expected
quality gain multiplied by the probability of a successful investigation. If this
exceeds the marginal cost of investigation (cI), then the media investigates. Oth-
erwise, it remains passive.
Candidate: Given the mutually sequentially rational strategies of the media and
voters, start by considering the indifference condition of an arbitrary candidate
with quality θc.
Vc(C̃ = 1; I
∗, R∗0, R1(θc) | θc) = θi. (21)
Using (3) and rearranging yields the following.
θc = θi − r + (1−R∗0 +ΨI∗(R∗0 −R1(θc)))−1cE = θ̂c(θc). (22)
If θc > θ̂c(θc), then the candidate will strictly prefer challenging and vice versa.
Notice that the value of θ̂c(θc) will depend on the follow up strategies I
∗, R∗0, R1(θc),
as well as on payoff parameters θi, r, cE. In particular, depending on whether the
candidate is superior, or inferior (or equal) to the incumbent, R1(θc) will take dif-
ferent values and (22) will define three distinct thresholds. This is because aside
a victory by blind-voting, a superior challenger will win the election if the me-
dia performs a successful investigation, whereas an inferior challenger will lose in
such situation. Using (15) to substitute for R1(θc) in (22) yields three thresholds
defining the decision rule used by the candidate in a PBE.
θ̂c(θc) =

θ̂c,w = θi − r + (1−R∗0 +ΨI∗(R∗0 − 1))−1cE, (θc < θi)
θ̂c,e = θi − r + (1−R∗0 +ΨI∗(R∗0 −R1(θc)))−1cE, (θc = θi)
θ̂c,b = θi − r + (1−R∗0 +ΨI∗(R∗0 − 0))−1cE, (θc > θi)
, (23)
where R1(θc = θi) ∈ [0, 1], as indicated in (15).29 Using (23), it is possible to
29The subscripts w, e, b stands for “worse”, “equal” and “better” respectively, referring to can-
didate’s quality relative to the incumbent’s.
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(24) is quite given candidate’s risk neutrality. Consider for instance some candi-
date who is of better quality than the incumbent. If she challenges, she would
win only if the media successfully uncovers her type, or if the voters blind-vote
for her. Given the subsequent strategies, the probability of one of these occurring
is exactly (1 − (1 − ΨI∗)R∗0). Given this probability and the fact that she cares
about the quality-dependent public good as well as the office rents, she would
find it worthwhile to challenge only if her type exceeded θ̂c,b. Although (24) is
intuitive, it is in a somehow more complicated form then necessary, as it features
several different thresholds.
Two observations make it possible to get a much simpler representation for
candidate’s PBE strategy. First, indifference thresholds in (23) themselves can
be ordered, as for instance the probability of victory for a superior candidate is
always greater then the probability of victory for an inferior candidate. Second,
depending on equilibrium values of these thresholds, some of the cases implied by
(24) will be infeasible, e.g. if θ̂c,w ≥ θi, then one cannot have θc < θi and θc > θ̂c,w
at the same time.
Lemma 1 (Connectedness of the set of strict challengers and unique-
ness of the indifferent candidate): Consider an arbitrary PBE described by
a strategy profile (C̃(θc), I








: θc > θ̂c(θc)
}
.
Then Ωp is connected. If it is non-empty, then its right end-point is θ. Fur-
thermore, if, at this PBE, there exists a θ∗ at which the candidate is indifferent,









, then it is a left-open interval with the unique indifferent chal-
lenger at its left boundary and θ as its right end-point. That is, there exists a
unique θ > θ∗ > θ such that Ωp = (θ
∗, θ] with θ∗ = θ̂c(θ
∗) and C̃(θ∗) ∈ [0, 1], and
θ < θ̂c(θc) for all θ < θ
∗.30




with no indifferent type, and
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Proof: Appendix. 
The idea behind lemma 1 is very simple. If a superior candidate decides to
challenge in an equilibrium, then all candidate-types with a higher quality will
challenge as well, as they would win with an equal probability and they would
produce a higher amount of public good if elected. On the other hand, if an
inferior candidate finds it worthwhile to challenge, then not only higher quality
inferior candidates would challenge due to similar motives, but superior candi-
dates would challenge too as they have the added benefit of an higher chance of
electoral victory. The fact that there should be a unique indifferent type connect-
ing non-challengers and challengers is just a restatement of candidate’s strategy
being upper hemi-continuous in her type. The usefulness of lemma 1 is that it
allows expressing candidate’s strategy by a single cutoff quality θ∗ in any PBE
with challenger entry.
Following lemma shows the “irrelevance” of the indifferent candidate-type’s
mixture, as well as of the strategy followed by informed voters when they find
out that the challenger’s quality is identical to incumbent’s quality.
Lemma 2 (Anything goes for candidate and informed voter when they
are indifferent): Consider a PBE defined by a belief system β(θc | C = 1) and
a strategy profile (C̃(θc), I
∗, R∗0, R1(θc)) and with Ω ̸= ∅, assigning a particular
value k ∈ [0, 1] to R1(θc = θi). Then varying k in [0, 1] and leaving everything else
intact (including beliefs), one gets a continuum of PBE. If there is an indifferent
candidate θ∗, then the same is true for C̃(θ∗) ∈ [0, 1], with beliefs remaining in-
tact almost everywhere.31
Proof: Appendix. 
When discussing various equilibria in what follows, I will sometimes use the word
“unique”. This should be understood as unique in the lemma 2 sense, referring to
uniqueness of media and uninformed voting strategies and the set of pure strategy
challengers. Relatedly, when presenting equilibria with challengers, I will omit
C̃(θ∗) and R1 from the description.
Finally, the following lemma shows that there is a common lower bound for
the set of positive probability challengers in any equilibria.
















(or Ω = ∅) are possible. Notice
that Ω can contain or exclude the indifferent type, depending whether she challenges with
positive probability or not.
31For the latter case, if θ∗ < θ, β(θ∗ | C = 1) will change accordingly but for θ > θ∗, β(θ | C = 1)
will remain being the truncation of f at θ∗.
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Lemma 3 (Lower bound for threshold quality): Let θ̂ = θi−(r−cE). Then
in any PBE, θ̂ ≤ θ∗ = inf Ω.32
Proof: Inequalities (58)-(60) show that θ̂c,b ≤ θ̂c,e ≤ θ̂c,w. From (23), varying I∗
and R∗0, the smallest value θ̂c,b can get is θ̂. It follows that in any equilibrium
with Ω ̸= ∅, θ̂ ≤ θ̂c(θ) ≤ θ for any θ ∈ Ω. If Ω = ∅, then inf Ω = +∞. 
Notice that θc+r−cE is the expected payoff of the challenger if she would win the
election with certainty. Lemma 3 then simply states that if the ex post payoffs
do not justify running for office (θc + r − cE < θi or equivalently θc < θ̂), candi-
dates will stay out. θ̂ represents the full adverse selection outcome, and it is an
important parameter playing a key role in determining what sort of equilibrium
prevails.33
To summarize the discussion so far; (23) and (24) tell that in a PBE, can-
didate’s strategy will depend on media and voter strategies. As the expressions
in (15), (16) and (20) show, these will in turn depend on their beliefs regard-
ing challenger’s quality. Beliefs should in turn be consistent with candidate’s
strategy, so they act as the glue that brings everything together. Depending on
parameter configurations and the freedom one has in specifying beliefs, there are
a variety of equilibria. The media will be active in some of them, and remain
passive in others. I start with relatively uninteresting ones, where the incumbent
goes uncontested.
2.3 Dictatorial Equilibria
One implication of lemma 3 is that payoff parameters can completely deter entry.
In particular, if costs of challenging are too high compared to office benefits, then
no candidate-type would challenge at all.
Proposition 1 (PBE - Parametric dictatorship): If θ̂ > θ, then there exists
a set of pooling PBE where no candidate-type challenges with positive probabil-
ity (Ω = ∅), media and voters hold whatever beliefs they want as long as these
are common and identical across non-singleton information sets, and they act
according to (15), (16) and (20) given those beliefs. Furthermore, there are no
PBE with Ω ̸= ∅.
Proof: The last statement follows from lemma 3. For the first statement, sup-
32Note that lemma 1 does not say that θ∗ is the indifferent type (although it is usually the






is the full adverse selection outcome.
79
pose no candidate-type challenges with positive probability, and media and voters
play arbitrary strategies with R1(θc) satisfying (15). Since beliefs are free as long
as they satisfy the criteria mentioned in the proposition (which follows from the
definition of PBE, as discussed previously), neither media nor voters would have
any incentive to deviate as long as beliefs are specified in a way ensuring that
(16) and (20) holds for given strategies. Furthermore, given media and voter
strategies, no candidate-type would have an incentive to deviate as they would
either be worse off (with a positive probability of victory) or indifferent. 
For the remainder of the paper, it is assumed that θ̂ ≤ θ. Even under this
assumption, there are dictatorial equilibria with no challengers.34
Proposition 2 (PBE - Trivial dictatorship): For any parameter configura-
tion satisfying θ̂ ≤ θ, the following describes a continuum of pooling PBE: No
candidate-type challenges (Ω = ∅), and in case of a counterfactual challenge,
media and voters hold common beliefs such that their strategies pinned down
by (16) and (20) ensure that θ̂c,b > θ holds (where θ̂c,b is defined in (23)), and
informed voters play according to (15).
Proof: Suppose media and uninformed voter strategies ensure that θ̂c,b > θ.




, so no candidate-
type challenges from (24). Conversely, suppose that no candidate-type challenges.
Then Ω = ∅ so beliefs are free. Therefore, one can always find beliefs which would
ensure that the strategies implied by (16) and (20) under such beliefs would guar-
antee that θ̂c,b > θ. One such example is beliefs that are degenerate at θ, which
ensure that I∗ = 0 and R∗0 = 1, so that no challenger has a positive chance of
winning the elections.35 
The reason for labeling the no-challenge pooling equilibria described in proposi-
tion 2 as “trivial” is that their existence completely depends on the indeterminacy
of beliefs off the equilibrium path and that they can occur under any parameter
configuration.





, there will be instances (random draws by Nature) where the incumbent goes un-
contested. However, in a game-theoretical sense, an equilibrium with Ω ̸= ∅ is not dictatorial
on the equilibrium path. Moreover, it is not hard to establish a repeated game argument
where the incumbent will always be challenged and the same equilibria will prevail. One
trivial example is as follows. Suppose that the game is infinitely repeated at the pre-election
stage but ends after the election. That is, the nature keeps drawing candidates sequentially
until one of them challenges. In that case, if Nature’s draws are independent over time and
candidates discount fully in between consecutive draws, then the same set of equilibria will
prevail.
35If θi = θ, then these are the only possible beliefs.
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Under the assumption that θ̂ ≤ θ, given appropriate strategies, some candidate-
types would find it worthwhile to challenge and might make voters better off in
case they get elected. Furthermore, given that some candidate-types challenge,
stronger candidates would have stronger incentives to challenge. This latter point
suggests that upon observing a counterfactual challenger entry, it might be sen-
sible for the media and voters to eliminate some types and form their out of
equilibrium beliefs based on that elimination. This elimination can either be on
the basis that some types would never challenge, or they would be “less likely” to
challenge. These are the ideas behind the two common dominance based refine-
ment criteria which are applied next, under which the pooling equilibria described
in proposition 2 do not survive.
Lemma 4 (Equilibrium refinements): Assume θ̂ ≤ θ. Cho and Kreps’ (1987)
Intuitive Criterion eliminates all trivial pooling equilibria if θ̂ > θi but it fails to
eliminate them if θ̂ ≤ θi. On the other hand, Banks and Sobel’s (1987) Divinity
Criterion eliminates all trivial pooling equilibria with no challengers.
Proof: Appendix. 
Both of the criteria mentioned in lemma 4 first eliminate a subset of candidate-
types on certain grounds of equilibrium dominance, then restrict off the equilib-
rium path beliefs to the undominated portion of the quality space. No further
restrictions are imposed on beliefs. They then check whether there exists some
candidate-types who would prefer to challenge under any such beliefs, i.e. given
any media and voter best-responses implied by those beliefs. Both criteria co-
incide in the second step but differ in the way they refine the set of potential
challengers. In particular, Intuitive Criterion (IC) compares the best payoff that
a candidate can get by challenging to her equilibrium payoff θi. As such, it
nullifies the possibility of counterfactual challengers arising from the set [θ, θ̂),
restricting off the equilibrium path beliefs to [θ̂, θ]. If θ̂ > θi, this is sufficient to
eliminate all trivial equilibria, as in that case, any belief system constrained to
[θ̂, θ] implies the challenger being always strictly superior to the incumbent. This
makes an electoral victory a certainty, which incentivizes candidate-types with
qualities above θ̂ to challenge, destroying trivial equilibria. On the other hand, if
θ̂ ≤ θi, then IC, say, allows for beliefs degenerate at θ̂ ≤ θi, which allows for me-
dia and voter best-responses implying a sure loss, preventing any candidate from
challenging. This is where the Divinity Criterion (DC) comes into picture. DC
contrasts sets of media and voter strategies under which candidates can be made
better off by challenging compared to staying out and getting θi. In particular,
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DC eliminates a candidate with quality θ if there exists another candidate-type θ′
who is not only strictly better off under all media and voter strategies that make
θ better off (or indifferent) conditional on a challenge, but who is also strictly
better off under some strategies which leave θ strictly worse off. This captures
the idea of some candidates being “more likely” to challenge, and eliminates all





strictly superior politicians. Therefore, it eliminates all trivial pooling equilibria,
including those that are missed by the IC.36
Next, I turn attention to more interesting equilibria with equilibrium chal-
lengers.
2.4 Equilibria With Challengers
This section presents equilibria where some candidate-types challenge and elec-
tions take place on the equilibrium path. Most of them are unique in the lemma
2 sense and whichever prevails depends on the particular configuration of payoff
parameters. The presentation starts with less interesting ones with a passive me-
dia and moves gradually to equilibria with different levels of media activation.
To begin with, lemma 5 shows that beliefs have a very simple structure in any
equilibrium with challengers.
Lemma 5 (Equilibrium beliefs): In any PBE with Ω ̸= ∅, equilibrium beliefs
are described as follows when Ω is non-singleton.
β(θc | C = 1) =





is either the unique candidate-type who is indifferent between
challenging and staying out, or θ∗ = θ and she strictly prefers to challenge. If Ω
is singleton, then θ∗ = θ and the beliefs are described as follows.











Proof: Follows directly from (14) and lemma 1. 
As expected, connectedness of the challenger set implies that beliefs are simply
36This is reminiscent of how IC fails to eliminate some inefficient equilibria in a Spence model
(Spence, 1973) with more than two types, whereas DC eliminates all but the Riley equilibrium
(Riley, 1979).
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truncated priors as long as the set of challengers is of non-zero measure. Note
that one should not be too concerned with the exact belief concerning θ∗ (except
when it is the only challenger). Given a positive measure of challengers, this
belief has no effect on relevant expectations, as the beliefs, being truncations of
continuous priors, are continuous themselves.37
2.4.1 Equilibria With a Passive Media
When political payoffs are structured in a manner ensuring that only superior
candidate-types challenge, media won’t be needed at all.
Proposition 3 (PBE - Passive Media: No adverse selection): Assume
θi ≤ θ̂ ≤ θ. Then the following is the unique (in the lemma 2 sense) PBE with
challengers:
Ωp = (θ
∗, θ] with θ∗ = θ̂; I∗ = 0; R∗0 = 0.





Then β(θ | C = 1) = 1, so E [θc | C = 1] = θ and E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] = 0,
which imply I∗ = 0 and R∗0 = 0. But then, (23), (24) and the fact that









for some unique θ∗ < θ, and beliefs are
pinned down by (25). Since f is full-support, this implies E [θc | C = 1] > θi
and E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] = 0, so unique media and voter best-responses
are I∗ = 0 and R∗0 = 0 respectively. From (23) and (24), this implies that
θ∗ = θ̂ = θi − (r − cI). Next, assume that θi = θ. Then it must be that
θ̂ = θi = θ (otherwise, Ω would be empty). This implies β(θ | C = 1) = 1, so
E [θc | C = 1] = θ = θi and E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] = 0, to which the unique
media best-response is I∗ = 0 and voter best-response is any R∗0 ∈ [0, 1]. Yet,
from the expression for θ̂c,e in (23) and the fact that I
∗ = 0, the only voter strat-





(and Ωp = ∅). 
Notice how θ̂ ≥ θi implies that r ≤ cE. That is, office rents are no greater than
costs of challenging. This implies that for any candidate-type who decides to chal-
lenge, public good considerations should dominate office rents because rents are
not enough to compensate for costs of challenging even under a certain prospec-
tive victory. Consequently, any challenger should be quality-wise superior to the
37In fact, the specification in (25) implicitly assumes that receivers cannot distinguish between
mixed and pure actions when they are played (i.e. they can only observe the realization if there
is any mixing). If one were to assume the opposite, then (25) would be the straightforward
truncation of f , independent of C̃(θ∗).
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incumbent, which follows from lemma 3. In other words, whenever participation
costs are higher then office rents, the mere act of challenging is a sufficiently
strong signal of candidate quality, which allows uninformed voters to confidently
elect the challenger. This eliminates the intervention need of the media against
the possibility of voters making an ex post mistake. That is, the magnitude of
challenging costs allow superior candidates to self-select without requiring media
activity and there is no adverse selection.
When θ̂ < θi, office rents exceed participation costs (r > cE). This opens up
the possibility of adverse selection, while at the same time indicates that challeng-
ing is not a sufficiently strong signal to imply superiority of the challenger with
certainty. Yet in equilibrium, the challenger should still be better than the in-
cumbent on average. This is because in any PBE, media and voters best-respond
to their beliefs regarding challenger’s quality, which turn out to be correct as they
should be consistent with candidate’s strategy.
Lemma 6 (Expected equilibrium non-inferiority of challengers): If θ̂ <
θi, then in any PBE with Ω ̸= ∅, beliefs should satisfy the following.
E [θc | C = 1] ≥ θi. (27)
Proof: Suppose not, i.e. E [θc | C = 1] < θi. Then from (16), R∗0 = 1. From
(23), this implies θ̂c,w > θi. (24) then implies that no inferior (θc < θi) candidate-
type challenges in equilibrium. But if Ω ̸= ∅, beliefs should then satisfy (27), a
contradiction. 
Lemma 6 is very intuitive. A minimum requirement for a positive probability of
an electoral victory for a challenger is voters having beliefs suggesting that she is
better than incumbent on average. Voters in turn have these beliefs because they
can improve average challenger quality by threatening to reelect the incumbent.
One thing that lemma 6 does not imply is the signalling strength of challenging.
It is rather the opposite. Because the trade-off between office rents and costs of
challenging cannot prevent inferior candidate-types from challenging, media and
voters become obliged to impose a threat-based selection upon them via their
strategies, at least up to the point where the average challenger becomes non-
inferior than the incumbent. A related result shows the limits to this strategic
selection effect.
Lemma 7 (Limits to strategic selection): If θ̂ < θi, then in any PBE with
Ω ̸= ∅, the following should hold regarding the set of challengers.
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The first two are boundary cases and are not very important. The last one, how-
ever, is important. It tells that whenever office rents exceed challenging costs,
not only the signalling strength of a costly challenge is hindered due to a di-
vergence between preferences of the candidate and the electorate, but also that
this hindrance cannot be fully compensated by media and the voter efforts for
inducing strategic selection. In simpler terms, if r > cE, then inferior challengers
cannot be fully excluded. The intuition behind this result will be clearer subse-
quently, but the main reason should be more or less clear: costly and imperfect
technology of journalism. Although voters can induce some improvement in se-
lection by sometimes blind-voting for the incumbent, they are constrained by the
consistency of their beliefs: if they were to exclude all inferior challengers, say,
by fully committing to reelect the incumbent in case of remaining uninformed
(under such commitment, challengers win only under a successful investigation,
i.e. only if they are superior to the incumbent), then they would no longer have
the incentive to do so, as only superior candidate-types would challenge.
Corollary 1 (Impossibility of unconditional commitment to the incum-
bent): If θ̂ < θi, then in any PBE with Ω ̸= ∅, R∗0 < 1.
This is precisely the reason voters need the media for: to mop up inferior chal-
lengers missed due to incredibility of their voting threat. Yet, because investi-
gation is costly and sometimes fails, media itself is limited in the extent of its
willingness to attempt in exposing inferior challengers.
Before moving on to presenting other equilibria, I will further elaborate on
the equilibrium best-response correspondences of the media and voters. This will
not only help with the presentation of equilibria later on, but will also facilitate
comparative statics. First, notice that lemma 1 and lemma 5 imply that one can
limit attention to simple truncated expectations when considering voter best-
responses. This gives a simple cutoff rule that characterizes uninformed voters’
decisions under any equilibrium with challengers.
Lemma 8 (Equilibrium voter best-response under uncertainty): Con-
sider an equilibrium with Ω ̸= ∅. If θi < E [θc], then R∗0 = 0. If θi ≥ E [θc], then
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there exists a unique θV (θi) such that the following holds.
R∗0 ∈

{0} , (θ∗ > θV (θi))
[0, 1] , (θ∗ = θV (θi))
{1} , (θ∗ < θV (θi))
, (28)
where θV (θi) ∈ [θ, θi] with θV (θi) ∈ {θ, θi} only if θi = E [θc] or if θi = θ respec-
tively, and θ∗ = inf Ω.
Proof: Suppose that Ω ̸= ∅ and define θ∗ = inf Ω. Notice that lemma 5 implies
the following.
E [θc | C = 1] = E [θc | θ∗ ≤ θc] . (29)
It follows that as f is full-support, E [θc | C = 1] is strictly increasing in θ∗ as
long as θ∗ < θ. First, assume that θi < E [θc]. Then the following holds.
θi < E [θc] ≤ E [θc | C = 1] , (30)
where the second inequality is an equality only if θ∗ = θ. Using (16), this immedi-
ately implies that R∗0 = 0. Next, assume that θi ≥ E [θc]. Consider the following
equation.
θi − E [θc | θV ≤ θc] = 0. (31)
Since the left-hand side is strictly decreasing in θV , the fact that θV (θi) ∈ {θ, θi}
whenever θi = E [θc] or θi = θ respectively immediately follows. Now fix a θi
satisfying E [θc] < θi < θ. If θV = θ, then the left-hand side of (31) is strictly
positive and if θV = θi, it is strictly negative. Moreover, since the density f





from the fundamental theorem of calculus. Combining this with the
fact that the left-hand side is strictly decreasing in θV , the intermediate value
theorem implies that there exists a unique θV (θi) ∈ (θ, θi) solving (31). (28)
directly follows from this and (29), along with (16). 
In a signalling model, when one is using PBE as an equilibrium concept, best-
responses of receivers are defined as best-responses to their beliefs. In (16), those
beliefs were embedded into the conditional expectation, which is the decision-
relevant statistic from a voter’s perspective. Using lemma 1 and its follow-up
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lemma (lemma 5) allows one to summarize beliefs in any PBE with challengers
using a single number: θ∗ = inf Ω. Whether this number implies that average
challenger is superior to the incumbent depends not only on the incumbent’s
quality, but also on the shape of f . The exact requirements are buried within
θV (θi), which has a nice interpretation: it is the minimum challenger quality that
voters are willing to accept before they commit on reelecting the incumbent in
case they remain uninformed. Combining lemma 8 with corollary 1 results in the
following.
Corollary 2 (Another lower bound for threshold quality): If θ̂ < θi, then
in any PBE with Ω ̸= ∅, one must have θV (θi) ≤ θ∗ = inf Ω.
Corollary 2 tells that ex ante, voters get what they want in equilibrium. More
precisely, given the monotonicity of candidate’s participation decision and their
own risk-neutrality, they are always satisfied on average in equilibrium. A similar
exercise can be carried out for the media’s decision.
Lemma 9 (Equilibrium media best-response): Consider an equilibrium




∗ = 0, and when cI
Ψ
≤ K(θi), there exists a unique
θM(Ψ, cI , θi) such that the following holds.
I∗ ∈

{0} , (θ∗ > θM(Ψ, cI , θi))
[0, 1] , (θ∗ = θM(Ψ, cI , θi))
{1} , (θ∗ < θM(Ψ, cI , θi))
, (32)
where θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ∈ [θ, θi], with θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ∈ {θ, θi} only if cIΨ = K(θi) or
cI = 0 respectively, and θ
∗ = inf Ω.
Proof: Suppose Ω ̸= ∅ and θ̂ < θi. Let θ∗ = inf Ω. Since θ̂ < θi, lemma 6














E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] > cIΨ
) . (33)
Consider the conditional expectation in (33). Lemma 5 allows one to simplify it
as follows.
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E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] =
∫ θi
θ










(θi − θc)f(θc) dθc,
=
F (θi)− F (θ∗)
1− F (θ∗)
{θi − E [θc | θ∗ ≤ θc < θi]} . (34)
Now consider the following equation.
F (θi)− F (θM)
1− F (θM)




The fundamental theorem of calculus implies that this function is continuous on
[θ, θi] and differentiable on (θ, θi).
38 Differentiating the left-hand side with respect
to θM , one gets the following.
f(θM) (F (θi)− 1)
(1− F (θM))2
{θi − E [θc | · ]} −




E [θc | · ] < 0, (36)
for θM ∈ (θ, θi). It follows that (35) is strictly decreasing in θM when θM is in
[θ, θi]. This implies that for a given θi, E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] will be at its
lowest when θ∗ = θ. So there exists a unique unit cost K(θi) satisfying:
F (θi) {θi − E [θc | θ ≤ θc < θi]} −K(θi) = 0, (37)
such that whenever cI
Ψ
> K(θi), left-hand side of (35) is strictly negative for all θM
and whenever cI
Ψ




Then whenever evaluated at θ, left-hand side of (35) is strictly positive, and when
θM → θi, left-hand side goes to − cIΨ . From the intermediate value theorem and
(33), the result follows. 
Note that unlike lemma 8, the assumption θ̂ < θi is necessary to obtain lemma 9.
39
This allows one to invoke lemma 6, which identifies challenger as the potentially
inferior politician to be elected in case the uncertainty does not resolve. This is
because corollary 2 implies that if voters remain uncertain, they will “weakly”
elect the challenger in any equilibrium with θ̂ < θi. Other than that, the general
logic remains the same. Lemma 1 and the fact that it implies truncated beliefs
38This can be more clearly seen from the third line of (34).
39Imposing this assumption to lemma 8 resulted in corollary 2.
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in any equilibrium with challengers allow to embed beliefs into a single number
θ∗. The decision-relevant statistic E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1], as well as the func-
tional form of the prior distribution then determine the form of the investigation
threshold θM(·). Notice that this threshold not only depends on incumbent’s
quality, but also on the cost and strength of the media’s investigation technology.
θM(·) is the minimum challenger quality that the media is willing to accept be-
fore “waking up”. Intuitively, one would expect that a decrease in investigation
cost or an increase in its strength would make the media more selective, which
is indeed true as will be seen later on. However, investigation cost and journalis-
tic strength are not isomorphic in their equilibrium effects as one would expect,
which will also be seen later on.
Besides sufficient self-selection, there are two ways media can remain passive
in equilibrium. I start with the most obvious one, already mentioned in lemma
9.
Proposition 4 (PBE - Passive media: Prohibitive costs): Assume that
θ̂ < θi and Ω ̸= ∅. Assume further that cIΨ > K(θi). Define θ
∗ = inf Ω. Then the
following equilibria prevail and they are unique in the lemma 2 sense.
1. If θi < E [θc], then I∗ = R∗0 = 0 with θ∗ = max{θ, θ̂}.
2. If θi ≥ E [θc] and θV (θi) ≤ θ̂, then I∗ = R∗ = 0 with θ∗ = max{θ, θ̂}.






such that θ∗ = θV (θi).
Proof: Suppose θ̂ < θi,
cI
Ψ
> K(θi) and Ω ̸= ∅. I∗ = 0 follows directly from
lemma 9.
1. If θi < E [θc], then this follows directly from lemma 8, the fact that I∗ = 0
and (23)-(24).
2. Assume θi ≥ E [θc] and θV (θi) ≤ θ̂ and suppose instead θ∗ > max{θ, θ̂}.
Since θV (θi) ≤ θ̂, lemma 8 directly implies R∗0 = 0. But then (23)-(24),
along with I∗ = 0 imply that θ∗ = max{θ, θ̂}, a contradiction. Moreover,
if θ∗ = max{θ, θ̂} (θ∗ < θ̂ is not allowed due to lemma 3), R∗0 = 0 is the
unique blind-voting strategy (given I∗ = 0) consistent with this fact, which
follows again from (23)-(24).
3. Assume θi ≥ E [θc] and θV (θi) > θ̂ and suppose instead θ∗ > θV (θi).
From lemma 8, this implies that R∗0 = 0. But then, (23)-(24) imply
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θ∗ = max{θ, θ̂}. If θ̂ ≥ θ, this is a direct contradiction. If not, then it
is a contradiction because lemma 8 has shown that θ ≤ θV (θi). Combining
this with corollary 2 yields θ∗ = θV (θi). From (28), this implies that voters
are indifferent when uninformed. But given I∗ = 0 and the expressions in
(23), there exists a unique R∗0 that solves the following:
θV (θi) = θi − r + (1−R∗0)−1cE, (38)





follows from the range given in lemma 8:
θV (θi) ∈ [θ, θi]. Note that θ̂ < θi implies cEr < 1. 
Other than stating the most obvious reason for media passivity, proposition 4
also offers insights on the selection mechanism used by receivers to improve chal-
lenger quality. When the media is out of the picture due to too high costs or a too
weak investigation technology, it is up to voters to improve challenger selection
by exploiting the self-fulfilling nature of their rational expectations. In the first
equilibria, they never want to reelect the incumbent because her quality is so low
that even if all candidate-types were challenging, they would still be better off
replacing the incumbent with one of them.40 The second equilibria is a case of
sufficient self-selection, not sufficient in the sense that it ensures ex post superior-
ity of the challenger if she were to be elected as in proposition 3, but sufficient in
the sense that the lowest quality candidate-type that would be elected is better
than the lowest quality which voters are willing to face. As shown later on, a
low incumbent quality would facilitate the prevalence of such “low standards”.
In the final equilibria, voters’ standards are high enough, so that they induce
some improvement in challenger selection by threatening to sometimes vote for
the incumbent when they are uninformed. The next set of equilibria is related to
this idea of standards.
Proposition 5 (PBE - Passive media: Low media standard): Assume
that θ̂ < θi and Ω ̸= ∅. Assume further that cIΨ ≤ K(θi). Define θ
∗ = inf Ω. Then
the following equilibria prevail and they are unique in the lemma 2 sense.
1. If θi < E [θc] and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ≤ θ̂, then I∗ = R∗0 = 0 and θ∗ = max{θ, θ̂}.
2. If θi ≥ E [θc] and max {θV (θi), θM(Ψ, cI , θi)} ≤ θ̂, then I∗ = R∗0 = 0 and
θ∗ = max{θ, θ̂}.
40Note that I am referring to these as “equilibria”, because they are only unique in the lemma
2 sense.
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3. If θi ≥ E [θc], θM(Ψ, cI , θi) < θV (θi) and θV (θi) > θ̂, then I∗ = 0. Further-





such that θ∗ = θV (θi).
Proof: Suppose θ̂ < θi,
cI
Ψ
≤ K(θi) and Ω ̸= ∅.
1. Assume θi < E [θc] and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ≤ θ̂ and suppose instead θ∗ > max{θ, θ̂}.
Since θi < E [θc], lemma 8 implies R∗0 = 0. Since θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ≤ θ̂, lemma
9 implies I∗ = 0. But then (23)-(24) imply that θ∗ = max{θ, θ̂}, a contra-
diction. Combining this with lemma 3 then implies θ∗ = max{θ, θ̂}. Given
R∗0 = 0, I
∗ = 0 is the unique investigation strategy consistent with this fact,
which follows again from (23)-(24).
2. Assume θi ≥ E [θc] and max {θV (θi), θM(Ψ, cI , θi)} ≤ θ̂ and suppose instead
that either I∗ = 0 or R∗ = 0 (or both). (23)-(24), along with lemma 1
then implies that θ∗ > θ̂. But then, lemmas 8 and 9 imply that R∗0 = 0
and I∗ = 0, a contradiction. It follows that in equilibrium, one must have
I∗ = R∗0 = 0 and the only θ
∗ consistent with beliefs which would justify
these media and voter strategies is θ∗ = max{θ, θ̂}.
3. Assume θi ≥ E [θc], θM(Ψ, cI , θi) < θV (θi) and θV (θi) > θ̂. Suppose instead
θ∗ > θV (θi). Then by assumption, we also have θ
∗ > θM(Ψ, cI , θi). From
lemmas 8 and 9, these imply R∗0 = 0 and I
∗ = 0. But then, (23)-(24) imply
θ∗ = max{θ, θ̂} ≤ θV (θi), a contradiction. Combining this with corollary
implies that in equilibrium, one must have θ∗ = θV (θi) so that voters are
indifferent when uninformed. Furthermore, since θM(Ψ, cI , θi) < θV (θi), one
must also have I∗ = 0 from lemma 9. Finally from (23), there is a unique







follows as before. 
Proposition 5 reveals two additional reasons for equilibrium media passivity be-
sides sufficient self-selection and a priori prohibitive unit costs: absolutely, and
relatively low media standard. The first two cases correspond to equilibria in
which political incentives provided by ex post net office benefits are not too high
relative to media’s standard, so that the lowest candidate-type who would chal-
lenge under a certain victory is higher then the lowest type media is willing
to accept before considering to use its journalistic tools. In the last case, me-
dia passivity arises due to its standard being low relative to voters’ standards.
Foreseeing that voters who are left to their own deductive means would already
provide better selection (higher minimum challenger competence) compared to its
own standard, it remains silent, choosing to avoid costs and risks associated with
investigation. In other words, voters are “pickier”, and knowing this, media stays
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passive. Notice that within the current boundaries of the model, both absolute
and relative media standards ultimately depend on two things. First, quality of
the incumbent along with the specific unconditional distribution of types. Since
the media and voters use different decision statistics, these would affect their
cutoff qualities differently and hence could affect the ordering of their standards.
For instance, an immediate look at equations (31) and (37) implies that if the
quality distribution were to gain skewness to the left, i.e. started putting a higher
mass on higher qualities, then ceteris paribus, media would have more reason to
become active. This might seem counter-intuitive but it is the logical implication
of the media being benevolent. If, conditional on a challenge threshold, average
quality of the challenger were to increase, then voters would not be so aggressive
in their incumbent retention threats. This would give the media more reason to
be active, as there would be more ex post inferior challengers to expose. Second,
media’s investigation costs and its journalistic strength are the main determi-
nants of the lowest quality challenger palatable to media before engaging in an
investigation. These will be studied in more detail later on.
2.4.2 Equilibria With an Active Media
For presenting the equilibria in this section, it is useful to define the following
parameter.





θ̂Ψ is the quality of the worst challenger when R0 = 0 and I = 1, i.e. it is the
maximin challenger quality that the media can achieve given that voters always
elect the challenger if they remain uncertain. It reflects the maximum reach of
media’s journalistic powers, given that it receives no help from (uncertain) voters
regarding selection. Notice that θ̂ ≤ θ̂Ψ, with the inequality being strict unless
Ψ = 0. As indicated previously, the main force incentivizing the media towards
being active is its standard. Parameter configurations under which this standard
will be high enough can be broadly classified under two categories. I start with
the more obvious one.
Proposition 6 (PBE - Active media: Below average incumbent): Assume
that θ̂ < θi,
cI
Ψ
≤ K(θi), and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) > θ̂, along with Ω ̸= ∅. Assume further
that θi < E [θc]. Define θ∗ = inf Ω. Then the following equilibria prevail and they
are unique in the lemma 2 sense.
1. If Ψ < 1− cE
r
and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) < θ̂Ψ, then R
∗
0 = 0 and there exists a unique
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I∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that θ∗ = θM(Ψ, cI , θi).
2. If Ψ < 1− cE
r
and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ≥ θ̂Ψ, then R∗0 = 0, I∗ = 1 and θ∗ = θ̂Ψ.
3. If Ψ ≥ 1 − cE
r
, then R∗0 = 0 and there exists a unique I
∗ ∈ (0,Ψ−1 − cE
Ψr
)
such that θ∗ = θM(Ψ, cI , θi).
Proof: Suppose θ̂ < θi,
cI
Ψ
≤ K(θi), θM(Ψ, cI , θi) > θ̂, Ω ̸= ∅ and θi < E [θc].
R∗0 = 0 directly follows from lemma 8.
1. Assume Ψ < 1− cE
r
and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) < θ̂Ψ. Note that the former assumption
implies θ̂Ψ < θi (and also note that this equilibrium could not occur when
cI = 0 since this would imply from lemma 9 that θM(·) = θi). Suppose that
θ∗ < θM(Ψ, cI , θi). Then from lemma 8, we have I
∗ = 1. Since R∗0 = 0, this
implies from (23) that θ∗ = θ̂Ψ > θM(Ψ, cI , θi), a contradiction. Suppose
instead θ∗ > θM(Ψ, cI , θi). Then from lemma 8, we have I
∗ = 0. Since
R∗0 = 0, this implies from (23) that θ
∗ = θ̂ < θM(Ψ, cI , θi), a contradiction.
It follows that in equilibrium, one must have θ∗ = θM(Ψ, cI , θi). Given
R∗0 = 0 and the expressions in (23), there exists a unique I
∗ that satisfies
the following:
θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θi − r + (1−ΨI∗)−1cE, (40)
where the range I∗ ∈ (0, 1) is dictated from the fact that at this range,
θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ∈ (θ̂, θ̂Ψ).
2. Assume Ψ < 1 − cE
r
and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ≥ θ̂Ψ. Since R∗ = 0, in any equilib-
rium, one must have θ∗ ∈ [θ̂, θ̂Ψ]. This is because as I∗ is varied in [0, 1],
that is the resulting range for θ∗ from (23). So for any θ∗ ̸= θ̂Ψ, one would
get I∗ = 1 from lemma 9, which would result in a contradiction of the form
θ∗ = θ̂Ψ. It follows that I
∗ = 1 and θ∗ = θ̂Ψ.
3. Assume Ψ ≥ 1 − cE
r
. Note that with this assumption; θ̂Ψ ≥ θi. Suppose
instead that θ∗ > θM(Ψ, cI , θi). Then lemma 9 implies I
∗ = 0. This,
along with (23)-(24) and the fact that R∗0 = 0 implies that θ
∗ = θ̂ <
θM(Ψ, cI , θi), a contradiction. Suppose instead θ
∗ < θM(Ψ, cI , θi). Then
lemma 9 implies I∗ = 1. This, along with (23) and the fact that R∗0 = 0
implies θ∗ = θ̂Ψ ≥ θi ≥ θM(Ψ, cI , θi) (the latter inequality follows from
lemma 9), another contradiction. It follows that in equilibrium, challenger
threshold should satisfy θ∗ = θM(Ψ, cI , θi). Lemma 9 has shown that if
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cI > 0, then θM(·) < θi. So given R∗0 = 0 and the expressions in (23), there
exists a unique I∗ that satisfies the following:
θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θi − r + (1−ΨI∗)−1cE, (41)





follows from the observation that at
this range, θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ∈ (θ̂, θi). 
When the incumbent’s quality is below average (and investigation technology is
not too weak and/or not too costly), media shines the most. Because voters are
ex ante content with even the worst candidate-type challenging, this is the set-
ting where the media has the most incentive to take the initiative and actively
investigate. It does so in order to make sure that it is not an inferior challenger re-
placing the incumbent. In other words, bad incumbents attract bad challengers,
which is when the media is most needed. Proposition 6 also reveals that the
relation between the probability of a successful investigation and net (of costs
of challenging) office rents plays a key role in determining the extent of media
activity. Comparing these two is akin to contrasting the strength of media’s pos-
itive selection powers to the potency of the negative selection effects of political
payoffs. In the first two equilibria, the latter dominates so that even if the media
was fully active (I∗ = 1), it would be unable to deter all inferior candidate-types
from challenging (θ̂Ψ < θi). Yet if the chance of an investigation failure is suf-
ficiently high, then the real costs of information would be high as well, which
would translate into a low standard for the media, lower even than θ̂Ψ. So in the
first equilibria, media never investigates with certainty but mixes up until the
minimum challenger quality accommodates its low standard. Second equilibria
occurs when the media strength is at its sweet spot regarding the intensity of its
journalistic activity: when it is low relative to the severity of adverse selection,
but not that low in absolute terms so that investigation is still cost efficient, its
standard will be higher than the reach of its selection powers. Hence, it will have
a strong incentive to engage actively in political journalism, implying I∗ = 1. In
the final case, the strength of investigation technology is sufficient to deter all
inferior challengers (θ̂Ψ ≥ θi), so as long as cI > 0, media will return to mixing.
Figure 2 depicts various ranges of Ψ associated with different regimes of equi-
libria when θi < E [θc]. It has investigation strength on the x-axis and the associ-
ated values for θM and θ̂Ψ on the y-axis for fixed values of r, cE, cI , θi,E [θc]. The
(solid) orange curve represents θ̂Ψ, which is equal to θ̂ = θi − r + cE whenever
Ψ = 0, is strictly increasing in Ψ, and has a vertical asymptote at Ψ = 1.
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Figure 2: Media Strength and Equilibrium Transition - Below Average Incumbent
The (solid) blue curve represents θM(·), which is equal to θ when Ψ ≤ Ψ0, is
increasing in Ψ and takes a specific value whenever Ψ = 1.41 It’s concave shape
(for Ψ > Ψ0) is strongly suggested by two facts: First, θM is strictly increasing in
Ψ whenever Ψ > Ψ0 (so its derivative with respect to Ψ is nowhere zero, see next
section), and second, one can see from (35) that whenever Ψ → ∞, θM → θi,
i.e. θM has a horizontal asymptote at θ = θi. Yet, it is possible that θM exhibits
several “slanted” inflection points before turning fully concave and asymptoting
towards θi. The way the figure is drawn, as Ψ is varied in [0, 1], five regimes of
equilibria will arise:
1. Ψ ∈ [0,Ψ0) - Proposition 4 case 1 (prohibitive costs): I∗ = 0 and θ∗ = θ̂.
2. Ψ ∈ [Ψ0,Ψ1] - Proposition 5 case 1 (low standard): I∗ = 0 and θ∗ = θ̂.
3. Ψ ∈ (Ψ1,Ψ2) - Proposition 6 case 1: I∗ ∈ (0, 1) and θ∗ = θM(·).
4. Ψ ∈ [Ψ2,Ψ3] - Proposition 6 case 2: I∗ = 1 and θ∗ = θ̂Ψ.
5. Ψ ∈ (Ψ3,Ψ4) - Proposition 6 case 1 again: I∗ ∈ (0, 1) and θ∗ = θM(·).





and θ∗ = θM(·).




The fact that θM is increasing in Ψ is not hard to see but will nevertheless be shown in the
following section.
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There are three things noteworthy to mention about the regime switching be-
haviour when Ψ is varied. First, in the particular example given above, case 1
in proposition 6 occurs twice. This is not a peculiarity caused by the way the
figure is drawn, nor does it depend on the assumed pictographic concavity of
θM(·) but rather a consequence of policy continuity, which is to be shown sub-
sequently. If the equilibria in which media always investigates were to occur,
then case 1 in proposition 6 should occur at least twice as Ψ is varied, because
otherwise (if the passage was direct from case 2 to case 3), I∗ would jump from





where Ψ−1 − cE
Ψr
≤ 1. Second, in general, the equilibria
in proposition 6 case 2 (I∗ = 1) does not need to occur, since if the signalling
strength of challenger entry is relatively high, then media would never be fully
active, i.e. it would always mix. This can be seen from the dashed orange curve,
which represents an upwards shift in θ̂Ψ due to an increase in participation costs
cE or a decrease in office rents r. On the flip side, if the cost of investigation
was lower, then the curve representing θM(·) would shift up (dashed blue curve),
implying that the media would be fully active for a wide range of parameter val-
ues reflecting its strength.42 Notice that investigation cost is the sole (besides
strength) determinant of media pickiness in this model. However, one can also
assume that media gets additional benefits (besides altruism) from revealing the
true quality of challengers by, say, giving it a reward b every time it successfully
does so. An increase in b would have very similar effects to a decrease in cI . Fi-
nally, again with respect to the example given above, the passage from case 2 to
case 1 and 3 respectively implies that media becomes less active as its journalistic
strength increases. Yet, this decrease in journalistic activity is never high enough
to undermine the gains associated with the increase in Ψ. From figure 2, one can
immediately see that θ∗ is the lower envelope of the relevant curves, i.e.







and thus, it is increasing in Ψ. The intuition behind this is clear. The reason
for reduced media activity when it is stronger is the increased threat it poses to
inferior challengers. As such, the media no longer needs to be as active as before,
as it can achieve a better selection effect by less journalism.
A below average incumbent is not the only reason for the media being actively
involved in selection. If it has sufficiently low costs, it can also be active due to
higher standards compared to voters.
42As cI → 0, θM (·) converges pointwise to the horizontal line at θi. On the other hand, as
cI → ∞, θM (·) converges pointwise to the horizontal line at θ.
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Proposition 7 (PBE - Active media: Higher media standard): Assume
that θ̂ < θi,
cI
Ψ
≤ K(θi), and Ω ̸= ∅. Assume further that θi ≥ E [θc] and that
θM(Ψ, cI , θi) > max{θ̂, θV (θi)}. Define θ∗ = inf Ω. Then the following equilibria
prevail and they are unique in the lemma 2 sense.
1. If Ψ < 1− cE
r
and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) < θ̂Ψ, then R
∗
0 = 0 and there exists a unique
I∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that θ∗ = θM(Ψ, cI , θi).
2. If Ψ < 1− cE
r
and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) > θV (θi) ≥ θ̂Ψ, then I∗ = 1, and there exists
a unique R∗0 ∈ [0, 1− cE(1−Ψ)r ) such that θ
∗ = θV (θi).
3. If Ψ < 1 − cE
r
and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ≥ θ̂Ψ > θV (θi), then R∗0 = 0, I∗ = 1 and
θ∗ = θ̂Ψ.
4. If Ψ ≥ 1 − cE
r
, then R∗0 = 0 and there exists a unique I
∗ ∈ (0,Ψ−1 − cE
Ψr
)
such that θ∗ = θM(Ψ, cI , θi).
Proof: Suppose θ̂ < θi,
cI
Ψ
≤ K(θi), E [θc] ≤ θi, Ω ̸= ∅ and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) >
max{θ̂, θV (θi)}.
1. Almost identical to the proof of proposition 6 case 1, with the added fact
that θV (θi) < θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θ
∗ implying R∗0 = 0.
2. Assume Ψ < 1 − cE
r
and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) > θV (θi) ≥ θ̂Ψ. Suppose instead
θ∗ > θV (θi). Then lemma 8 implies R
∗
0 = 0. But then, for any I
∗ ∈ [0, 1],
one must have:
θ∗ = θi − r + (1−ΨI∗)−1cE ≤ θ̂Ψ ≤ θV (θi),
a contradiction. Combining this with corollary 2 ensures that in any equilib-
rium, one must have θ∗ = θV (θi), so voters are indifferent when uninformed.
Since by assumption θM(·) > θV (·), I∗ = 1 follows directly. Moreover, from
(23)-(24), the unique R∗0 should solve the following.
θV (θi) = θi − r + [(1−Ψ)(1−R∗0)]
−1 cE, (43)
where the range R∗0 ∈ [0, 1− cE(1−Ψ)r ) follows from the fact that at this range,
θV (·) ∈ [θ̂Ψ, θi). Note that θV (·) = θi can’t occur in this equilibrium as long
as cI > 0, since from lemma 9 we have θM(·) < θi.
3. Assume Ψ < 1− cE
r
and θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ≥ θ̂Ψ > θV (θi). First, suppose instead
θ∗ < θ̂Ψ. Then from lemma 9, I
∗ = 1. Then from (23)-(24), for any
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R∗0 ∈ [0, 1], one has:
θ∗ = θi − r + [(1−Ψ)(1−R∗0)]
−1 cE ≥ θ̂Ψ, (44)
a contradiction. Next, suppose θ∗ > θ̂Ψ. Then from lemma 8, R
∗
0 = 0, so
from (23)-(24), for any I∗ ∈ [0, 1], one has:
θ∗ = θi − r + (1−ΨI∗)−1cE ≤ θ̂Ψ, (45)
a contradiction. It follows that in equilibrium, θ∗ = θ̂Ψ. If θM(·) > θ̂Ψ, then
I∗ = 1 follows from lemma 9. If θM(·) = θ̂Ψ, then I∗ = 1 follows from the
definition of θ̂Ψ. In both cases, R
∗
0 = 0 follows from lemma 8.
4. Almost identical to the proof of proposition 6 case 3, with the added fact
that θV (θi) < θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θ
∗ implying R∗0 = 0. 
Proposition 7 shows that even if the incumbent is an above average quality politi-
cian, which gives voters the incentive to improve the pool of potential challengers
by fine-tuning their voting strategies under uncertainty, media can still play a role
in selection if costs of investigation are sufficiently low. First, third and fourth
cases are very similar to first, second and third cases of proposition 6 respectively,
so they don’t require additional discussion. Second case of proposition 7 is in-
teresting however, because it involves the media aggressively investigating and
voters threatening to sometimes reelect the incumbent simultaneously. Unlike
other equilibria, which underline the substitutability between media and voter
strategies in improving selection (as either one or the other is active, never both),
these equilibria emphasize the complementarity between them. The maximum
quality for the worst candidate achievable by media selection alone is bounded
above by θ̂Ψ. Since this is below the minimum challenger quality acceptable to
voters, one needs to introduce an appropriate probability of retaining the incum-
bent into their strategy under uncertainty to make sure that a satisfactory (and
stable) expected challenger quality is attained. Notice that voters could get this
minimum quality even though media was passive, i.e. even if I∗ = 0. Since the
media acts as an altruistic “extended arm” of voters in this model, why then do
they still investigate aggressively and undertake costs of journalism? One can
read this as a coordination failure result. An alternative, and a more appropriate
reading would note that voters and media care about the same thing, but from
different perspectives. While the voters care about the expected quality of the
politician to be placed in the office, media cares about the expected ex post welfare
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loss due to placing the wrong guy in the office. As long as costs of journalism are
low and investigation strength is not too low, this latter concern would dominate
the former in its standard for worst challenger quality. This observation follows
from a simple comparison of media and voters’ objectives in (31) and (35), which
suggests that whenever cI is low enough and Ψ is not too low, θM(·) > θV (·).
Figure 3: Media Strength and Equilibrium Transition - Above Average Incumbent
Figure 3 gives the figure 2 analogue of proposition 7, with θV (θi) taking an
appropriate value for case 2 to occur at a certain range of Ψ. The main difference
between figure 3 and figure 2 is the existence of a θV (θi) > θ, which is indicated
by θi > E [θc] as shown in lemma 8. Below, I list various regimes of equilibria
associated with it.
1. Ψ ∈ [0,Ψ′0) - Proposition 4 case 3 (prohibitive costs):
I∗ = 0, R∗0 ∈ (0, 1− cEr ), θ
∗ = θV (θi).
43
2. Ψ ∈ [Ψ′0,Ψ′1) - Proposition 5 case 3 (low media standard):
I∗ = 0, R∗0 ∈ (0, 1− cEr ), θ
∗ = θV (θi).
3. Ψ ∈ (Ψ′1,Ψ′2] - Proposition 7 case 2 (higher media standard):
I∗ = 1, R∗0 ∈ [0, 1− cE(1−Ψ)r ), θ
∗ = θV (θi).
4. Ψ ∈ (Ψ′2,Ψ′3] - Proposition 7 case 3 (higher media standard):
I∗ = 1, R∗0 = 0, θ
∗ = θ̂Ψ.
43Note that R∗0’s range does not include 1 − cEr unlike the statement of the proposition. This
is because in the figure, θV (θi) < θi.
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5. Ψ ∈ [Ψ′3,Ψ′4) - Proposition 7 case 1 (higher media standard):
I∗ ∈ (0, 1), R∗0 = 0, θ∗ = θM(·).






, R∗0 = 0, θ
∗ = θM(·).
First, notice that the same equilibria prevail under the first two regimes in the
list above. This is because θ∗ = θV in both of them and θV is independent
of Ψ, which implies that the cost-benefit structure of the media is irrelevant in
equilibrium. Second, non-monotonic response of media activity to improvements
in journalistic strength can be clearly seen: up to Ψ′1, media does not investigate at
all; between Ψ′1 and Ψ
′
3, it always investigates; and between Ψ
′
3 and 1, it sometimes
investigates. Keep in mind that the equilibria does not remain the same between
Ψ′3 and 1 as at this range, θ
∗ = θM(·) where the latter depends on Ψ. Voters
reelect the incumbent with positive probability under uncertainty even after the
media becomes fully active, but cease to do so once the media strength attains a
sufficiently high level and allows the media to provide a strong enough selection
effect by itself. This level corresponds to Ψ′2, where θV = θ̂Ψ. Third, notice
that despite the non-monotonic response of media activity, minimum challenger
quality is (weakly) increasing in media strength, because when this is low and
thus selection powers of the media is low, voters provide an adequate amount of
selection through their blind-voting strategies.







Finally, notice that the equilibria that arise exactly at Ψ′1 is not mentioned in the
list. Furthermore, media policy have a discontinuity at that point, jumping from
I∗ = 0 to I∗ = 1. This might seem contradictory with the previous remark about
policy continuity under θi < E [θc]. As will be shown in the next subsection,
policy continuity depends on the lemma 2 sense of uniqueness, which no longer
holds at Ψ′1.
Proposition 7.1 (PBE - Indeterminate media activity: Knife-edge case):
Assume that θ̂ < θi,
cI
Ψ
≤ K(θi), and Ω ̸= ∅. Assume further that θi ≥ E [θc] and
that θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θV (θi) > θ̂. Define θ
∗ = inf Ω. Then prevailing equilibria are
no longer unique in the lemma 2 sense and consist of θ∗ = θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θV (θi)
with any pair I∗, R∗0 such that the following holds.
θ∗ = θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θV (θi) = θi − r + [(1−ΨI∗)(1−R∗0)]
−1 cE. (47)
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Proof: Suppose that θ∗ > θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θV (θi), then lemmas 8 and 9 imply
R∗0 = I
∗ = 0, which implies (from (23)-(24)) θ∗ = θ̂, a contradiction. Suppose




which contradicts corollary 1. It follows that θ∗ = θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θV (θi). So the
media and voters should both be indifferent in equilibrium, and from (23)-(24),
the only θ∗ that would satisfy such simultaneous indifference and candidate’s
sequential rationality is given by (47). Note that there is a continuum of I∗, R∗0
satisfying (47), hence no longer uniqueness. The exact allowable ranges for I∗ and
R∗0 will depend on the specific parameter configuration at which the indifference
θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θV (θi) occurs. 
This concludes the presentation of equilibria in this model. Next, I will study
the effects induced on equilibrium strategies by changes in payoff parameters with
a particular emphasis on the media’s journalistic strength and its investigation
decision.
2.4.3 Equilibrium Effects of Changes in Payoffs
Payoff parameters in the model are: θi, cE, r, cI and Ψ. I start by studying the
equilibrium selection effects of these parameters, i.e. how does the equilibrium
challenge threshold respond to a change in one of these parameters. Following
lemma partly answers this question.
Lemma 10 (Comparative statics - Media and voter cutoffs): Assume
θV (θi) ∈ (θ, θi), then θV (θi) is strictly increasing in θi. If θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ∈ (θ, θi),
then θM(·) is strictly increasing in Ψ,θi and strictly decreasing in cI .
Proof: Appendix. 
This is a very intuitive result and in line with previous discussions. A higher
incumbent quality incentivizes both the media and voters to demand a higher
minimum challenger quality. Furthermore, a fall in information costs or an in-
crease in journalistic strength allow the media to be more aggressive in setting
its standard. Next, I define two piecewise functions which will allow expressing
the equilibrium challenge threshold in a simple form. For the voters:
θ̃V (θi) =
θ, (θi < E [θc])θV (θi), (θi ≥ E [θc]) , (48)
with θV (θi) is as defined in lemma 8. Notice that θ̃V (θi) is continuous, as θV (θi) =
θ whenever θi = E [θc], and θV (θi) itself is continuous. For the media:
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with θM(·) is as defined in lemma 9. Notice that θ̃M(·) is continuous, as θM(·) = θ
whenever cI
Ψ
= K(θi), and θM(·) itself is continuous. Combining all the different
equilibria presented previously, following function can be seen to map payoff
parameters to the unique equilibrium challenge threshold.44




θ̂Ψ, θ̃M(Ψ, cI , θi)
}}
. (50)
The mapping defined in (50) is continuous, as all of its components are continu-
ous. Moreover, θ̂ and θ̂Ψ are strictly increasing in θi, cE and strictly decreasing
in r.45 Furthermore, θ̂Ψ is strictly increasing in Ψ. Combining these with lemma
10, next corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 3 (Equilibrium response of minimum challenger quality):
θ∗(Ψ, cI , θi, cE, r) is non-decreasing in θi,Ψ, cE and non-increasing in cI , r.
46
The reason for using the terms non-decreasing and non-increasing is that de-
pending on the equilibrium, slight changes in some parameters might leave the
challenge threshold intact. For instance, if θ̂ > max
{
θ̃V (θi), θ̃M(Ψ, cI , θi)
}
, then
I∗ = R∗0 = 0 and θ
∗ = θ̂ (proposition 5 case 2), and slight changes in Ψ or cI have
no impact on the value of θ∗. From (50), it can be seen that an increase in θi
always increases θ∗ unless θ∗ = θ: if θ∗ ∈ {θ̂, θ̂Ψ}, then it increases it due to the
fact that candidates themselves care about the quality of the politician to assume
the office, and if θ∗ ∈ {θV (·), θM(·)}, then it increases it due to either the media
or voters demanding a higher minimum quality from them. On the other hand,
a slight change in Ψ or cI affects the equilibrium only if the media was already
actively involved in selection.47 As expected from such a case, an increase in
information costs worsens selection while an increase in media strength improves
it. Finally, a change in political payoffs r and cE affects the equilibrium minimum
challenger quality only if θ∗ ∈ {θ̂, θ̂Ψ}. While the direction of their impact is intu-
44Notice that even if an equilibrium is not unique in the lemma 2 sense (i.e. proposition 7.1),
θ∗ is still unique.
45As a reminder, θ̂ = θi − r + cE and θ̂Ψ = θi − r + (1−Ψ)−1cE .
46Notice that this result does not depend on the concavity/convexity characteristics of θM (·). It
solely hinges on the monotonicity of thresholds. If θM (·) were to intersect θ̂Ψ multiple times,
then the figures (4) and (5) would be different but the monotonicity would remain intact.
47Or about to be actively involved, i.e. at a regime switching point. This can occur when there
is an equality relationship between θM (·) and one of the remaining thresholds in (50).
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itive, i.e. higher office rents attract worse challengers and higher challenge costs
discourage them, a more interesting aspect about this result is that they don’t
influence θ∗ whenever θ∗ ∈ {θV (θi), θM(Ψ, cI , θi)}. Whenever voters or the me-
dia are able to achieve a minimum challenger quality up to their standards (and
these standards are higher than the institutional lower bounds), their strategies
neutralize negative selection effects of political payoffs in the margin. This can
be read as an envelope result. For instance, whenever the media has a higher
standard compared to voters but its ability to induce selection is limited by its
strength and yet it is still sufficient to provide an adequate level of selection in the
eyes of voters (i.e. proposition 7 case 3), then the constraint associated with θ̂Ψ
is active so a change in political payoffs affects the minimum challenger quality
in equilibrium. Figures 4 and 5 plot challenge thresholds corresponding to figures
2 and 3 respectively.
Figure 4: Media Strength and Challenger Threshold - Below Average Incumbent
Figure 5: Media Strength and Challenger Threshold - Above Average Incumbent
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Equilibrium responses of media and voter strategies (under uncertainty) to
changes in payoffs are slightly more involved. I first start with a straightforward
comparative statics result. Notice that both media’s and uncertain voters’ equi-
librium strategies are differentiable in payoff parameters when the equilibrium
is not at a regime switching point. This is because at an “interior” equilibria,
they are unique and are either pure strategies equal to 0 or 1 in a sufficiently
small open neighbourhood around the given payoff vector, or a completely mixed
strategy satisfying a uniquely solvable equation (in such a neighbourhood) such
as (41) made up of differentiable components θM(·) or θV (·).48
Lemma 11 (Comparative statics - Media and voter strategies): Assume
that the given payoff vector (θi, cE, r, cI ,Ψ) corresponds to an equilibrium at a




, cE, cI > 0 and
Ψ ∈ (0, 1). Then both I∗ and R∗0 are differentiable in payoff parameters. If they
are equal to 0 or 1, then their derivatives with respect to payoff parameters are

























< 0 only if the equilibrium
occurs at proposition 7 case 2.49 If the equilibrium is characterized by θ∗ =
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≥ (>)0 again if f is (strictly) log-concave.
Proof: Appendix. 
First thing to notice from lemma 11 is that payoff parameters (satisfying the
48By regime switching points, I mean parameter configurations at which slight perturbations
to payoffs would result the new equilibria to occur under a new parameter regime. For
instance a payoff vector leading to θM (Ψ, cI , θi) = θV (θi) > θ̂Ψ corresponds to such a regime
switching point, as a slight increase in Ψ would change the equilibria from proposition 7.1
to one under proposition 7 case 2. Another example is a configuration such that θi < E [θc]
and θ̂ = θM (Ψ, cI , θi). Yet another example is proposition 7 case 3 with θ̂Ψ = θM (Ψ, cI , θi).
The reason that differentiability of strategies can be violated at these points (besides possible
continuity issues) is that if they correspond to indifference points where a slight perturbation
would lead a receiver to switch from playing a pure strategy to a complete mixture, then they
can introduce non-differentiable kinks into strategies.
49Notice that the non-regime switching point assumption requires θV (θi) ̸= θ̂Ψ if the equilibrium
were to occur at proposition 7 case 2.
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non-regime switching condition) affect media and voter strategies at the margin
only if they are actively participating in selection and playing completely mixed
strategies. This results from their action sets being finite and the related nature
of equilibria in this model. If they are playing pure strategies, then there must be
a particular strict ordering between various decision-relevant quality thresholds,
which would keep holding if the payoff vector was slightly perturbed. Looking
at the impact of marginal changes in payoff parameters, signs associated with r
and cE are intuitive. An increase in r or a decrease in cE represents a weakening
in the signalling power of a challenge because holding media and voter strategies
constant, the quality of the worst candidate-type who challenges falls. Media
and voters respond to this by tightening the leash. In case of media, this takes
the form of investigating more frequently. In case of voters, it implies retaining
the incumbent more often. Regarding θi, it is possible to distinguish two effects.
Since candidates themselves care about the public good and hence the quality of
the elected official, ceteris paribus, an increase in the incumbent quality attracts
better candidates, which increases expected challenger quality (voters’ decision
statistic), as well as the expected inferior challenger quality (media’s decision
statistic). If these latter increases are not enough to compensate the higher
benefit from reelecting the incumbent -which is the case when f is log-concave-
then media has a stronger incentive to be active and voters have more reason
to increase their threat of reelecting the incumbent. Regarding cI , an increase
in information costs never influence an uncertain voter’s decision as long as the
non-regime switching condition is satisfied. But as expected, it makes the media
less likely to be active given that it is not constrained by its strength. Finally, the
interesting fact about media strength Ψ is that it can influence voting decision
under uncertainty. If the equilibrium is as described in proposition 7 case 2, i.e.
the media has a higher quality standard compared to voters (θM(·) > θV (·)) but
not only it is constrained by its strength when it comes to satisfying its own
standard (θM(·) > θ̂Ψ), it is also constrained in the sense that the minimum
challenger quality it can guarantee by being fully active is not sufficient to satisfy
voters (θV (·) > θ̂Ψ). In that case, an increase in media strength translates into
a higher minimum challenger quality as the media is fully active. This allows
voters to reduce their threat of retaining the incumbent. On the other hand,
an increase in Ψ has an ambiguous effect on media activation whenever it is
not constrained by its strength and is actively involved in selection. This is in
line with the non-monotonic media activation pattern discussed in the previous







∂θM(Ψ, cI , θi)
∂Ψ
−Ψ−1I∗ ≷ 0. (53)
In (53), the first term (which is strictly positive from lemma 10) reflects the
efficiency gain due to increased journalistic strength. Since an investigation is
more likely to succeed following an increase in Ψ, undertaking costs associated
with it is better justified, which is reflected in the higher media standard. The
second term captures the boost to media’s selection strength. For a given level
of media activity I∗, a higher Ψ implies a higher minimum challenger quality.
In other words, same (or even slightly higher) positive selection effect can be
induced by a slightly lower level of activity, which would translate into expected
cost savings. If the latter effect dominates the former, then media activity should
decrease. However, this decrease would never be strong enough to fully erode the
efficiency gain. This can be either deduced indirectly from corollary 3, or can be











The inequality in (54) follows from the first term in (53) being strictly positive.
Intuitively, one should expect the expression in (53) to be positive for relatively
low values of Ψ and negative for high values of Ψ. In fact, if the continuity (or
almost everywhere continuity) of I∗ can be established, then one can show that
I∗ indeed possesses such non-monotonicity in its comparative static.
More generally, if I∗ and R∗0 are continuous in payoff parameters, then one can
generalize the comparative statics results in lemma 11 to the entire set of payoff
parameters satisfying θ̂ < θi. The following result is the first step in establishing
such generalization.
Lemma 12 (Payoff upper hemicontinuity of media and voters’ equilib-
rium mixed strategy correspondences): Consider the following set.
Υ =
{
(θi, cE, r, cI ,Ψ) : θi ∈ [θ, θ], cE > 0, r > 0, r > cE, cI > 0,Ψ ∈ [0, 1]
}
(55)
Equilibrium mixed strategy correspondences of voters and the media are upper
hemicontinuous in payoff parameters on Υ.
Proof: Appendix. 
Propositions 4 to 7.1 have shown that equilibrium mixed strategy correspondences
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are single-valued except at the locus of parameters satisfying the conditions for
proposition 7.1. This implies that when particular selections I∗ and R∗0 are made
from these correspondences, they will be functions continuous everywhere on Υ
except on the locus where such non-uniqueness (in the lemma 2 sense) is present.50
Corollary 4 (Almost everywhere continuity of equilibrium media and
voter strategies): Let Υd be a subset of Υ defined as follows.
Υd =
{
(θi, cE, r, cI ,Ψ) ∈ Υ : θ̂ < θi,
cI
Ψ
≤ K(θi), θi ≥ E [θc] ,
θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θV (θi) ≥ θ̂
}
(56)
Then a particular pair (I∗, R∗0) ≡ (I(θi, cE, r, cI ,Ψ), R0(θi, cE, r, cI ,Ψ)) of media
and voter strategies is continuous on Υ \Υd and is discontinuous on Υd.51
One can select infinitely many pairs of functions (I∗, R∗0) over Υ describing equi-
librium strategies as long as they match the descriptions laid out in proposition
4 to 7.1. However, all those pairs will be identical except on Υd, due to lemma 2
sense of uniqueness. Despite the discontinuity, it turns out that it is still possible
to partially generalize lemma 11 over Υ due to “monotonicity” of the jumps at
points of discontinuity with respect to parameters characterizing media’s tech-
nology.
Lemma 13 (Equilibrium response of media and voter strategies): Take a
pair I∗, R∗0 of equilibrium strategies. Then in Υ\Υd; R∗0 and I∗ are non-decreasing
in r and non-increasing in cE. In Υ; R
∗
0 is non-decreasing in cI , non-increasing in
Ψ and I∗ is non-increasing in cI . Finally, in Υd; I
∗ is non-decreasing in Ψ.
Proof: Appendix. 
The intuition behind lemma 13 is simple. Continuity of I∗ and R∗0 on Υ \Υd en-
sures that lemma 11 carries over to any regime-switching point in it. It was also
shown that Υd consisted of payoff vectors leading to the knife-edge case described
in proposition 7.1. At any knife-edge equilibrium, media and voter standards are
exactly equal. So any increase in media strength or decrease in information
costs lead to media’s standard exceeding that of the voters, which introduces the
50This is because single-valued upper hemicontinuous correspondences are continuous when
viewed as functions.
51The terminology almost everywhere follows from the fact that Υd is a subset of a four-
dimensional subspace, so it has a Lebesgue measure zero on five dimensions, where the (re-
stricted) domain of strategies Υ resides.
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required monotonicity even when discontinuous jumps are involved. This mono-
tonicity allows to match the Υd-behaviour of strategies in media parameters with
the general pattern laid out in lemma 11. Shortcomings of lemma 13 are also not
surprising. Regarding θi, one can see that the differential impact of θi on θV (·)
and θM(·) may lead to knife’s edge being broken in both ways (θM(·) > θV (·) or
vice versa). Whichever case obtains, this makes sure that the impact of θi on I
∗
and R∗0 in Υd is asymmetric, so that one can not generalize the sign conformity
result obtained in lemma 11 for θi to Υd. Even if one is not interested in general-
izing lemma 11 to θi but simply wants to know its direction of impact at Υd, this




whenever θM = θV . Unfortunately, such
comparison does not yield a clear-cut ordering, but strongly suggests a higher
increase for θV under log-concavity. This would be in line with the result that
the media is relatively more important when the incumbent is below average and
would imply an upward impact (of an increase in θi) to R
∗
0 and vice versa. Regard-
ing political payoffs, notice that whenever ξ ∈ Υd satisfies θM(ξ) = θV (ξ) = θ̂(ξ),
a small increase in r or a decrease in cE would lead to an upward jump in one or
both media and voter strategies, so monotonicity holds at that point. However,
if ξ ∈ Υd satisfies θM(ξ) = θV (ξ) > θ̂(ξ), then a sufficiently small increase in r or
a decrease in cE would leave media and voter standards intact and would ceteris
paribus worsen the minimum challenger quality. This would require additional
selection efforts by media and/or voters.52 But this required improvement in
selection can be achieved in any possible way. For instance, voters can slightly
reduce their threat of retaining the incumbent with media becoming much more
active, or vice versa, or they can both become more aggressive in their selection
strategies. This implies that such a monotonicity-in-Υd result cannot be generally
obtained for political payoffs and would be dependent on the particular strategies
I∗, R∗0 in hand.
2.4.4 Information Technology and Incentives for Media Activity
Notice that lemmas 11 and 13 left the strategic impact of media strength on
media activity ambiguous besides suggesting a general non-monotonic pattern in
line with the previously discussed equilibrium transition patterns. This section
retakes the issue in a more detailed manner by building on the continuity and
jump-monotonicity results presented in the previous section. The presentation is
based on two cases already introduced in figures 2 and 3. These are not the only
possible transition patterns mapping changes in media strength to equilibrium
52This follows from (47).
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behaviour, but are the most interesting ones. A necessary condition for such full
pictures is not too high information costs and a sufficiently strong a priori nega-
tive selection due to relatively high office rents and/or low participation costs. In
addition, the influence of improvements in media strength will be contrasted with
the monotonic impact of (information) cost reductions, and whenever incumbent
is of above average quality, voters’ equilibrium responses will be included in the
picture.
I start with the case when the incumbent is relatively weak, i.e. when its
quality is below the unconditional average (θi < E [θc]). Figure 2 is reproduced
below with additional media standard curves corresponding to different levels of
investigation costs.
Figure 6: Media Strength, Information Costs and Equilibrium Transition - Below
Average Incumbent
As investigation costs decrease down to zero, media strictly prefers investigating
as long as the minimum challenger quality is below the incumbent, so its stan-
dard becomes θi. As costs increase from zero, two effects are observed. First,
media’s θM -curve (its non-constant portion) shifts down, reflecting the fall in its
standard for a given level of journalistic strength. Second, the minimum strength
above which the media considers becoming active (the prohibitively low level of
strength) increases. When θi < E [θc], strategies are continuous in cI and Ψ. This
is a direct consequence of corollary 4. Figure 7 gives media and voters’ strategic
responses as costs are increased from zero when other parameters are fixed. The
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solid purple line assumes that media strength is fixed at Ψ3 from figure 6.
53
Figure 7: Strategic Effects of Information Costs - Below Average Incumbent
As shown before, when incumbent’s quality is below average, voters always vote
for the challenger when uninformed and let media deal with selection. When
media’s strength is not high enough to fully eliminate the adverse selection effects
of high net political payoffs (Ψ < Ψ4 = 1− cEr ), it is fully active until costs become
sufficiently high (c0). Further increases in information costs gradually reduce
media activation, reflecting the increasing cost-inefficiency of inducing selection,
which is captured by the decreasing media standard. When costs become too
high (c1), media ceases to be active and becomes obliged to accept the adverse
selection in its full extent. Figure 7 also shows that increases in media strength
has a dual effect on the investigation curve in the (cI , I) space. First, it shifts
the full activation cutoff leftward. The reason behind this is the fact that a
higher strength leads to a higher deterrence power for a given level of media
activation, which implies that it becomes less efficient to be fully active at a
given cost. Relatedly, whenever Ψ = Ψ4, media ceases full activation unless costs
are zero, because a fully active media would imply a complete eradication of
adverse selection, which is never justified under positive costs. Second, it tilts
the decreasing portion of I∗ rightward. This reflects gains in cost efficiency, which
ensures that the media can remain active for a wider range of investigation costs.
To see the effects of increasing media strength, fix costs to cI = c0. Previous
discussions showed that when Ψ ∈ [0,Ψ1], media is completely passive and when
53The shape of investigation response in figure 7 does not depend on concavity of θM in Ψ for
Ψ > Ψ0 as depicted in figure 6. Even if θM (·) intersects θ̂Ψ more than twice as Ψ is varied,
for a given Ψ, as cI is increased from 0, it will intersect it at most once in the (cI , θ) plane.
110
Ψ ∈ [Ψ2,Ψ3], it is fully active. Furthermore, from the continuity of I∗, one can
deduce that it should be increasing at some right-neighbourhood of Ψ1, increasing
at some left-neighbourhood of Ψ2, and decreasing at some right-neighbourhood




θM(·), as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 14 (Irregularly non-monotonic strategic response to changes
in media strength): For any given θi, r, cE, cI satisfying θi < E [θc], if θM(·)
intersects θ̂Ψ at least once as Ψ is varied from 0 to 1, then it should intersect
it an even number of times. Suppose it does and let Ψ1, . . . ,Ψ2n denote the
ordered set of intersection points for some positive integer n. Also let Ψ0 denote
where θM(Ψ
0) = θ̂. Then I∗ is increasing at some right-neighbourhood of Ψ0.
Furthermore, for any k ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}. If k is odd then I∗ is increasing at some
left-neighbourhood of Ψk and if k is even then I∗ is decreasing at some right-
neighbourhood of Ψk. Finally Ψ2n < 1− r
cE
.
Proof: Follows directly from continuity of I∗ and from θM(·) < θi. 
Assuming that the media ever finds itself constrained by its strength (θM(·) > θ̂Ψ)
at some range of Ψ, lemma 14 suggests an irregular flat-topped inverse-U shaped
equilibrium strategic response by media to increases in its journalistic strength.
One can say that I∗ is “on average” increasing for low values of Ψ and decreasing
for high values of Ψ.
Figure 8: Media Strength and Equilibrium Transition - Below Average Incumbent
(Irregular Case)
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Figure 9: (Irregular) Strategic Effects of Media Strength - Below Average Incum-
bent
Figure 8 shows an irregular θM(·) which starts convex (as Ψ exceeds Ψ0 = cIK(θi)),
then bounces back and forth between convexity and concavity while intersecting
θ̂Ψ 4 times as Ψ is varied before turning fully concave.
54. Lemma 14 allows one to
establish the increasing behaviour of I∗ at the immediate right-neighbourhood of
Ψ0, immediate left-neighbourhoods of Ψ1 and Ψ3 and decreasing behaviour of it
at immediate right-neighbourhoods of Ψ2 and Ψ4. Meanwhile in the background,
R∗0 is always zero due to weak incumbent quality. Notice that figure 9 also shows
that as Ψ → 1, I∗ should fall below 1− cE
r
. This was already mentioned in previous
propositions where various regimes of equilibria were presented, and the reason is
that if I∗ ≥ 1− cE
r
when Ψ = 1, then adverse selection is fully eliminated, which
we saw to be incompatible with costly investigation. Following lemma shows
that the irregular behaviour of I∗ disappears if θM(·) is strictly concave in Ψ for
Ψ > Ψ0 as depicted in figure 6.
Lemma 15 (Regularly non-monotonic strategic response to changes in
media strength): Suppose that θM(·) is strictly concave for Ψ > Ψ0. Then
if it intersects θ̂Ψ, it should intersect it exactly twice.
55 Furthermore, given a
parametric configuration satisfying the transition pattern depicted in figure 6
and assuming that cI = c0; I
∗ = 0 for Ψ ∈ [0,Ψ1], it is continuously increasing
54Note the difference between Ψ0 (prohibitively low strength) and Ψ
0 (strength at which θM
becomes high enough to make sure media is no longer satisfied by full adverse selection
outcome θ̂)
55Except possibly if there is a tangency.
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for Ψ ∈ (Ψ1,Ψ2], I∗ = 1 for Ψ ∈ [Ψ2,Ψ3], and it is continuously decreasing for
Ψ ∈ (Ψ3, 1].
Proof: Appendix. 
In the current model, concavity/convexity behaviour of θM(·) (above Ψ0) can
be isolated down to shape of the distribution governing θc. For instance, if θc
is uniformly distributed, then θM(·) is indeed strictly concave at its increasing
portion as the figure 6 suggests. More generally, the last part of the proof of




for all θM ≤ θi for a given θi, where H(·) is given as follows.





(θi − θc)f(θc) dθc. (57)
A sufficient condition for this is the distribution of θc satisfying convex mean
residual life (CMRL) property.56 Concavity of H amounts to saying that the de-
crease in the average quality gap between the incumbent and inferior challengers
becomes more pronounced as the minimum challenger quality increases. As a re-
sult, required increases for media standard regarding minimum challenger quality
following strength gains gradually dampen down. The figure below gives the equi-
librium strategic responses corresponding to figure 6 by fixing information costs
at cI = c0 and varying Ψ from 0 to 1.
Figure 10: (Regular) Strategic Effects of Media Strength - Below Average Incum-
bent
56See Belzunce and Shaked (2001). Examples of commonly used distributions satisfying CMRL
property are exponential, Pareto and Weibull.
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The reason for the disappearance of irregularities when concavity of θM(·) holds









. The former represents the marginal in-
crease in media standard due to gains in cost-efficiency, and the latter describes
the marginal gains in deterrence power by threat of exposure. If the former is
non-smaller than the latter, then I∗ is necessarily increasing. When θM(·) is con-
cave at its increasing range, this ensures that the relative ranking of these two
marginal effects change at most once, which allows one to conclude that I∗ should
either be always increasing (e.g. high information costs such as c1 in figure 6)
or it should be (weakly) increasing up to a point and then decreasing for all Ψ
above that point. Imposing a parametric configuration which ensures that an
equilibrium with I∗ = 1 occurs then acts as an identification condition, which
recovers the flat-topped inverse-U shaped strategic media response to gains in
journalistic strength depicted in figure 10. Figure 10 also demonstrates the im-
pact of an increase in information costs, which “squeezes” media’s equilibrium
strategy schedule, making it activate at a higher strength and start reducing its
activity at a lower strength.
Next, I consider the case when incumbent quality is above average. For sim-
plicity, I only consider the regular case, but a slightly reworded version of lemma
14 still holds (and if the media ever becomes active there will still be a single
jump as θM(·) never decreases). Figure 3 is reproduced below with additional
media standard curves corresponding to different levels of investigation costs.
Figure 11: Media Strength, Costs and Equilibrium Transition - Above Average
Incumbent
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The only difference between figure 11 and figure 6 is the presence of an above
average incumbent quality, which ensures θV (·) ≥ θ. In the figure, it is assumed
that θi is sufficiently high so that θV (·) > θ̂. Again, I start by fixing several
different levels of media strength and let the information costs vary to see the
strategic responses of the media and voters.
Figure 12: Strategic Effects of Information Costs - Above Average Incumbent
Figure 12 depicts strategic effects of varying information costs when media
strength is fixed at three different levels from figure 11: Ψ3,Ψ5,Ψ6. Effects at Ψ5
and Ψ6 are straightforward. For the former, media is fully active up to c0, for that
this is the level of information costs below which its standard is above the min-
imum quality it can achieve using its investigation technology. As costs exceed
c0, media starts monotonically decreasing its level of activity due to decreased
cost-efficiency of eliminating adverse selection. Once costs exceed c1, its standard
becomes lower than the minimum challenger quality acceptable to voters, so the
roles switch and voters start dealing with adverse selection by assigning a posi-
tive probability to retaining the incumbent. Effects of cost increases under Ψ6 is
similar, except for the fact that media never becomes fully active due to an al-
ready sufficiently strong investigation technology, and that due to cost-efficiency
gains, the cost level above which its standard falls below that of the voters in-
creases. Under both Ψ5 and Ψ6, media’s selection constraint exceeds the standard
of voters, i.e. the minimum challenger quality that the media can induce accom-
modates voters’ preferences. This changes when Ψ = Ψ3. When media strength
is that low, even if the media is always active, it cannot provide voters with the
high quality challenger pool they demand (θV (·) > θ̂Ψ3). Consequently, up to c0,
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media is fully active and voters retain the incumbent with positive probability.
Once investigation costs exceed c0, media ceases activation, which is when vot-
ers increase their threat of retaining the incumbent to the level necessary when
media is passive. In line with corollary 4, both media’s and voters’ strategies
exhibit a single jump, which occurs when their standards are identical. Further-
more, directions of jumps satisfy the directions indicated in lemma 13. In figure
12, I consider various jump patterns emphasizing their indeterminacy, except for
their monotonicity and the requirement that they should satisfy equation (47) in
proposition 7.1.
Figure 13: Strategic Effects of Media Strength - Above Average Incumbent
Figure 13 shows strategic effects of increasing media strength when informa-
tion costs are fixed at cI = c0 in figure 11. There are two important differences
between figure 13 and figure 10. As in figure 10, improvements in media strength
first increase, then decrease media activity. But unlike figure 10, the increase is
sudden in figure 13 and takes the form of a jump to full activation instead of a
gradual increase. The second difference concerns voters’ behaviour. Unlike the
case when incumbent quality is below average, voters have to induce some posi-
tive selection by threatening to retain the incumbent when the media is unable
to match their standards due to cost-inefficiency of its information technology.
Even if media strength becomes sufficiently high so that the standards of media
and voters match, voters do not immediately cease their threat of retaining the
incumbent, as at first, media’s ability to induce selection is still limited. So be-
tween Ψ3 and Ψ4, as the media becomes stronger, voters gradually reduce their
threat of keeping the incumbent as they become more and more satisfied with the
minimum challenger quality provided by a fully active media. Also, when media’s
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investigation technology becomes perfect, media selection and voter selection be-
come perfect substitutes. In that case, I∗(1, c0) > R
∗
0(Ψ, c0) for Ψ < Ψ3 reflects
the overall higher standard of the media relative to voters (θM(·) > θV (θi)) when-
ever Ψ = 1.
Before concluding, it is worth considering the nature of the results regarding
the response of media activity to improvements in its investigation technology
and reflecting on how they would hold up against relaxation of some of the as-
sumptions of the model. The assumption that candidate-types face positive costs
for challenging implies that they care about the probability of winning and los-
ing. In turn, this makes sure that the media can increase or decrease the extent
of adverse selection continuously by mixing its investigation strategy, which is
interpreted as corresponding to different journalistic activity levels. This setup,
in essence, makes the problem of the media analogous to a problem where it is
choosing a continuous activity level (having a certain probability of success) be-
tween zero and one with the goal of maximizing its (expected) payoff by equating
its marginal benefits to its marginal costs. Parameter configurations under which
the media is playing a pure strategy can be interpreted as parametric regions
where certain constraints bind (either related to absolute prohibitiveness of its
costs, weakness of its technology, or voters having relatively higher standards),
forcing media to a corner solution where such marginal equalization does not hold.
Whenever such corner solutions arise, changes in investigation strength does not
affect media’s behaviour on the margin, but can lead to discontinuous upward
jumps by relaxing previously binding constraints. If the media is playing a mixed
strategy, it is operating on the margin and changes in media strength exhibit a
continuous response by affecting media’s marginal benefit relative to its constant
marginal cost cI . While a reduction in information costs always (weakly) increase
media activity, a downturn in media activity can be observed in response to an
improvement in journalistic strength when marginal gains in deterrence power
(at the given level of activity) exceed marginal net (taking costs into account)
benefit of an increased investigation success.
Costly challenge is key in this picture. If challenging was costless (cE = 0),
then it is always possible to construct an equilibrium where every candidate-type
with θc ≥ θi − r challenges even if they have no chance of winning at all. In that
case, depending on how the average challenger stands out against the incumbent,
uninformed voters would either retain the incumbent or vote for the challenger.
Contingent on voters’ subsequent behaviour, media would then base its decision
either on the average gain from exposing inferior challengers or the average gain
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from revealing a superior challenger. If costs are not too high, then media’s be-
haviour would be characterized by complete passiveness up to a certain level of
Ψ, above which it would be fully active.
In addition, one could have assumed that political rents are increasing in can-
didate quality. This assumption would not alter the nature of equilibria, nor
the qualitative conclusions as long as the type-monotonicity of challenging deci-
sion remains and voters still have an incentive to vote for the politician with the
highest quality. For instance, suppose that a challenger receives θc(1 + r) − cE
if she wins the election (i.e. a higher productivity also implies higher rents).
Then one can check that adverse selection will be present as long as cE
r
< θi and
that the decision to challenge preserves its upward monotonicity in quality levels
(i.e. if a candidate-type finds it worthwhile to challenge, so does a higher quality
candidate-type). As a result, starting with lemma 1, all of the previous results
would still be valid after appropriate modifications accommodating the new form
of candidate payoffs and the resulting new cutoffs. More generally, as long as
candidate payoffs are single crossing in (θc, C̃) (C̃ ∈ {0, 1} is the challenge deci-
sion) and at the end of the day the highest quality candidate produces the highest
amount of public good regardless of the rents she receives, the set of equilibria
would be isomorphic to the current one and the conclusions would remain intact.
Moreover, the model can be modified slightly to maintain its signalling struc-
ture while allowing for multiple candidates deciding on electoral participation.
By modifying media’s investigation technology so that it only partitions the set
of challengers into inferior and superior (relative to the incumbent) challengers if
successful and letting voters randomize uniformly over superior challengers when
informed and over all challengers when uninformed (if they decide to replace
the incumbent under uncertainty), the only difference one would get would be a
rescale effect in challengers’ individual probabilities of victory.57
Furthermore, dropping the assumption that voters are sophisticated enough
to make Bayesian deductions would only make the media more relevant (because
this opens the possibility of ex ante mistakes, in addition to ex post wrong deci-
sions) as well as keeping the non-monotonic activity pattern intact. For instance,
suppose that voters base their voting decisions on unconditional averages alone,
i.e. always retain an above average incumbent and replace a below average one.
57This would also constitute an intuitive modification as with a large set of challengers, it
wouldn’t be realistic to expect the media revealing all individual qualities with precision. In
fact, two technologies are effectively identical when there is a single candidate. If one were to
assume that all qualities are revealed with multiple challengers, then one would have to take
into account that even if a challenger is superior compared to the incumbent, she can still be
inferior compared to another challenger.
118
Media behaviour concerning the latter case would be identical to its behaviour in
the below average incumbent equilibria in the current model. In the former case,
only superior candidate-types would challenge but they would be elected if and
only if media successfully revealed their type. So a higher journalistic activity
would imply a larger challenger pool and media’s strength would constrain its
ability to attract superior challengers (so a weak media would be able to attract
only the top end of the distribution). Media would compare expected benefit
from introducing a superior politician to voters with costs of journalism, which
would determine its optimal lower bound for a superior challenger pool. Notice
that unlike the case with adverse selection at the challenger front, a case where
voters default to incumbent would imply adverse selection when the incumbent
is retained, so the media would want to make sure that the probability of a
candidate-type challenging is high enough. The set of equilibria would be similar
and one would again potentially observe a non-monotonic media response due to
binding-relaxing technology constraint.
Finally, suppose that the media receives an additional exogenous benefit for
successfully revealing challenger quality (reputation, or advertisement revenues
for high quality journalism). One can easily implement this into the current
framework by letting cI = c̃I − Ψb where b is the benefit. In that case, there
are two possibilities. If c̃I > b, then the set of equilibria would be identical up
to a scale. On the other hand, if there exists a Ψ∗ where c̃I
Ψ∗
= b, media would
always investigate for Ψ > Ψ∗. Depending on the magnitude of Ψ∗, it would then
be possible to get a media response similar to the one in figure 10 featuring an
upwards jump at Ψ = Ψ∗, assuming relatively weak challenger signalling.58 In
other words, media activity would display a hump-shaped response to improve-
ments in its strength: first increasing, then decreasing, then increasing again by
an upwards jump.
3 Conclusion
This chapter has built a pure adverse selection model of political entry featuring
an idealized media with limited screening powers to study two interrelated ques-
tions: how would a stronger media affect ex ante politician selection and how
would media itself respond to improvements in its screening technology. A moti-
vating factor was to establish a framework highlighting media’s neglected role in
dealing with ex ante selection in politics. One of the most obvious ways the media
58The reason for the jump would be a “true indifference” occurring at c̃IΨ∗ = b, where media’s
equilibrium mixed best-response correspondence would no longer be unique.
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can alleviate adverse selection is by exposing inferior politicians, allowing voters
to make an informed decision. Endowing an idealized media with the technology
of doing so but allowing that technology to be imperfect provides a simple way
of mapping media strength to the quality of political participation within an en-
dogenous information provision framework. Relatedly, a second motivation was
to provide an explicit account for the mechanism via which selection by media
threat operates, and to see whether any non-trivial pattern of journalistic activity
arises in response to improvements in media’s information technology. The rea-
son for having an a priori suspicion for that it might stemmed from the nature of
a media who acts as voters’ extended arm. If the extent of the adverse selection
is the sole factor that makes a media tick, then there is a theoretical possibility
of a strong but relatively passive media capitalizing on the threat it poses to low
quality challengers.
Several results have arisen from the model, including those that confirm this
intuition. First, even if voters are sophisticated in their beliefs and vote correctly
on average under uncertainty, media will still be relevant as long as its costs are
low relative to the scale of adverse selection because the technology it possesses
allows it to spare voters from a retrospective mistake. Second, an improvement in
media’s technology, whether it consists of cost reductions or gains in journalistic
strength, always improves selection by shrinking the set of inferior candidate-
types who challenge in equilibrium. The mechanism through which this selection
effect operates involves the media adjusting its activity level to make sure that
challenger quality is made public more frequently. This lowers the probability of
an electoral victory for inferior challengers (and inferior challengers alone), re-
ducing the magnitude of adverse selection. Relatedly, media is always (weakly)
more active when adverse selection is stronger, which ultimately depends on the
structure of political payoffs, i.e. how high the political rents are compared to
costs of political participation. Finally, strategic effects of an improvement in
media technology is considered. A lower cost of journalism always translates to a
more active media, as expected. However, improvements to media’s investigation
strength has a non-monotonic effect on its activity. For a relatively weak media,
it leads to an increase in journalistic activity and for a relatively strong media,
it leads to a more passive (“asleep”) media. The reason behind this asymmetry
between costs and strength is that while cost reductions only affect the net bene-
fits of journalism, strength has a dual effect. It not only increases net (expected)
benefits of an investigation, but also increases the threat posed by the media to
an inferior challenger at a given level of activity. This latter effect implies that
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if the media is already quite strong, it can reduce its costly journalistic activities
without undermining deterrence, an effect that can be best called the paradox of
good (strong) journalism.
Extending the boundaries of the current model to incorporate elements of
moral hazard is no trivial task. Besides rethinking the incumbent as an active
player instead of a mere payoff parameter, it would involve issues such as intro-
ducing a type-dependant tradeoff between rents and public good due to an under-
lying choice variable reflecting the effort allocated to public services in contrast
to rent extraction (and either suppression of politicians’ public good motivation
altogether or making rent extraction more beneficial), as well as recognition of
the fact that media’s beliefs and strategies would have to take incumbent’s out-
put signals and challenger’s post-election behaviour into account. However, there
are several potentially fruitful extensions that can be considered while remaining
within a pure adverse selection framework. First, the current model can easily be
extended to incorporate a non-singleton set of candidates simultaneously decid-
ing whether to challenge or not in the way discussed in the last part of the final
section. A more interesting approach would be to let the media (and only me-
dia) observe a set of noisy signals correlated with challenger qualities and decide
on which candidate to investigate basing on that set of signals. Even if media’s
investigation fails to resolve the uncertainty, the fact that media has singled out
a specific candidate can affect voter behaviour, and in particular cause them to
vote for that specific challenger (if they are not voting for the incumbent). This
would give an additional strategic motive for media activation and in turn affect
candidate behaviour, presumably in a form that excludes a subset of inferior chal-
lengers. Furthermore, it would add an additional dimension of media strength
(rumor/pre-screening accuracy), which can affect media activity not only in iso-
lation but also by its interaction with media’s investigative strength. Next, one of
the major reasons why the need for a media arises in the current model (besides
payoff-induced adverse selection) is the restricted nature of the message space.
For instance, if it was possible for challengers to choose their campaign expen-
ditures and if spending cE ≥ r was a feasible option, then one would expect the
existence of a semi-separating equilibrium with all non-inferior candidate-types
pooling at cE = r and all inferior candidate-types staying out (or mounting a
cheap challenge with cE = 0), leading to full resolution of negative selection. In
essence, this underlines the fact that media’s technology of type discovery and
candidates’ signalling technology are substitutable in voters’ eyes. However, an
electorate rarely possesses tools to costlessly and accurately distinguish between
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different campaign types. Under a setting of unobservable/partially observable
(for voters) actions, media can potentially provide a valuable service of signal
transmission by undertaking a costly investigation to discover and validate a
challenger’s participation costs and perhaps packaging its discovery in the form
of an endorsement. Its ability of doing so would in turn affect candidates’ strate-
gies. This line of reasoning points out towards potential complementarities be-
tween candidate signalling and media activity, which could be studied within the
current framework after appropriate modifications. Finally, the proposed frame-
work of media selection can be extended in a variety of ways in order to shed
light on numerous possible interactions between the structure of media industry,
(political) journalism and politician selection. For instance, suppose that there
are two media outlets and their journalistic activities are complementary in the
sense that both outlets investigating makes truth discovery more likely. Such
a setting, especially if both outlets possess sufficiently strong investigative tech-
nologies, would possibly give rise to a problem of free-riding, not only creating an
additional mechanism for media passivity under increased journalistic strength,
but also threatening to undermine selection. This could in turn underline factors
such as journalistic benefits and media exclusives as important determinants of
media activity, and thus selection. These issues are left for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 (Connectedness of the set of strict challengers and
uniqueness of the indifferent candidate): Fix a PBE with I∗, R∗0, R1(θc)
and Ωp. If Ωp = ∅, then it is connected. Consider θ̂c(θc) given by (22) and its
various evaluations according to θc’s position relative to θi given in (23). Following
inequalities are obvious and hold for any (I, R0, R1(θc = θi)).
θ̂c,b ≤ θ̂c,e (58)
θ̂c,e ≤ θ̂c,w (59)
θ̂c,b < θ̂c,w (60)
Suppose that there is an indifferent type θ∗ in this equilibrium. Take an arbitrary
θ ∈ [θ, θ∗). If θ∗ > θi, then θ∗ = θ̂c,b, so from inequalities (58)-(60), θ < θ̂c(θ).
If θ∗ = θi, then θ
∗ = θ̂c,e, so θ < θi = θ
∗ = θ̂c,e ≤ θ̂c,w and hence θ < θ̂c(θ). If
θ∗ < θi, then θ
∗ = θ̂c,b, so θ < θi and θ < θ̂c,b, which imply θ < θ̂c(θ). Now take
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. If θ∗ > θi, then θ
∗ = θ̂c,b so θ
′ > θ̂c(θ
′). If θ∗ = θi, then
θ∗ = θ̂c,e, so θ
′ > θ∗ = θ̂c,e ≥ θ̂c,b from the inequality in (58), from which it follows
that θ′ > θ̂c(θ
′). If θ∗ < θi, then θ
∗ = θ̂c,w and (60) implies that θ
′ > θ̂c(θ
′). Since
θ and θ′ were arbitrary, it follows that if it exists, θ∗ is unique and a candidate
with a higher quality (then θ∗) strictly prefers challenging.





θ > θi and θ > θ̂c,b, or θ = θi and θ > θ̂c,e. For the former, let θ̃ = θ − ϵ
where 0 < ϵ < min
{
θ − θi, θ − θ̂c,b
}
. Then θ̃ > θi and θ̃ > θ̂c,b, so θ̃ ∈ Ωp, a




and θ = θi, then either θ
is the only type who challenges with a positive probability, in which case (14)





who challenge with a strictly positive probability that is less than one,
in which case (14) requires E [θc | C = 1] < θi and E [max {0, θc − θi} | C = 1] =
0, as the prior f has full-support. In both cases, (20) implies that I∗ = 0, so
from (23), θ̂c,e = θ̂c,w, and hence from the definition of Ωp, θ = θi > θ̂c,e = θ̂c,w.
Let θ̃ = θ − ϵ where 0 < ϵ < θ − θ̂c,w. Then θ̃ < θi and θ̃ > θ̂c,w, so from (24),















, and pick a θ′c satisfying
θc < θ
′
c ≤ θ. There are three cases to consider.
1. Suppose that θc < θi. Then by definition of Ωp, θc > θ̂c,w. It follows
that θ′c > θ̂c,w. So if θ
′
c < θi, then θ
′
c ∈ Ωp. If θ′c = θi, then from (59),
θ′c > θ̂c,w ≥ θ̂c,e, so θ′c ∈ Ωp. If θ′c > θi, then from (60), θ′c > θ̂c,w > θ̂c,b, so
θ′c ∈ Ωp.
2. Suppose that θc = θi. Then by definition of Ωp, θc > θ̂c,e. It follows that
θ′c > θ̂c,e. Moreover, θ
′
c > θi and from (58), θ
′
c > θ̂c,e ≥ θ̂c,b, so θ′c ∈ Ωp.
3. Suppose that θc > θi. Then by definition of Ωp, θc > θ̂c,b. It follows that
θ′c > θi and θ
′
c > θ̂c,b, so θ
′
c ∈ Ωp.
Since both θc and θ
′
c were arbitrary, this proves that if Ωp is non-empty, then it








, with θ∗ < θ.




, i.e. inf Ωp = θ
∗ > θ. Note
that θ > θ∗ implies θ ∈ Ωp. I will show that the candidate with θ∗ is indifferent





there are three cases to consider.
1. Suppose that θ∗ < θi. First, assume that θ
∗ > θ̂c,w. Define θ̃ = θ
∗ − ϵ,
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where 0 < ϵ < min
{
θ∗ − θ̂c,w, θ∗ − θ
}
.59 Then θ < θ̃ < θ∗ < θi and
θ̃ > θ̂c,w, which (from (24)) implies that θ̃ ∈ Ωp, which contradicts with
the fact that θ∗ = inf Ωp. Next, assume that θ
∗ < θ̂c,w. Define θ̃ = θ
∗ + ϵ,
where 0 < ϵ < min
{
θi − θ∗, θ̂c,w − θ∗
}
. Since θ̃ > θ∗, θ̃ ∈ Ωp. But θ̃ < θi
and θ̃ < θ̂c,w, so θ̃ /∈ Ωp, a contradiction. It follows that if θ∗ < θi, then
θ∗ = θ̂c,w.
2. Suppose that θ∗ > θi. First, assume that θ
∗ > θ̂c,b. Define θ̃ = θ
∗− ϵ, where
0 < ϵ < min
{
θ∗ − θi, θ∗ − θ̂c,b
}
. Then θ̃ < θ∗. Moreover, θ̃ > θi and θ̃ >
θ̂c,b, which implies (from (24)) that θ̃ ∈ Ωp, contradicting with θ∗ = inf Ωp.
Next, assume that θ∗ < θ̂c,b. Define θ̃ = θ
∗ + ϵ, where 0 < ϵ < θ̂c,b − θ∗.
Then θ̃ > θ∗, so θ̃ ∈ Ωp. But we also have θ̃ > θi and θ∗ < θ̂c,b, which (from
(24)) implies that θ̃ /∈ Ωp, a contradiction. It follows that if θ∗ > θi, then
θ∗ = θ̂c,b.
3. Suppose that θ∗ = θi. First, assume that θ
∗ > θ̂c,e. From (59), we know
that θ̂c,e ≤ θ̂c,w. Suppose that θ̂c,e = θ̂c,w. Then θ∗ > θ̂c,w, and one obtains
a contradiction identical to the one obtained in the first part of the point 1
above. Suppose instead θ̂c,e < θ̂c,w. If θ
∗ > θ̂c,w > θ̂c,e, one obtains the same
contradiction. If θ̂c,w ≥ θ∗ > θ̂c,e, then note that for any θ < θ∗, one has
θ < θ̂c(θ) = θ̂c,w, i.e. from (24), nobody below θ
∗ challenges. So from (14)
and the fact that f is full support, one must have E [θc | C = 1] > θi and
E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] = 0. Hence from (20), I∗ = 0, and thus from
(23), θ̂c,e = θ̂c,w, which contradicts with θ̂c,e < θ̂c,w. Next, assume θ
∗ < θ̂c,e.
From (59), we know that θ̂c,b ≤ θ̂c,e. If θ̂c,b = θ̂c,e, then θ∗ < θ̂c,b, and one
gets a contradiction identical to the one obtained in the second part of the
point 2 above. So suppose instead θ̂c,b < θ̂c,e. If θ
∗ < θ̂c,b < θ̂c,e, one gets
the exact same contradiction. If θ̂c,b ≤ θ∗ < θ̂c,e, then for any θ < θ∗ = θi,
one has θ < θ̂c(θ), as (59) implies θ̂c,e ≤ θ̂c,w. Since for any θ > θ∗ = θi, one
has θ ∈ Ωp, (14) and the fact that f is full-support implies that one must
have E [θc | C = 1] > θi and E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] = 0. So from (20),
I∗ = 0, and hence from (23), θ̂c,b = θ̂c,e, which is another contradiction. It
follows that if θ∗ = θi, then θ
∗ = θ̂c,e.
This shows that when inf Ωp = θ
∗ > θ, then θ∗ = θ̂c(θ
∗), i.e. θ∗ is indifferent
between challenging and staying out. Since Ωp is the set of candidates strictly
59This is where the assumption θ∗ > θ comes into picture. It guarantees that such a strictly
positive ϵ exists.
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Proof of Lemma 2 (Anything goes for the candidate and informed vot-
ers when they are indifferent): Take a PBE defined by β(θc | C = 1) and a
strategy profile (C̃(θc), I
∗, R∗0, R1(θc)) and assume that Ω ̸= ∅. The latter implies
that beliefs are pinned down by (14). Varying R1(θc = θi) = k ∈ [0, 1] will po-
tentially destroy this equilibrium only if there exists an indifferent type θ∗ = θi.
Suppose there is. Then from lemma 1, either Ωp = ∅ and Ω = {θi} (which is








. In both cases, beliefs
should impose E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] = 0, which implies I∗ = 0 (as long as
cI > 0), which implies that θ̂c,e is independent of R1(θc = θi) from (23). Since the
candidate’s strategy does not depend on it, neither do beliefs. Therefore, with a
k′ ̸= k, (10)-(14) should still be satisfied and hence varying k along [0, 1] results
in a continuum of PBE. Now suppose that the given PBE features an indifferent
type θ∗ and let g = C̃(θ∗). Either θ∗ = θ, in which case g ∈ (0, 1] and beliefs
put all the mass on θ, in which case they are independent of g, or θ∗ < θ. In the
latter case, lemma 1 and (14) implies that beliefs on Ωp are simply f truncated
at θ∗ and a change in g would have no effect on that. Hence, a change in g would
have no effect on the expectations in (16) and (20) and thus lead to no deviation
incentives for the media and voters. It follows that varying g along [0, 1] will
simply result in a continuum of PBE, with only β(θ∗ | C = 1) changing to reflect
changes in g = C̃(θ∗). 
Proof of Lemma 4 (Equilibrium Refinements): Assume θ̂ ≤ θ. First sup-
pose that θ̂ > θi and consider some trivial pooling equilibrium as described in
proposition 2. Note that this implies r < cE, i.e. costs of participation cannot
be fully recovered in case of an electoral victory. Consider the following sets of
types.
Φ = [θ, θ̂); (61)
Φ′ = [θ̂, θ]. (62)
Equilibrium payoff of the candidate is θi. Consider arbitrary candidate-types
θc ∈ Φ and θ′c ∈ Φ′. Then following inequalities are true by definitions of Φ, Φ′
and θ̂:
θc + r − cE < θi, (63)
θ′c + r − cE ≥ θi. (64)
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Furthermore, from (3), the maximum payoff that a candidate can get by playing
off the equilibrium strategy of challenging is max {θc + r − cE, θi − cE}.60,61 It
follows that the set Φ is equilibrium dominated in the Intuitive Criterion sense,
while the set Φ′ is not. So upon observing a challenge, the beliefs should restrict
candidate quality to Φ′.62 Due to θ̂ > θi, this implies E [θc | C = 1] > θi and
E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] = 0. If the beliefs satisfy these, then I∗ = 0 and
R∗0 = 0, i.e. the media never investigates and uninformed voters replace the
incumbent with certainty. If this is the case, then a candidate with quality θ′c ∈ Φ′
would get θ′c+r−cE if she were to challenge, which is higher than her equilibrium
payoff θi. So the equilibrium is eliminated by the Intuitive Criterion. Since the set
of equilibria that survive the Divinity Criterion is a subset of the set of equilibria
that survive the Intuitive Criterion, this equilibrium is also eliminated by the
Divinity Criterion.63
Next, suppose that θ̂ ≤ θi and consider some trivial pooling equilibrium as
described in proposition 2. Note that this implies r ≥ cE. Also note that Intuitive
Criterion is no longer enough to eliminate this equilibrium, as, say, it allows for
a belief density degenerate at θ̂ ≤ θi. However, it still refines the set Φ = [θ, θ̂)
away from the above procedure, and so does the Divinity Criterion. Now define
the following sets.
Φ̃ = [θ̂, θi]; (65)
Φ′′ = Φ′ \ Φ̃ = (θi, θ]. (66)
I will show that Divinity Criterion refines Φ̃ away but leaves Φ′′ intact. Define
the sets D(θ | C = 1) and Ds(θ | C = 1) as the sets of media and voter strategies
(both mixed and pure) that yields non-smaller and strictly greater (expected)
60Strictly speaking, Intuitive Criterion requires that when computing the maximum payoff a
candidate can get by playing an off the equilibrium strategy, one should assume that receivers





assumption requires receivers’ (media and voters) pure strategies to be constrained to the




” (see the next footnote). Here, that set contains all possible
actions by the media and uninformed voters.
61In general, a set of best responses to some set Λ is defined by fixing some belief under the
sole assumption that the sender (challenger) is in Λ, finding the set of best-responses to that
belief, and taking the union of such sets of best responses over all feasible beliefs under that
assumption. Technically, such feasible beliefs are required to be measurable distributions
assigning a positive measure only to measurable subsets of Λ, and belief densities to be
Radon-Nikodym derivatives of such distributions. As such, there are uncountably many of
them as long as Λ is a set of positive measure.
62And that is the only restriction on beliefs. So any belief distribution assigning a positive
measure only to subsets of Φ′ is allowed.
63See Muñoz-Garćıa and Esṕınola-Arredondo (2011).
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payoffs respectively compared to the equilibrium payoff θi for the candidate with
quality θ who came to play the off-the-equilibrium strategy of challenging.64 A
type θ̃ is eliminated under Divinity Criterion if there exists another type θ′′ such
that the following holds.
D(θ̃ | C = 1) ⊂ Ds(θ′′ | C = 1). (67)
Fix a θ′′ ∈ Φ′′ and consider an arbitrary θ̃ ∈ Φ̃. First, assume that θ̃ = θ̂. This
candidate’s quality satisfies θc + r − cE = θi, so the only receiver strategies that
don’t make her worse off are the ones giving her a probability one of winning the
election. But those strategies would also give a probability one of winning to θ′′,
making her better off as θ′′ > θ̃. Furthermore, since θ′′c + r − cE > θi, θ′′ can be
made strictly better off by strategies giving her a probability of victory less than
one (this follows from rearranging the third line in (23)). This eliminates θ̃ = θ̂.
Next, assume that θ̂ < θ̃ < θi. Consider any pair (R
∗
0, I
∗) that makes θ̃ no worse
off by giving her a victory probability (1−R∗0+ΨI∗(R∗0−1)). But then the victory
probability of θ′′ is (1−R∗0+ΨI∗(R∗0−0)), which is strictly greater, so she should
be strictly better off. Now consider a strategy that consists of R∗0 = 1 and I
∗ = 1.
This gives a certain victory to θ′′ and a sure loss to θ̃, making the former better
off and the latter worse off. This eliminates any θ̃ ∈ (θ̂, θi). Next, assume that
θ̃ = θi. If θi = θ̂, then this is eliminated so assume θi > θ̂. Consider any triplet
(R∗0, I
∗, R1(θc = θi)) that makes θ̃ no worse off. From (23), one can see that these
strategies will give a greater or equal victory probability to θ′′. Furthermore,
θ′′ > θi, so she should be strictly better off. Finally consider a strategy that
consists of R∗0 = 1, I
∗ = 1 and R1(θc = θi) = 1. This gives a certain victory to θ
′′
and a sure loss to θ̃ = θi, making the former better off and the latter worse off.
So Φ̃ is equilibrium dominated in the Divinity Criterion sense. In addition, pick
some θ′′′ ∈ Φ′′. Since both θ′′ and θ′′′ are better than the incumbent, they have
the same payoffs and hence have identical D’s and Ds’s. It follows that upon
observing a challenge, the media and voters should conclude that the challenger
belongs to Φ′′ = (θi, θ]. If this is the case, then any beliefs given this restriction
should satisfy E [θc | C = 1] > θi and E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] = 0, implying
I∗ = 0 and R∗0 = 1. But then, any candidate with a type θ > θ̂ would be strictly
better off challenging, so the equilibrium does not survive Divinity Criterion. 
64Again, Divinity Criterion in reality constrains voter and media strategies in D and Ds to be
best-responses to [θ, θ]. But as indicated by the discussion in footnotes 60-61, this is a “slack
constraint”, as any feasible belief over [θ, θ] is allowed in the definition of these sets, and so
they allow any strategy to be considered.
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Proof of Lemma 7 (Limits to strategic selection): Assume θ̂ < θi and
consider a PBE with Ω ̸= ∅.
1. Suppose θi = θ. Ω being assumed non-empty, assume instead that inf Ω < θ.
Then lemma 1 and f being full-support along with lemma 5 implies that
beliefs should satisfy E [θc | C = 1] < θi and E [max {0, θc − θi} | C = 1] =
0, implying R∗0 = 1 and I
∗ = 0. But from (24), this would imply Ω = ∅,




and Ωp = ∅. Moreover,
because the media does not investigate under this scenario (I∗ = 0), R∗0
should adjust to make sure that θc = θ is indifferent between challenging
and staying out, i.e. so that θ̂c,e = θi = θ in equilibrium. Rearranging this
using (23) and the fact that I∗ = 0, one can see that there exists a unique







because r > cE (which is implied by θ̂ < θi).
2. Suppose θi = θ. Then if Ω ̸= ∅, from lemma 1 and f being full-support,
beliefs should imply E [θc | C = 1] > θi and E [max {θi − θc, 0} | C = 1] = 0,
implying I∗ = R∗0 = 0 from (16) and (20). From (23), this implies θ̂c,w < θ̂,









, and suppose instead θ∗ ≥ θi. Again, if Ω ̸= ∅, lemma 1
and f being full-support makes sure that beliefs induce I∗ = R∗0 = 0. But




, a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 10 (Comparative statics - Media and voter cutoffs):
Assume that θV (θi) ∈ (θ, θi) solves the following equation:
θi − E [θc | θV ≤ θc] = 0. (69)
Such θV (θi) exists and is unique when θi > E [θc] from lemma 8. Since the
density f is continuous, E [θc | θV ≤ θc] is continuously differentiable in (θ, θi)











where the derivative at the right-hand side is evaluated at θV = θV (θi) and its
sign follows from the fact that f is full-support. Furthermore, if f is (strictly)
log-concave, then ∂E[θc|θV ≤θc]
∂θV
∈ (0, 1] (∈ (0, 1)).65 So if f is (strictly) log-concave,
then the following holds.
∂ (θV (θi)− θi)
∂θi
≥ (>)0. (71)
Similarly, assume that θM(Ψ, cI , θi) ∈ (θ, θi) solves the following equation.
F (θi)− F (θM)
1− F (θM)




Such θM(Ψ, cI , θi) exists and is unique when 0 <
cI
Ψ
< K(θi) from lemma 9. Let
H(θi, θM) denote the first term at the left-hand side of (72). Since the density f is
continuous, H(θi, θM) is continuously differentiable in (θ, θi) from the fundamen-
tal theorem of calculus. Proof of lemma 9 has already shown that ∂H(θi,θM )
∂θM
< 0.
So applying the implicit function theorem three times to the equality in (72)
yields:




























where the first term in (75) follows from differentiating the right-hand side of
the third line in (34) with respect to θi and evaluating the resulting expression
at θ∗ = θM .
66 The expressions at right-hand sides of (73)-(75) are evaluated at
the given Ψ, cI , θi and the corresponding θM(Ψ, cI , θi) which solves the equation
(72). Now assume that the prior density f is (strictly) log-concave and consider
the following equivalent expression for ∂θM (Ψ,cI ,θi)
∂θi
obtained via differentiating (72)
with respect to θi.













{θi − E [θc | · ]}+ F (θi)−F (θM )1−F (θM )
∂
∂θM
E [θc | · ]
. (76)
65This fact is shown in Heckman and Honoré (1990), proposition 1.
66Differentiating the first term in (72) with respect to θi is equivalent to this, as the first term
in (72) is simply a reexpression of (34).
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≥ (>)f(θM) (1− F (θi))
(1− F (θM))2
, (77)
because θi > θM . So the first term of the numerator in (76) is no smaller
(strictly greater) than the first term of the denominator. Furthermore, due to log-









.67 As Shaked and Shantikumar (2007) show, this is equiva-
lent to random-variable θc dominating the random variable θc−δ in the likelihood
ratio order, since δ > 0 is arbitrary.68 This implies that in any interval, the con-
ditional expectation of θc should be no smaller than the conditional expectation
of θc − δ, i.e.
E [θc − δ | θM ≤ θc − δ < θi] ≤ E [θc | θM ≤ θc < θi] . (79)
Taking δ out and rearranging yields the following.
E [θc | θM + δ ≤ θc < θi + δ]− E [θc | θM ≤ θc < θi] ≤ δ. (80)
Dividing both sides by δ and taking the limit as δ → 0 gives:
∂
∂θM
E [θc | · ] +
∂
∂θi
E [θc | · ] ≤ 1
⇐⇒ 1− ∂
∂θi
E [θc | · ] ≥
∂
∂θM
E [θc | · ] . (81)
It follows that the second term of the numerator in (76) is no smaller than the
second term of the denominator. Hence, one must have:
∂ (θM(Ψ, cI , θi)− θi)
∂θi
≥ (>)0, (82)
67See lemma 1 in An (1998).
68See Shaked and Shantikumar (2007), p. 66.
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whenever f is (strictly) log-concave. Finally, differentiating (74) once more with
respect to θM yields the following condition for concavity.






















The term in the first line is strictly negative and the first three terms in the second
line are strictly positive. Keeping these in mind, plugging in for ∂θM (Ψ,cI ,θi)
∂Ψ
from










For this condition to hold for Ψ > Ψ0, a sufficient condition is the non-positivity
of the right-hand side, i.e. concavity of H(·) in θM . 
Lemma 11 (Comparative statics - Media and voter strategies): Take
a payoff vector (θi, cE, r, cI ,Ψ) corresponding to an equilibrium at a non-regime




, cE, cI > 0 and Ψ ∈ (0, 1). Then
there are several possible cases corresponding to different regimes. The cases are
listed below.
1. Case 1: R∗0 = I
∗ = 0 with pure strategies: proposition 4 cases 1 and 2;
proposition 5 cases 1 and 2. Since by assumption the equilibrium is not
at a regime-switching point, there is some open neighbourhood around the
given payoff vector where the equilibrium satisfies the same parametric con-
dition specific to the particular regime at which the equilibrium is occurring
and thus R∗0,I
∗ are still zero. This constancy implies differentiability with
derivatives being equal to zero.
2. Case 2: Passive media with voters doing the selection: proposition 4 case 3
and proposition 5 case 3. Then I∗ = 0, it is differentiable and its derivatives









θV (θi) = θi − r + (1−R∗0)−1cE, (85)
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on a sufficiently small neighbourhood around the given payoff vector. Solv-
ing this yields:
R∗0 = 1− [θV (θi)− θi + r]
−1 cE. (86)









= [θV (θi)− θi + r]−2 cE > 0; (89)
∂R∗0
∂cE
= − [θV (θi)− θi + r]−1 < 0; (90)
∂R∗0
∂θi
= [θV (θi)− θi + r]−2 cE
∂ (θV (θi)− θi)
∂θi
≷ 0, (91)
where the sign of (90) follow from the fact that θV (θi) − θi + r > 0. Fur-
thermore, if f is (strictly) log-concave, then (91) is non-negative (strictly
positive) from (71) in the proof of lemma 10.
3. Case 3: Active media with voters participating in selection: proposition
7 case 2. Then I∗ = 1, it is differentiable and its derivatives are zero





(notice how the non-regime switching point assumption implies R∗0 ̸= 0)
and satisfies:
θV (θi) = θi − r + [(1−Ψ)(1−R∗0)]
−1 cE, (92)
on a sufficiently small neighbourhood around the given payoff vector. Solv-
ing this yields:
R∗0 = 1− (1−Ψ)−1 [θV (θi)− θi + r]
−1 cE. (93)






= −(1−Ψ)−2 [θV (θi)− θi + r]−1 cE < 0; (95)
∂R∗0
∂r




= −(1−Ψ)−1 [θV (θi)− θi + r]−1 < 0; (97)
∂R∗0
∂θi
= (1−Ψ)−1 [θV (θi)− θi + r]−2 cE
∂ (θV (θi)− θi)
∂θi
≷ 0, (98)
where the signs in (95),(97) follow from the fact that θV (θi) − θi + r > 0.
Furthermore, if f is (strictly) log-concave, then (98) is non-negative (strictly
positive) from (82) in the proof of lemma 10.
4. Case 4: Active media with uncertain voters strictly preferring the chal-
lenger: proposition 6 cases 1, 2, 3, and proposition 7 cases 1, 3 and 4. Then
R∗0 = 0, it is differentiable and its derivatives are zero for the same reason
given in case 1. If the equilibrium occurs at proposition 6 case 2 or proposi-
tion 7 case 3, where the media is (strictly) constrained by its strength, then
I∗ = 1 and the same kind of differentiability and zero-derivatives argument
applies. If not, then I∗ satisfies the following:
θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θi − r + (1−ΨI∗)−1cE, (99)
on a sufficiently small neighbourhood around the given payoff vector. Solv-
ing this yields:
I∗ = Ψ−1 −Ψ−1 [θM(Ψ, cI , θi)− θi + r]−1 cE. (100)
Differentiating with respect to payoff parameters yields the following:
∂I∗
∂cI














= Ψ−1 [θM(·)− θi + r]−2 cE > 0; (103)
∂I∗
∂cE
= −Ψ−1 [θM(·)− θi + r]−1 cE < 0; (104)
∂I∗
∂θi




where the signs in (101) and (104) follow from the fact that θM(·)−θi+r >
0. Furthermore, if f is (strictly) log-concave, then (105) is non-negative
(strictly positive) from (82) in the proof of lemma 10. Finally, the expression
in (102) follows from a straightforward (re)substitution for I∗. 
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Proof of Lemma 12 (Payoff upper hemicontinuity of media and voters’












Let ξ = (θi, cE, r, cI ,Ψ) ∈ Υo. For any ξ ∈ Υo, the equilibrium challenge threshold
is given by a unique θ∗(ξ) defined in (50). This completely pins down beliefs
in a Bayesian manner from (25).69 This and lemma 6 in turn imply that the
equilibrium best-response correspondence of the media is given by the following.
BRM(ξ) =

{1} , (ΦM(ξ) > 0)
[0, 1] , (ΦM(ξ) = 0)
{0} , (ΦM(ξ) < 0)
, (107)
where ΦM : Υ → R is a function satisfying the following:
ΦM(ξ) = θ
∗(Ψ, cI , θi, cE, r)− θ̃M(Ψ, cI , θi), (108)
with θ̃M(Ψ, cI , θi) as defined in (49) and θ
∗(Ψ, cI , θi, cE, r) as defined in (50). From
the facts that both θ∗(·) and θ̃M(·) are continuous, ΦM is continuous in ξ. First, I
will show that BRM(ξ) is UHC in ξ. Let BR
u
M denote the upper inverse (image)
of BRM , i.e.
BRuM(E) = {ξ ∈ Υo : BRM(ξ) ⊂ E} , (109)
where E is some set in R. BRM(ξ) is UHC if and only if BRuM maps open sets
to open sets. Let E be an arbitrary open set. There are four cases to consider.
1. E ⊂ [0, 1]: BRuM(E) = ∅, open.
2. [0, 1] ⊂ E: BRuM(E) = Φ−1M (R) ∩Υo, open because ΦM is continuous so its
inverse image maps open sets to open sets and Υo is open and intersections
of open sets are open.
3. {0} ⊂ E and {1} ̸⊂ E: BRuM(E) = Φ−1M (R−−) ∩ Υo, open due to same
reason above.
69Note that I am limiting attention to the set of non-refinable equilibria, i.e. equilibria with
challengers.
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4. {0} ̸⊂ E and {1} ⊂ E: BRuM(E) = Φ−1M (R++) ∩ Υo, open due to same
reason above.
It follows that BRM(ξ) is UHC on Υ
o. It is also UHC in Υ because one can “open”
Υ by replacing domains for θi and Ψ in it with
(
θ − ϵ, θ + ϵ
)
and (−ϵ, 1 + ϵ) re-
spectively and repeat the above argument. Now take some sequence ξn → ξ∗
and let the associated sequence of equilibrium media strategies be denoted by
I∗n → I∗.70 I will show that I∗ is an equilibrium strategy given ξ∗. Suppose not.
Then I∗ ̸∈ BRM(ξ∗). By assumption, I∗n is an equilibrium strategy for ξn for all n,
i.e. I∗n ∈ BRM(ξn) for all n. Furthermore, BRM is UHC and its range ([0, 1]) can
be contained in some compact set A ⊂ R. So the closed-graph characterization
of upper hemicontinuity implies I∗ ∈ BRM(ξ), a contradiction. So I∗ is an equi-
librium strategy, which completes the proof. The proof of upper hemicontinuity
for voters’ equilibrium mixed strategy correspondence is analogous. 
Proof of Lemma 13 (Equilibrium response of media and voter strate-
gies): Take a pair I∗, R∗0 of equilibrium strategies. The fact that in Υ \ Υd,
R∗0 and I
∗ are non-decreasing in r and non-increasing in cE follows from lemma
11 and corollary 4. Using the same two results, we can see that I∗ is non-
increasing in cI , R
∗
0 is non-decreasing in it (in fact independent of it), and that
R∗0 is non-increasing in Ψ, again in Υ \ Υd. Finally, pick a payoff vector ξ ∈ Υd.
If θM(ξ) = θV (ξ) = θ̂(ξ), then I
∗ = R∗0 = 0 (proposition 5, case 2), which
is unique in the lemma 2 sense. Any marginal increase in cI would result in
θM(·) < θV (ξ) = θ̂(ξ), which would again lead to proposition 5, case 2, so the
equilibrium is unique in the lemma 2 sense.71 Any marginal decrease in cI would
result in θM(·) > θV (ξ) = θ̂(ξ) and yield a unique equilibrium under proposition
7 case 1. So from lemma 12, I∗, R∗0 are continuous in Ψ,cI , and hence lemma
11 applies.72 Finally, assume θM(ξ) = θV (ξ) > θ̂(ξ). Then from proposition 7.1,
I∗ = I(ξ) and R∗0 = R0(ξ) take particular values to ensure that the following is
satisfied.
θ∗ = θM(Ψ, cI , θi) = θV (θi) = θi − r + [(1−ΨI∗)(1−R∗0)]
−1 cE, (110)
with I∗ ∈ [0, 1], R∗ ∈ (0, 1). Now consider an arbitrarily small increase in cI .
Then from lemma 10, θV (ξ) > θM(ξ) > θ̂(ξ). So the equilibrium switches to
case 3 in proposition 4 with I∗ = 0 and R∗0 uniquely solving (38), which is just
70If I∗n is not unique, then pick arbitrarily. Existence is guaranteed because it was shown.
71This follows from lemma 10.
72The reason for including this point to the set of discontinuities is that strategies are possibly
discontinuous in r and cE , which is why one cannot generalize lemma 11 for them over Υd.
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(110) with I∗ = 0. So R∗0 should not decrease, i.e. should jump up. Similarly, I
∗
should not increase, i.e. jump down. Considering an arbitrarily small decrease
in cI would lead to a mirror image of this, with a passage to an equilibria under
proposition 7 case 1, 2, 3 or 4. If it is case 2 or 3, then one can see that I∗ either
jumps up to 1 (full investigation), or it was already equal to 1 so that it does not
decrease, which translates into a non-increasing R∗0. If it is case 1 or 4, then one
can see that R∗0 either jumps down or stays constant, which implies an upward
jump, i.e. a non-decreasing behaviour by I∗. Finally, the regime transition effect
of an arbitrarily small increase in Ψ (when the payoff vector Ψ belongs to Υd) is
identical to the regime switching effect caused by an arbitrarily small decrease in
cI . 
Proof of Lemma 15 (Regularly non-monotonic strategic response to
changes in media strength): The fact that θM(·) and θ̂Ψ intersect exactly
twice if they intersect without being tangent follows immediately from strict
concavity of θM(·), strict convexity of θ̂Ψ, θ̂Ψ > θi for Ψ > 1− cEr and θM(·) < θi
for all Ψ. The behaviour of I∗ for Ψ ∈ [0,Ψ1] and Ψ ∈ [Ψ2,Ψ3] are already
shown. Consider the expression for the derivative of I∗ with respect to Ψ whenever












Since I∗ is continuous and is strictly smaller than 1 for Ψ > Ψ3, this expression




I∗ = 1. Combining this with the continuous differentiability of
















The sign in (112) follows from a simple fact. Because θM(Ψ) is strictly concave in
[Ψ0, 1] and θ̂Ψ is strictly convex in [0, 1]; because they are both strictly increasing
over these ranges; and because θM(Ψ3) = θ̂Ψ3 , θM(·) > θ̂Ψ for Ψ ∈ (Ψ2,Ψ3) and
θM(·) < θ̂Ψ for Ψ ∈ (Ψ3, 1]; θ̂Ψ should be steeper than θM(Ψ) at Ψ = Ψ3. This





















From this, (112) immediately follows. Furthermore, since θM(Ψ) is continuously
differentiable, so is I∗ on (Ψ3, 1). It follows that there is some ϵ < 1−Ψ3 such that
∂I∗
∂Ψ
< 0 when Ψ ∈ (Ψ3,Ψ3 + ϵ). Now suppose that I∗ is increasing somewhere on
(Ψ3, 1). Then its derivative should be strictly positive somewhere on this interval.
Due to continuous differentiability of I∗ on (Ψ3, 1), this implies the existence of
some δ satisfying Ψ3 + ϵ < δ < 1 where
∂I∗
∂Ψ




a Ψ slightly higher than δ. If this is the case, then (111) implies that at Ψ = δ,


















Because θM(·) is strictly concave, and because ΨI∗ is increasing everywhere due
to (54), such an infinitesimal increase implies that the left-hand side of (114)
becomes smaller than the right-hand side holding the right-hand side constant.
So the only way for the inequality in (115) to hold is if the right-hand side falls
even more. But this would imply that I∗ is decreasing, which is a contradiction.
Hence there is no such δ and I∗ is (strictly) decreasing on (Ψ3, 1). The proof for
















which follows from the fact that θM(·) is steeper than θ̂Ψ at Ψ = Ψ2. Regarding
(Ψ1,Ψ2), continuity of I
∗ implies that there exists some ϵ1 ≤ Ψ2 − Ψ1 where I∗
is increasing in (Ψ1,Ψ1 + ϵ1), and some ϵ2 ≤ Ψ2 − Ψ1, where I∗ is increasing in
(Ψ2 − ϵ2,Ψ2). If these intervals are overlapping, then I∗ is increasing everywhere
on (Ψ1,Ψ2). Suppose not, and without loss of generality, suppose that there exists




must be true at Ψ = b. But then, the previous argument shows that it should
be decreasing for all Ψ > b, a contradiction. This also establishes that if I∗ is
increasing, then it is non-decreasing everywhere in the left (increasing everywhere
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Chapter 3: Electoral Campaigning with
Correlated Ignorance
Abstract
This chapter aims to understand the effects of the diffusion of political
knowledge in an electorate on politicians’ campaign structures in demo-
cratic elections. The term campaign structure emphasizes a distinction
between valence and policy focused campaigns. For this purpose, a two-
candidate probabilistic voting model of costly policy and valence campaign-
ing with ignorant (purely valence-driven) voters is developed. The model
shows that resources devoted to valence campaigning increase with the
fraction of ignorant voters and proximity of candidate legacies to the ideal
policy of non-ignorant pseudo-swing voter.1 The latter implies that when
the state of being ignorant is correlated with policy preferences, and when
politicians represent opposite segments of the policy spectrum at the begin-
ning of the campaign, an otherwise symmetric setting can lead to campaign
divergence after the correlation is taken into account. That is, depending
on the context, right or left-wing politicians might be more inclined to
engage in valence campaigning, solely due to political awareness varying
monotonically across the electorate.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Summary
Electoral campaigns are often more complex than envisaged by spatial models of
policy announcement in the Downsian tradition. Besides manipulative techniques
such as priming or framing, what Riker (1983) called heresthetics, they include at
least two forms of campaign activities differing in their focus: policy and valence.
Other than issue positioning, first one involves efforts of persuasion and commit-
ment via detailed outlines, proposals and rhetorical engagements as emphasized
1Pseudo-swing voter refers to the decisive voter under costless policy announcement and no
campaigning. Once campaigning is introduced, she is no longer swing voter but her position
constitutes an important reference point.
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by Hinich and Munger (1993). Valence is usually employed as a catch-all term
encompassing non-policy factors that may influence voting decisions. Valence
campaigning can include emphases of universally (or near-universally) desirable
prospects, e.g. prosperity, justice, inclusive growth, moderate religiosity in some
societies etc., or it can involve accentuation of candidates’ positive character as-
pects and virtues, e.g. integrity, competence, leadership quality etc., what Stokes
(1992) calls first and second elements of valence politics respectively.2,3 It also
comprises activities of image promotion, impressionistic advertising and even neg-
ative campaigning, also sometimes referred colloquially as mudslinging.4,5
There are several empirical studies on campaign structures. Lau and Pomper
(2002) find that incumbents resort less to negative campaigning compared to chal-
lengers in U.S. senatorial elections between 1992-2002. With the same dataset,
Brueckner and Lee (2013) show that centrist candidates tend to go more nega-
tive. In a recent study based on 2008 U.S. congressional elections, Gschwend et
al. (2014) show that candidates who have a policy advantage conduct campaigns
with a heavier policy focus and candidates with a valence advantage tend to do
the opposite. Curini (2014), using a dataset covering 60 years in 37 countries,
shows that the ideological distance of a candidate to its adjacent competitors has
a negative impact on its tendency to emphasize issues related to character va-
lence, particularly corruption and honesty. One factor that can influence the tone
of a campaign, as well as lead different candidates to diverge in terms of campaign
structures is informational status, or political awareness of an electorate. So far,
2Usage of the term valence is far from being uniform in the literature, mostly owing to a lack of
consensus on what constitutes policy and non-policy issues. Besides indicating a differentiation
between what Berelson et al. (1954) call “style issues” in contrast to “position issues”, it is
generally used in a fashion implying a directional uniformity regarding the desirability of a
valence issue. However, it is also used in contexts where the issue at hand can generate positive,
as well as negative support in different parts of the electorate.
3Related to the second footnote, political issues often have both spatial and valence aspects,
e.g. immigration. For this chapter, valence dimension would be best thought as consisting of
issues orthogonal to the policy dimension.
4There are several studies showing that looks of candidates are relevant in campaign designs
and can matter for electoral outcomes. For instance, Atkinson et al. (2009) find that in U.S.
Senate elections, parties tend to select “higher quality challenger faces” in more competitive
districts. Todorov et al. (2005) conducted an experiment asking naive students to rank two
candidates in terms of “facial competence” basing on a short exposure to their photographs.
They found that students’ responses can predict the outcomes of U.S. congressional elections
with 70% accuracy.
5Negative campaigns are often conducted via ads that either directly attack one’s opponent, or
contrast him/her with the attacker. It can be seen as a form of valence campaigning involving
significant risks of backlash as demonstrated by Dole & Hagan affair in 2008 U.S. Senate
elections in North Carolina. It should also be kept in mind that some authors argue (e.g.
West (1993)) that voters can define some campaigns as being negative simply due to their
dislike towards them.
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this remains unexplored empirically and received less attention theoretically but
there are legitimate reasons to expect such effect. Since the seminal study of Con-
verse (1964) interpreting results from American National Election Studies panel
surveys covering the decade of 50’s, pervasive voter cluelessness is an acknowl-
edged phenomenon. Going beyond lack of information, Converse (1964) showed
a lack of both temporal and ideological incoherence characterizing the answers
of a significant majority regarding positional issues, which he interpreted as a
major disconnect between mindsets of political elites and “men in the street”.
Converse (1964) also showed that this lack of political sophistication correlates
negatively with levels of education and political knowledge.6 Returning to lack
of information, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993) cite 90-91 Michigan NES survey,
revealing that 55% of the voters could not correctly identify parties’ positions
regarding federal spending, and 53% of them did not know which party held the
majority in the Senate. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) show that this lack of
information is negatively correlated with socioeconomic variables such as income
and education. A frequently cited TÜSİAD (2001) study reports strong positive
correlations between various measures of political information and socioeconomic
status for Turkish voters.
Why might voters’ levels of political knowledge or degrees of awareness influ-
ence the way candidates conduct their campaigns? Clarke et al. (2009) provide
some evidence from UK for leader effects, and more generally character valence
mattering more for politically less sophisticated voters. Leiter (2013), analyzing
individual level data from Germany, Britain and Netherlands, shows that polit-
ically sophisticated voters care more about proximity in positional issues, but
both types (sophisticated and unsophisticated) of voters care equally about va-
lence issues.7 Likability heuristics, as suggested by Brady and Sniderman (1985),
or usage of leader images as cues for policy, as put forth by Clarke et al. (2004)
are among some of the potential explanations proposed for existence of valence
voters and their seeming prevalence among the less informed. Popkin (1994), and
later Lupia and McCubins (1998) have argued that voters can use a variety of
low-information heuristics to approximate an informationally complete rational
6Converse’s (1964) analysis revealed the existence of some voters who hold positions on a
variety of issues, albeit inconsistent from a unidimensional liberal-conservative framework.
This contributed to later alternative models of voting, such as multidimensional voting à la
Plott (1967) or average “consideration ownership” model of Zaller (1992). Nevertheless, it
also revealed that a significant portion of voters seem to vote without any policy or issue
considerations (i.e. noise voters).
7Both studies measure political sophistication using an interaction term that consists of formal
education and political knowledge.
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decision. Yet, there is also evidence for less knowledgeable voters being moved
by superficial differences in politicians or basing their votes on frivolous candi-
date traits. Lau and Redlawsk (2006) provide experimental evidence from mock
elections on how subjects with less interest and knowledge on an issue can show
support for (physically) more attractive versus less attractive candidates, despite
the less attractive candidate representing a position closer to their preferences.
Lenz and Lawson (2011), using individual-level voting data from 2006 US gu-
bernatorial and senatorial elections, find that poorly informed voters who also
watch TV disproportionately cast their votes on the basis of candidates’ physical
appearances. Negiz and Akyıldız (2012), using survey data from 2009 Turkish
local elections, provide evidence for voters having low levels of formal education
attaching greater importance to physical characteristics in candidates compared
to relatively better educated voters. These patterns suggest that politicians run-
ning for office and their campaign teams have sufficient reason to structure their
campaigns by taking not only the electorate’s policy preferences, but also their
audience’s cognitive/informational limitations into account.
In this chapter, I build a model of electoral campaigning bringing these consid-
erations together. The model is a variation on Baron’s (1994) and later Grossman
and Helpman’s (1996) noise voters framework, with elements of costly policy and
valence campaigning and correlated ignorance.8 The electorate is divided into
two types of voters. Informed or politically aware voters who can observe the
messages generated by campaigns in the policy dimension, and ignorant voters
who can’t condition their voting decisions on policies.9 All voters get affected by
valence campaigning, which is assumed to operate by inducing an additively sep-
arable partisanship effect.10 In addition, this informational status is assumed to
depend monotonically on policy preferences in a probabilistic sense. I first spec-
ify a simple probabilistic voting model with two office-motivated politicians and
a continuum of voters indexed according to their preferred policies, incorporat-
ing this idea of correlated informational segregation, on top of which I introduce
8I use the term “correlated” figuratively, referring to a particular form of stochastically mono-
tonic association defined in assumption 1 later on, which also implies correlation literally.
9This sort of ignorant voter behaviour can be justified with an argument invoking incomplete
information (being unable to observe policies) and Knightian uncertainty regarding initial
positions of the politicians. Alternatively, one can go with a bounded rationality argument
involving voter sophistication. In any case, voters are algorithmic players in my model as I
focus on the way politicians structure their campaigns around policy and valence elements,
by assuming that campaigns do work as intended for whatever reason. There is a separate
literature of microfounded campaigns dealing with the question of why do campaigns work,
which is briefly reviewed in the next subsection.
10This is a convenience assumption. Assuming that only ignorant voters are influenced by
valence campaigning would only strengthen the conclusions of this chapter.
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elements associated with campaigning. Politicians are endowed with limited re-
sources, which they can allocate between policy and valence campaigning. While
valence campaigning works as mentioned above, policy campaigning allows politi-
cians to commit on policies differing from their pre-campaign positions, which can
be interpreted as their reputations or legacies they inherited from their party af-
filiations.
The model is partly inspired by an observational curiosity characterizing a
large part of Turkish electoral politics in the last decade which left many ob-
servers puzzled. AKP, the heir of “Islamic left”, frequently associated with a
conservative, rural and relatively uneducated voter base, was a newcomer back in
2002 Turkish elections. Unlike its main opponent CHP which is often associated
with better educated and relatively liberal urban voters and whose campaign was
heavily based on valence issues, AKP conducted a campaign with an almost-
exclusive policy focus and positioned itself to a much more liberal stance than
one would expect by looking at preferences of its voter base. The “puzzle” is
somehow related to the characteristic image of Turkish rural voters being suscep-
tible to valence-related communal appeals popularized in literature and cinema,
as well as a common preconception that parties campaign in their own backyards.
While the latter preconception was more or less valid for the two decades pre-
ceding 2002, AKP’s campaign was hugely successful partly because it broke this
cycle.11 In fact, if the characteristic image contains a grain of truth and CHP and
AKP’s voter bases were indeed more policy and valence sensitive respectively in
a statistical sense, then they would have incentives to behave in a manner com-
patible with the observation, as already being the boss of your own house gives
all the reason for campaigning at each other’s backyard. This chapter essentially
provides a simple model capturing this idea using a correlated ignorance argu-
ment.
The chapter has two central results. First one is a reiteration of already
known results with a slight twist and comes from the benchmark probabilistic
voting model without campaigning. If whether voters are ignorant or not is
independent of their policy preferences, then existence of ignorant voters is ir-
relevant and candidates converge to the policy dictated by the centripetal force
generated by the entirety of the electorate. This is basically Wittman’s (1989)
11The cycle was a partial byproduct of a military coup in 1982 which resulted in a continuous
army tutelage for almost 20 years, as well as a heavy “political landscape engineering” by
military cadres. See Zürcher (2004) chapter 15 for a brief overview of Turkish politics after
80’s and Hale and Ozbudun (2009) for a detailed narrative of the period following AKP’s
emergence, as well as a comparison of its election campaigns with those of its opponents’.
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argument, later called “miracle of aggregation” by Brennan (2012). On the other
hand, no matter how large the fraction of ignorant voters is, as long as there
is some systematic relation between policy preferences and informational sta-
tus, ignorant voters’ preferences are completely ignored. This is in accord with
Baron (1994) and Grossman & Helpman’s (1996) insights derived from models
with finite numbers of voters. The twist is: when this relation is monotonic, i.e.
when ignorance and preferences are correlated, the electoral outcome has a left or
right bias, depending on the direction of the correlation.12 Second, and the main
result is obtained when campaigning is introduced. Assuming that candidates
are positioned at the opposing segments of the policy spectrum at the begin-
ning of the campaign, a monotonic association between policy preferences and
informational status ceteris paribus introduces asymmetries into their campaign
strategies. That is, assuming a positive (negative) correlation between ignorance
and policy preferences, candidates competing in an otherwise symmetric envi-
ronment would differ in their campaign focuses with the left (right) candidate
conducting a more valence focused campaign and vice versa. At the heart of the
result lies the role played by the effective proximity of politicians’ initial positions
(legacies) to pseudo-swing voter’s position. The latter represents the most bene-
ficial position in the policy dimension in terms of victory probabilities assuming
no valence campaigning. A lower distance between the two incentivizes a candi-
date to follow a more valence oriented campaign due to decreasing marginal rate
of substitution between different campaign types. There are several additional
results such as the no-longer-irrelevance of the fraction of ignorant voters under
costly campaigning, which can be read in the concluding section.
1.2 Previous Literature and Contribution
As mentioned in the previous section, one strand of campaigns literature is in-
volved in microfounding them. It evolved as a substrand of the literature aiming
to characterize conditions under which information transmission (from politicians
to voters) occurs in elections, which in turn got its kickstart with Banks’ (1990)
seminal paper. Banks’ (1990) model is not really a model of campaigning, but
a simple signalling extension of the standard Downsian framework, where candi-
dates have preferred positions unknown to voters and announcing a policy that
differs from this position is costly for the winner for some reason. He shows that
12This result is reminiscent of Bartels (2008) who is a strong proponent of the view that a
large impoverished part of the population is not politically represented due to lack of political
knowledge.
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information transmission, i.e. separating equilibria, occurs only if deviation costs
are sufficiently high and politicians are extreme enough in their initial positions.
Prat (2002) is among the first papers attempting to microfound electoral cam-
paigns. He considers a median-dominated Downsian setting with two politicians
who (besides policy) compete in quality, true value of which is neither known
to voters, nor to a lobbying group who doesn’t care about quality but has its
own policy preference. Both the lobby and voters get noisy signals about the
quality gap between candidates, with former’s signal being private and latter’s
signal being public. The lobby picks a candidate to whom it offers contribu-
tions, which pays off if the candidate wins and which the candidate receives if he
wins by announcing a position matching lobby’s preference. Candidates can use
contributions in advertisement, which generates no direct information or pref-
erence manipulation, but indirectly provides voters with the information that
the candidate is being financed by the lobby. Since the lobby wants its candi-
date to win, and since it uses its private signal to forecast the subsequent public
signal, this otherwise useless advertisement activity signals a higher candidate
quality to voters. Comparing the value of this information to the welfare loss
stemming from policy distortion towards lobby’s preference allows Prat (2002)
to analyze welfare effects of banning campaign contributions. Coate builds two
models where campaigns play a directly informative role and are funded by a
lobby as well. In Coate (2004a), he assumes that candidates differ in an unob-
servable quality dimension but unlike Prat (2002), he considers advertisement
as conveying truthful information to the electorate, i.e. good quality candidates
can advertise and reveal themselves to some voters with the fraction increasing
in advertisement expenditure, but bad quality candidates cannot. By allowing
candidates to bargain policy positions with the lobby in return for contributions,
he can study welfare effects of introducing contribution limits, which turn out to
be positive. In Coate (2004b), there are prospective candidates with fixed but
privately known policy positions. Candidates are chosen by their parties at the
beginning of elections according to their likelihood of winning. There are two
lobbies representing left and right segments of the policy spectrum and campaign
contributions can be used for truthfully conveying candidate positions in a man-
ner similar to Coate (2004a). The dual-partisan nature of lobbying, as well as the
lack of an electorate-wide desirable attribute such as quality reverses his previous
normative conclusions, and he shows that limiting campaign contributions can be
Pareto worsening. Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) propose an alternative model of
directly informative campaigning. There are two candidates, one decisive voter
149
and a state of nature: the identity of the candidate holding the correct (bene-
ficial for the voter) position. Information is symmetric and no one knows this
state. Campaigning conveys truthful information to everyone in the form of a
continuous stochastic process pointing out towards the correct candidate as long
as the campaigner keeps incurring its cost, which is interpreted as candidate’s
fund raising ability. In addition, only the underdog (in terms of voter support,
which depends on public beliefs) can campaign. They show that if an interven-
tion equalizes the playing ground by evening out the cost gap between candidates’
campaign technologies, then it is welfare improving due to strategic substitutabil-
ity of campaign activities. From this brief summary, it should be apparent that
one big advantage of microfounding campaigns as informative activities is that it
allows for a satisfactory normative analysis of policy interventions by considering
informational costs. Naturally, the model presented here will be lacking on that
front. However, since the main goal of the chapter is to lay down the foundations
of a framework where asymmetries in the way candidates structure their cam-
paigns can be tracked down to campaign responsiveness of their audience, this
is not too big of a loss. Relatedly, there are no contributors but politicians are
endowed with exogenously given campaign resources in my setting.
Since Stokes’ (1963) seminal critique of Downs (1957), there is an ongoing
effort of coming up with theories of electoral competition taking valence consid-
erations into account but models incorporating policy and valence dimensions
into a unified setting appeared relatively recently. Although they usually differ
in their focus and scope, they can be roughly thought as belonging to a com-
mon strand of unmicrofounded and persuasive campaigns.13,14 This chapter can
be loosely placed within this literature. A standard result from the spatial vot-
ing literature is the mean voter theorem, emphasizing the policy location of the
swing voter when candidates compete in a probabilistic framework and voters
have quadratic utilities. One of the first papers from the persuasive campaigns
literature is by Schofield (2003), who shows that when candidate valence is gen-
erated by activist coalitions, and when the valence these coalitions generate can
be influenced by politicians via policy accommodation, the mean value theorem
no longer holds. Wiseman (2006) presents a model that is slightly closer to the
one in this chapter. His setting features two candidates moving sequentially (an
incumbent and a challenger), each offering platforms that consist of a costless pol-
13For the sake of brevity, this strand will henceforth be referred as persuasive campaigns liter-
ature.
14Interestingly and unusually, this literature did not appear before but arose simultaneously
with the microfounded campaigns literature.
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icy position and an amount of campaign spending which translates linearly into
valence support in the voting stage. Politicians have intrinsic policy preferences
and are constrained with limited resources but since campaign resources have
no alternative use, they allocate all of their budget to obtain valence support,
so valence is in effect exogenously determined. His focus is rather on positional
deviations caused by the presence of valence campaigning and the influence ex-
ercised by valence budgets. His general result is that incumbent’s policy stance
depends on challenger’s valence budget and if the challenger is relatively poor
in terms of resources, then the incumbent can get away with a less moderate
policy position. Continuing with the theme of valence-policy interaction, Carrillo
and Castanheira (2008) consider a model of sequential campaigning where two
candidates with intrinsic policy preferences (left and right) first announce one of
three possible policies: L,M,R with M coinciding to median voter’s position and
left candidate can only announce L,M and vice versa. They then make a costly
valence investment which is interpreted as a competence demonstration. They
assume that a fraction of the electorate does not observe the valence dimension,
and find out that if this fraction is too high or too low, convergence to median
prevails. For an intermediate range of uninformedness, policy divergence remains
a possibility. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009), maintaining policy first,
valence second timing, specify a probabilistic voting model with stochastic pref-
erences where purely office motivated candidates are uncertain of voters’ bliss
points. They show that even though candidates have no intrinsic policy prefer-
ences, they announce polarized platforms in equilibrium in order to soften the
subsequent valence competition. Zakharov (2009), again within a policy first,
valence second framework, focuses on the effects of exogenous partisanship. His
model has two parties, each having its own partisan base consisting of voters who
either vote for the party with which they are affiliated, or abstain. Parties can
engage in costly valence spending to swing non-partisan voters after announcing
their policy positions.15 He shows that an increase in partisan voters makes can-
didates engage more intensively in valence campaigning, as well as making them
strategically diverge in policy positions to reduce costs associated with acquiring
valence. Serra (2010) reverses the timing and assumes that candidates first invest
in valence, then announce policies. She shows that in a non-probabilistic frame-
work, valence spending is again associated with platform polarization. Moving
on to a different theme, Meirowitz (2007) starts with a pure valence campaign
15Herrera, Levine and Martinelli (2008) consider a framework similar to Zakharov’s (2008) with
partisan voters but assume that campaigning can probabilistically stop voters from abstaining.
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setting, modelling valence competition as an all pay auction with effort costs
being analogous to the price paid by bidders, and electoral victory representing
the auctioned good. By considering mixed as well as pure strategies, he shows
that the candidate with an electoral advantage (which can be interpreted as an
incumbency advantage) exerts less effort and the candidate with a cost advantage
exerts more effort for valence campaigning. His results imply that while a policy
aiming to increase funding costs could be opposed by both parties, a policy in-
troducing a spending cap would always make the electorally disadvantaged party
better off. Morton and Myerson (2012) integrate lobbying and persuasive cam-
paigning within a probabilistic voting framework. They assume that candidates
first announce policy platforms, then competitively raise campaign funds which
they then spend to acquire valence. Interest groups’ contributions depend not
only on the policy commitments in the first stage, but also on probabilities of an
election victory. While their setting generates a multiplicity of equilibria, they
show that the contribution market can negate the natural uncertainty associated
with probabilistic voting, ensuring the victory of one of the candidates. In all
the models mentioned so far in this paragraph, policy competition occurs via
costless announcements. Eyster and Kittsteiner (2007) specify a model without
valence elements where two parties choose a policy platform at the beginning of
the election, and then conduct costly policy campaigns in separate constituencies
with different median voters in order to relocate from their initial platforms. They
show that in equilibrium, parties position themselves asymmetrically to right and
left and proceed to carving out their own “home turfs” within neighbourhoods of
their announced positions. Unlike the models presented so far, campaign tech-
nology in this chapter contains both policy and valence elements. Relocating is
costly as in Eyster and Kittsteiner (2007), albeit candidates’ initial positions are
exogenously given. Valence is costly as well, as in Zakharov (2009) or Ashworth
and Bueno de Mesquita (2009), and candidates are endowed with campaign bud-
gets as in Wiseman (2006), which they can allocate between these two types of
campaign activities.
There are several more papers that should be mentioned here, as they share
some common elements with the model presented in the next section. Baron
(1994), Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Strömberg (2004) are among impor-
tant papers which model uninformed voters as noise voters who don’t respond
to policy proposals. The first two assume that uninformed voters are “impres-
sionable” in the sense that they can be swinged by campaign spending as in my
model. The difference is, they assume that this valence-susceptibility is exclusive
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to uninformed voters. Their goal is to provide insight on how the policy mak-
ing process is captured by interest groups who provide politicians with means
of capturing uninformed masses. Strömberg (2004) uses the same framework to
study the effects of mass media on policy competition in elections. His model
features no valence campaigning but rather a media industry which determines
who gets the news, i.e. who becomes a noise voter and who responds to policy.
He shows that if the media industry is characterized by large fixed costs and in-
creasing returns, then large groups (of voters having the same policy preferences)
are more likely to end up informed, which implies that equilibrium platforms
are biased towards their preferences. Regarding policy campaigning, the main
inspiration for the specification in this chapter came from Harrington and Hess
(1996) who use a similar costly relocation model in the context of negative cam-
paigning. Their model features no valence campaigning but candidates, besides
relocating themselves by spending campaign resources, are also able to shift each
other back towards initial positions by undertaking costly and persuasive ex-
tremism allegations. There are also two other papers which attempt to introduce
correlation between policy preferences and ignorance like I do in this chapter.
Making a detour to the lobbying theme, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) study
incentives governing interest groups regarding local versus national capture in a
multi-district probabilistic voting model with purely office motivated politicians
and noise voters. Their model features an electorate divided into three classes:
rich, middle class and poor with a fraction of rich (and informed) voters ex-
ogenously organized into a lobbying group. Interpreting voters who respond to
policy competition as politically aware voters, they assume that the rich group
have the highest number of politically aware voters and vice versa. They show
that high inequality districts are more prone to interest group capture due to a
lower fraction of politically aware voters, which results campaign contributions
being more valuable at local level then at national level. Finally, Lind and Rohner
(2013) builds a Wittmanian probabilistic voting model featuring noise voters and
politicians with intrinsic policy preferences, which makes them subject to a util-
ity cost when committing to a different platform.16 Their motivation is to build
a lobbying-free model that can explain the “rich bias” in redistributive policies
across U.S. states. Their specification do not feature valence campaigning but
intrinsic policy preferences combined with deviation costs have effects similar to
policy campaigning with costly relocation employed in this chapter. Their con-
clusions regarding policy platforms are similar: introduction of correlation leads
16See Wittman (1983).
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one candidate becoming more moderating, and the other becoming more extreme.
Besides the difference in focus and lack of campaigning, the way they introduce
this correlation is different. They apply a constant perturbation to the conditional
probability function at a cutoff policy preference and apply variational calculus
to study its effects. My model instead uses stochastic order relations, which also
allows me to study the effects of strengthening the correlation.
Contributions of this chapter are twofold. First, it provides a reasonably
simple way of introducing correlated ignorance in a probabilistic voting model,
which allows to not only study the effects of a correlation between policy prefer-
ences and ignorance in isolation from the fraction of the latter, but also to assess
the impact of strengthening this correlation. Although the electorate is assumed
to be a continuum in this chapter, the method is equally applicable when the
policy conflict is characterized by a finite or a countably infinite number of pol-
icy positions. Second, it offers a novel potential explanation for asymmetries in
politicians’ campaign structures without exclusively relying on candidate-specific
characteristics and instead arguing that correlated political awareness, interacting
with candidate legacies can ceteris paribus provide sufficiently strong incentives
to candidates for differentiating their campaign tones. This explanation can pos-
sibly offer guidance for future empirical work.
Next section presents the model. It starts by specifying a simple probabilistic
voting model with noise voters, then introduces correlation between ignorance and
policy preferences. This is followed by the introduction of campaigning, which is
embedded on top of this benchmark probabilistic voting model. One shortcoming
of the campaign model with costly policy relocation is that it doesn’t allow for
cheap (free) announcement of policies. Before concluding, I attempt to address
this in an alternative model where candidates first costlessly announce policies,
then allocate their resources between policy and valence campaigning, where pol-
icy campaigns serve to reduce the post election ambiguity faced by policy aware
(and risk averse) voters. Final section concludes.
2 Model
The main model consists of two modifications to a standard probabilistic voting
framework with two politicians and a continuum of voters indexed according to
their preferred policies who rank different policies using a utility difference and
additive bias specification. First, electoral competition involves two dimensions:
valence and policy. Engaging in both types of competition requires spending
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resources, with which politicians are endowed in different amounts. Second, a
fraction of the voters are assumed to be noise voters, in the sense that their
voting decisions are based purely on the valence dimension. These voters are
deemed ignorant because assuming that they care about policy, they should ei-
ther be unable to observe the policy competition, or they should have cognitive
limitations preventing them from assessing policy proposals. Being ignorant and
having a specific policy preference are not ex ante independent events, but they
are monotonically related in a probabilistic sense. I build the model step by step,
starting with a probabilistic voting model with ignorant voters, no valence cam-
paigning and costless policy commitment. This not only constitutes a benchmark
for the full model but also provides a point for assessing the effects of correlated
ignorance on campaign behaviour later on.
2.1 Probabilistic Voting with Correlated Ignorance
There are two purely office motivated politicians labelled A and B. They can
costlessly announce and commit to policies XA, XB ∈ [0, 1]. It is assumed that
they maximize the probability of electoral victory, although one can equivalently
assume that they maximize expected vote shares.17 There is a continuum of sin-
cere voters with measure 1, who are indexed according to their policy preferences
x ∼ [0, 1] distributed according to an absolutely continuous distribution F . For
a given policy X, the reduced-form policy preference of a voter with bliss point
x is captured by the following utility function.
U(X;x) = −D(|X − x|), (1)
where D : R+ → R+ represents voter’s disutility from facing a policy different
from her bliss point, which is assumed to depend symmetrically on the distance
between actual and ideal policies. It is further assumed that D is strictly increas-
ing, strictly convex and sufficiently smooth so that D ◦ | · | is twice continuously
differentiable.18 While strict convexity ensures the existence of a unique pure
strategy equilibrium, symmetry allows to get a clean peak at the effects of corre-
lated ignorance on campaigning by construction of a symmetric equilibrium.19
17This is a trivial consequence of both expected vote share and probability of victory maximiza-
tions yielding the same best responses. Patty (2002) shows the equivalence of two objectives
in two candidate elections without abstention or coordinated voting.
18This specification, first used by Davis et al. (1970), is quite common in positive political
theory literature.
19The conclusions derived from the probabilistic voting model in this section is robust under
any smooth (twice continuously differentiable) voter utility satisfying single-crossing in policy-
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Voters are either informed or ignorant. Informed voters are assumed to ob-
serve a perfectly informative private signal revealing policy announcements. In
addition, they care about the identity of the politician announcing the policy in
a specific way. Letting I = 1 denote the state of being informed, the pre-election
utility of an informed voter from a candidate i victory through announcement of
policy X is given by the following.
W (X, i;x, I = 1) = ±γxI + U(X;x). (2)
In (2), γxI represents a bias towards the candidate A (so ± = + if i = A). This
is the widely used additive bias specification, first popularized by Enelow and
Hinich (1982). Under ex ante politician uncertainty on the bias, it gives rise
to the standard utility-difference probabilistic voting model à la Lindbeck and
Weibull (1987). The bias consists of two components. An individual ideological
component σxI , which can ex ante be seen as an idiosyncratic preference shock
that is independent across voters, and a common valence component δ, which can
be seen as a systemic preference shock that affects all voters in the same way.
γxI = σ
x
I + δ, (3)
where σxI and δ are distributed uniformly over supports [−βI , βI ] and [−α, α]
respectively. Uniformly distributed biases is a widely made assumption in proba-
bilistic voting models. Under more general voter utilities20, it ensures the global
concavity of politician payoffs. Here, it simplifies the exposition and the results
would hold if one assumed a symmetric distribution for the idiosyncratic shock
and log-concave distribution for the common shock. Their realizations are not
observed by politicians at the time of policy announcements.
Ignorant voters neither observe policy announcements, nor receive any policy
signal that can be conditioned upon. The pre-election utility of an ignorant voter
from a candidate i victory is given by the following.
W (X, i; x, I = 0) = ±γxU . (4)
This approach for modelling uninformed voting behaviour is quite standard and
goes back to Baron (1994). It is later used by Grossman and Helpman (1996)
in the context of lobbying, and by Strömberg (2004) in the context of mass
type pair when voters are indexed in some unidimensional type-space instead of being indexed
according to their bliss points. See appendix.
20Even more general than single-crossing.
156
media’s effect on electoral competition. It can be justified in two ways. First,
it can be taken as an ad hoc bounded rationality specification. Alternatively, it
can be assumed that upon not-observing the policy announcement, rational but
ignorant voters hold common beliefs over symmetric policy announcements across
politicians.21 The bias γxU is specified as before.
γU = σ
x
U + δ, (5)
where σxU is distributed uniformly over support [−βU , βU ]. Notice that the pos-
sibility of differing (non-policy) ideological heterogeneity between two types of
voters (βI ̸= βU) is left open. At worst one can assume βI = βU . If not, βI ̸= βU
can be taken as an approximation to existence of socioeconomic groups governing
informational status, e.g. urban dwellers versus rural inhabitants. It is assumed
that informational status and policy preferences are dependent, and the depen-
dence is summarized by the following conditional mass function.
Γ(x) = P(I = 1|x). (6)
The timing of events is as follows. [1] Both politicians, knowing the distribu-
tions of policy preferences, σxI , σ
x
U , δ and Γ(x), simultaneously and noncooper-
atively announce their electoral platforms: XA, XB ∈ [0, 1]. [2] Nature chooses
who is ignorant and who is not, idiosyncratic and common shocks realize. [3]
Voters vote according to (2) and (4). [4] Winner implements the policy.
Given two policy proposalsXA, XB, an informed voter with a policy preference
x strictly prefers voting for A if the following condition holds.
σxI −D(|XA − x|) + δ > −D(|XB − x|)
=⇒ σxI > D(|XA − x|)−D(|XB − x|)− δ, (7)
i.e. only if her bias towards candidate A is strong enough to compensate for the
extra disutility she incurs by voting for A instead of B. Given any realization of
the common shock δ, it follows that the probability she votes for the candidate
A is given by the following.
21This makes sure that conditional on beliefs, expected policy-utility differences for uninformed
voters from voting on A or B are zero. In fact, since politicians are identical besides their
label, and since uninformed voters’ policy preferences will not be taken into account by
politicians under any belief system, beliefs that put all the mass on the policy to which
politicians converge would constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to a game with voters
as Bayesian actors. Keeping this in mind, as typical in probabilistic voting literature, I take



















D(|XB − x|)−D(|XA − x|) + δ
}
, (8)
where the second line follows from the fact that σxI is uniformly distributed.
Similarly, from (4), for a given realization of δ, an ignorant voter with policy
preference x votes for candidate A if the following condition is satisfied.
σxU > −δ. (9)
It follows that the probability she votes for A is given by the following.







Using the fact that population is of measure 1, for a given realization of δ and
a given pair of electoral platforms (XA, XB), the expected measure of informed






σxI > D(|XA − x|)−D(|XB − x|)− δ
)
dF (x). (11)





(1− Γ(x))P (σxU > −δ) dF (x). (12)
To begin with, assume that informational status and policy preferences are


















D(|XB − x|)−D(|XA − x|)
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SUA (δ) = (1− Γ̂)
∫ 1
0




































Notice that from law of large numbers, (15) is also the actual share of votes that
the candidate A would receive under the realized δ and given policy platforms.








D(|XA − x|)−D(|XB − x|)
]
dF (x), (16)
where Γ̃(·) denotes the effective policy weight of informed voters taking into
account relative voter heterogeneity, i.e.
















If βI = βU , then Γ̃(·) is simply the share of informed voters in the electorate. The
more ideologically heterogenous informed voters are relative to ignorant voters,
the more noisy their policy preferences become in the eyes of politicians, which
reduces their effective weight in policy proposals. From (16) and due to the fact
that δ is distributed uniformly in [−α, α], the probability of an electoral victory

























(18) is the objective function for candidate A, which he maximizes with respect


























A Nash equilibrium of the electoral game without campaigning will be a pair of
policy platforms (X∗A, X
∗
B) such that:












Strict convexity of the voter disutility ensures that the electoral game has a unique
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Electoral game - Existence and uniqueness of pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium): The electoral game with costless policy commit-
ment and no valence campaigning has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Strategy spaces, being [0, 1], are convex and compact. From continuity
of D(·), P(Sk(δ;Xk, Xj) > 12) is continuous in Xk for any Xj and vice versa for
k, j ∈ {A,B} and k ̸= j. Since D(·) is strictly increasing and strictly convex,
−D(·) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave. Furthermore; |X − x| is convex
in X for any x. It follows that −D(|X − x|) is strictly concave in X for any x. In-
tegral of (strictly) concave functions is (strictly) concave, so P(Sk(δ;Xk, Xj) > 12)
is strictly concave in Xk for any Xj for k ∈ {A,B} and k ̸= j. Thus, from
Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan theorem, the electoral game has a unique pure-strategy




Focusing on the problem of candidate A (candidate B’s problem and first-order
condition is symmetric), the first-order sufficient condition for an interior maxi-


























D′(XA − x)dF (x) +
∫ 1
XA
D′(x−XA)dF (x) = 0, (21)
22Global concavity of the objective function ensures the sufficiency of the first-order condition.
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where the third line follows due to D being twice continuously differentiable, F





= 0.23 At the optimal plat-
form, the marginal probability gain from offering a policy slightly more aligned
with preferences of the voters to the right should be exactly compensated by the
marginal probability loss from that policy being slightly more distant to bliss
points of the voters to the left. Two facts stand out from (21). First, from the
symmetry of first-order conditions, policy convergence occurs, i.e. both politi-
cians commit to same platforms. This is a natural consequence of politicians
having no intrinsic policy preferences or any constraints preventing them from
freely relocating across the policy space. Second, neither existence of ignorant
voters, nor any increase in the share of ignorant voters have any effect on equi-
librium platforms. This is in stark contrast with Lind and Rohner (2013), who,
assuming intrinsic policy preferences for politicians, show that a decrease in the
fraction of ignorant voters leads to at least one candidate choosing a less polarized
platform. Their result stems from the fact that when candidates have preferred
policies, there is a tension between “centrifugal” (own policy) and “centripetal”
(electorate’s preferences) forces.24 An increase in the fraction of ignorant vot-
ers favours centrifugal forces, allowing politicians to win elections by proposing
platforms closer to their own bliss points. In the current model, the hegemony
belongs to the centripetal force, on which the presence of ignorant voters have no
effect, unless their policy preferences systematically differ from the preferences of
informed voters. The lack of association between informational status and policy
preferences implies that politicians would have no reason to assume that informed
voters, who can be swinged by offering different policies, will have different pref-
erences compared to the general population. From (21), one can immediately
see that there will be a unique interior electoral platform that will satisfy the
first-order condition.
Lemma 1 (Electoral game - Unique interior equilibrium policy): Assum-
ing full support for F , in equilibrium, there exists a unique X∗ ∈ (0, 1) announced
by both politicians.
Proof: Policy convergence follows from the equivalence of first-order conditions
under the symmetric payoffs given in (20). D is strictly increasing so at XA = 0,
(21) is strictly positive and at XA = 1, it is strictly negative. Since D is con-
23These ensure that the derivative can be passed under the integral. The last one implies that
boundary variations from Leibniz rule get cancelled out. Under a more general voter utility,
the same cancellation would occur from the envelope theorem.
24This terminology is first employed by Cox (1990).
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tinuously differentiable, the left-hand side of (21) is continuous in XA, so from
intermediate value theorem, there is some X∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that (21) holds when
XA = X
∗. D is strictly convex, so the left-hand side of (21) is strictly decreasing
in XA, which implies that this X
∗ is unique. 
There is also a special case under which the position of X∗ can exactly be located.
Lemma 2 (Electoral game - Equilibrium policy with symmetric distri-
bution): Assume that F has a symmetric density f . Then X∗ = 1
2
.




D′(X − x)dF (x) +
∫ 1
X
D′(x−X)dF (x) = 0. (22)






+ k) = f(1
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+ k. Their marginal disutilities are both D′ (k) and they get exactly the same
weight due to symmetry of f . So the marginal probability loss from the former is
exactly compensated by the marginal probability gain from the latter. Varying
k from 0 to 1
2
completes the argument. Uniqueness follows from lemma 1. 
Suppose now that informational status and policy preferences are ex ante
dependent in a probabilistic sense, i.e. (6) is no longer constant but varies with
x. Politicians would then make use of the statistical information this fact provides














σxI > D(|XA − x|)−D(|XB − x|)− δ
)










D(|XB − x|)−D(|XA − x|)
]
dF (x|I = 1) + δ
}
, (23)
where the second line follows from a straightforward application of the Bayes’
rule and Γ is the unconditional probability of a voter receiving the perfectly
informative signal, or equivalently, the total measure of informed voters as the





= P(I = 1). (24)
Since correlation or not, politicians have no means of capturing the support of
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ignorant voters, the expression for the measure of ignorant voters who vote for




. So given a



















D(|XB − x|)−D(|XA − x|)
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D(|XA − x|)−D(|XB − x|)
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Both proposition (1) and lemma 1 are still valid, and politicians will announce
some unique platform XA = XB = X
∗ ∈ (0, 1) as long as f(x|I = 1) does not put





D′(X − x)dF (x|I = 1) +
∫ 1
X
D′(x−X)dF (x|I = 1) = 0. (26)
So in a probabilistic voting model with costless policy commitment, presence of
noise voters affect equilibrium platforms only if preferences of the latter differs
systematically from those of the informed voters because, as can be seen more
clearly from (26), politicians only care about policy preferences of informed voters.
Hence, the closer the association is between policy preferences and informational
status, the stronger will be the divergence between the equilibrium policy and
preferences of ignorant voters. This also implies that unlike the previous case,
there will be a divergence between the political outcome and a planner outcome
assuming that the social planner treats all agents in an egalitarian manner. To
see this, just notice that informational status is irrelevant for the planner. Hence,
while the solution to planner’s problem would satisfy (22), the political outcome
would solve (26).
How will the equilibrium policy differ under correlated ignorance? To deter-
mine the direction of bias, one needs to posit some form of monotonicity governing
the relation between informational status and policy preferences. In the context
of a unidimensional policy space, there are a variety of reasons why informational
status can be monotonically associated with policy preferences. One reason might
be cognitive: a certain level of human capital accumulation may be required to
map electoral discourses onto pledged policies and this can be related to policy
preferences. For instance, the policy variable can be thought as representing a
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redistributive policy instrument (e.g. tax level or public good with a balanced
budget), preferences toward which can be related to gross incomes, which can in
turn be associated with educational attainment. Another reason might be infor-
mational in the literary sense: A certain time-commitment to follow the media
might be required to accurately learn about policy positions and the extent with
which voters can access media resources may depend on factors such as wealth or
geography, which can in turn induce a somehow monotonic association between
informational status and policy preferences. For example, the policy variable can
be representing some metric of religious intensity in education, which can be more
preferable for rural conservative voters, who might have more limited access to
informational resources. Without loss of generality, suppose that informational
status and policy preferences have a probabilistically decreasing association in
the following sense.
Assumption 1 (Likelihood ratio (LR) dominance): F (x|I = 1) is LR-
dominated by F (x|I = 0), i.e. f(x|I=0)
f(x|I=1) is increasing in x.
Assumption 1 says that ignorant voters are more likely to have higher policy
preferences compared to ignorant voters.25 From law of total probability, F (x) is
a weighted average of these two conditional distributions so it also implies that
F (x|I = 1) is LR-dominated by F (x), i.e. f(x)
f(x|I=1) is increasing in x. So compared
to F (x), F (x|I = 1) signifies a left shift in the mass of its density, reflecting the
assumption that compared to general population, informed voters are more likely
to prefer lower policies. In fact, since informational status is a binary random
variable, assumption 1 is equivalent to monotonicity of Γ(x).
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity of Γ(x) and LR-dominance): F (x|I = 1) being
LR-dominated by F (x|I = 0) is equivalent to Γ′(x) = ∂P(I=1|x)
∂x
≤ 0, assuming
that Γ(·) is differentiable.
Proof: Appendix. 
At this point, it should be noted that assumption 1 is stronger than necessary,
because U = −D is supermodular in (X, x). In the appendix, I show that the
monotonicity described in proposition 3 below prevails under first-order stochas-
tic dominance order as long as voter utilities are supermodular. The reason for
imposing the stronger assumption is that it allows for a much more intuitive expo-
sition. This is because one implication of assumption 1 is that not only F (x|I = 1)
25Such as higher taxes, higher provision of religious education, etc. The opposite assumption
would yield the opposite conclusions.
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is first-order stochastically dominated by F (x), but that this dominance survives
on any measurable set B ⊆ [0, 1], i.e. F (x|x ∈ B) ≤ F (x|x ∈ B, I = 1) for
all x ∈ B. In fact, to get the intuitive exposition in proposition 2, it would be
enough to assume the slightly weaker condition that F (x|I = 1) is dual -hazard
rate dominated by F (x|I = 0), that is, both hazard-rate and reverse-hazard rate
dominated. This would provide just enough truncation-proofness (the require-
ment is that first-order stochastic dominance survives only on half truncations)
and is implied by but does not imply LR-dominance.26 While assumption 1 means
that a voter with a high policy preference always has a lower chance of receiving
the policy signal compared to a voter with a lower policy preference; both of the
weaker assumptions would allow for the possibility of ex ante political-savviness
among voters who prefer higher policies. It should also be mentioned that under
assumption 1, lemma 3 implies that the state of being informed and policy pref-
erences are negatively correlated in the literary sense.
Corollary 1 (Negative correlation between informational status and
policy preferences): Under assumption 1, the random variables x and I are
negatively correlated, i.e. cov(x, I) ≤ 0.27
Proof: Appendix. 
To determine the direction of policy bias, I start by rewriting the first-order
condition (22) in a modified but equivalent form.
−F (X)E
[
D′(X − x)|x ≤ X
]





where E denotes the expectation operator. Doing the same for (26) gives the
following.
− F (X|I = 1)E
[
D′(X − x)|x ≤ X, I = 1
]
+ (1− F (X|I = 1))E
[
D′(x−X)|x > X, I = 1
]
= 0. (28)
Next proposition shows that the solution of (28) should be non-greater than the
solution of (27).
26See chapter 1 in Shaked and Shantikumar (2007). Dual-hazard rate dominance can be thought
as the two-sided version of the concept of one-sided conditional stochastic dominance used
by Maskin and Riley (2000). In addition, if the voter disutility in (1) is quadratic, a simple
negative correlation between I and x would be sufficient.
27Note that negative correlation does not imply assumption 1. In fact, it doesn’t even imply
first-order stochastic dominance. Correlation is a much weaker measure capturing only linear
association. See Yi and Tongyu (2004).
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Proposition 2 (Monotonicity of equilibrium electoral platforms): Let
X∗ denote the solution to (27) and X∗c denote the solution to (28), then under
assumption 1, X∗c ≤ X∗, with the inequality being strict if the LR-dominance is
strict.
Proof: Suppose assumption 1 holds, i.e. f(x|I=0)
f(x|I=1) is increasing in x. Then due to




P(I = 1)f(x|I = 1) + P(I = 0)f(x|I = 0)
f(x|I = 1)




F (x|I = 1) being LR-dominated by F (x) implies that it is also first-order stochas-
tically dominated by it. So for anyX, F (X) ≤ F (X|I = 1) and thus (1−F (X)) ≥
(1−F (X|I = 1)). Furthermore, from truncation-proofness of the LR order, both
F (x|x ≤ X, I = 1) and F (x|x > X, I = 1) are LR-dominated (and thus first-
order stochastically dominated) by F (x|x ≤ X) and F (x|x > X) respectively.
Since D′(·) is strictly increasing due to strict convexity, it follows that D′(X − x)
is strictly decreasing in x for x ∈ [0, X) and D′(x−X) is strictly increasing in x




















These imply that (28), and thus (26) evaluated at X∗ does not hold with equality
but rather with ≤, with the inequality being strict if one of the above inequalities
is strict. Moreover, the left-hand side of (26) is strictly decreasing in X due to
strict convexity of D. It follows that X∗c ≤ X∗. 
The intuition behind proposition 2 is straightforward. At any optimal interior
policy, marginal probability loss for electoral victory due to positioning further
away from voters to the left should be exactly compensated by the marginal
probability gain resulting from offering a policy slightly closer to bliss points of
those to the right. The negative association between being informed and policy
preferences not only implies that voters to the left are weighted more heavily
in their contribution to these marginal probabilities compared to the case with
no association, but also that voters who matter more in the margin, i.e. the
“tail” voters who are furthest away from the proposed policy are more heavily
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represented at the left portion of the distribution. As a result, politicians take this
left shift in the center of mass of the centripetal force into account and commit
to lower platforms. Below, I provide a simple example with linear disutilities.28
Example: Suppose D(·) is linear, i.e.
D(|X − x|) = |X − x| . (30)
Under no association between informational status and policy preferences, politi-


















Using the Leibniz rule, (31) yields the following.
−F (X) +
[
F (1)− F (X)
]
= 0. (32)






Under dependence, the same condition becomes:




So instead of the median of the entire distribution, the informed median holds
all the strings. Furthermore, under assumption 1, F (X∗|I = 1) ≥ F (X∗) = 1/2.
Since F (·|I = 1) is increasing, it follows that X∗c ≤ X∗. 
Proposition 2 shows that introducing a positive association between policy
preferences and ignorance leads to a left bias in equilibrium policy proposals.29
28Note that with linear disutilities, D◦|·| is no longer differentiable at 0. Nevertheless, since the
set of non-differentiable points is of measure zero, they can be integrated away so the first-
order conditions and previous conclusions still hold with the exception of boundary variations
as shown in the example.
29Left is used in a purely spatial sense in the context of the current model. If the policy variable
were to represent tax rate, right would be more reality-accommodating.
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A related consideration would be to assess the impact of the strength of this
dependence. What is the effect of a stronger positive association between pol-
icy preferences and ignorance on equilibrium platforms? To shed light on this,
suppose there is some parameter θ ∈ [0,∞) that measures the strength of depen-
dence by indexing conditional distributions in the following sense.
Assumption 2 (Monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) ordering): The family
of absolutely continuous and smooth distributions F =
{






fθ(x|I = 1, θ)
f(x|I = 1, θ)
]
≤ 0, ∀F (·|I = 1, θ) ∈ F , (35)
with F (x|I = 1, 0) = F (x), where fθ denotes the partial derivative of f .
Assumption 2 is a continuous version of the likelihood-ratio ordering.30 It amounts
to saying that for any θ′ > θ and x′ > x, the following condition holds.
f(x′|I = 1, θ)
f(x′|I = 1, θ′)
≥ f(x|I = 1, θ)
f(x|I = 1, θ′)
⇐⇒ f(x|I = 1, θ
′)
f(x′|I = 1, θ′)
≥ f(x|I = 1, θ)
f(x′|I = 1, θ)
. (36)
In short, distribution of preferences conditional on having received the policy
signal puts relatively more weight on lower policies under a stronger dependence
between informational status and policy preferences.
Lemma 4 (Stronger correlation): Assume that the population distribution
of preferences F (x) and the total measure (unconditional probability) of ignorant
voters remain fixed. Let θ be as described in assumption 2 and suppose θ′ > θ.
Then covθ′(x, I) ≤ covθ(x, I) ≤ 0.
Proof: Appendix. 
From the result in proposition 2, one can guess that a stronger association between
policy preferences and informational status in the sense of assumption 2 would
lead politicians to propose lower policies in equilibrium. This is indeed the case.
Proposition 3 (MLR-monotonicity of equilibrium platforms): Let X∗(θ)
denote the equilibrium policy proposal by candidates where θ denotes the strength
of negative association between being informed and policy preferences of voters.
30See Milgrom (1981).
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D′(X − x)dF (x|I = 1, θ) +
∫ 1
X
D′(x−X)dF (x|I = 1, θ) = 0. (37)
Let Z(X, θ) denote the left-hand side of (37). Since D is twice continuously
differentiable and F (·|·) is smooth, the implicit function theorem implies that
(37) defines X as a function X ≡ X∗(θ) on an open neighbourhood around the







From strict convexity of D, we have ∂Z(X,θ)/∂X < 0. So dX∗(θ)/dθ will have the same
sign as ∂Z(X,θ)/∂θ. Using the fact that dF (x|I = 1, θ) = f(x|I = 1, θ)dx; this is in










D′(x−X)fθ(x|I = 1, θ)dx. (39)






D′(X − x)fθ(x|I = 1, θ)
f(x|I = 1, θ)




D′(x−X)fθ(x|I = 1, θ)
f(x|I = 1, θ)
dF (x|I = 1, θ). (40)
From (35) and (37), the first term in (40) must be non-smaller than the second
term in absolute value, which implies ∂Z(X,θ)/∂θ ≤ 0, and thus dX∗(θ)/dθ ≤ 0. 
This is intuitive, as a stronger positive dependence between ignorance and policy
preferences implies that the subpopulation of policy-relevant voters is character-
ized by a relatively higher proportion of people having lower policy preferences.
Also notice that proposition 2 can be seen as a special case of proposition 3.
Next section builds a simple model of electoral campaigns with ignorant vot-
ers and an embedded tradeoff between policy and valence campaigning on top of
the framework proposed in this section to study the influence of this demographic
covariation on campaign strategies.
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2.2 Valence and Costly Policy Campaigning
I now assume that both politicians are endowed with campaign resources denoted
by RA, RB. They can allocate these resources between two types of campaign
activities: policy and valence. Rj can be interpreted as financial resources, as well
as time or human resource endowments, or some measure reflecting a combination
of them.
Pj + Vj ≤ Rj, j ∈ {A,B} , (41)
where Pj and Vj denote the amounts spent on policy and valence campaigning
respectively by the politician j.
Valence campaigning takes the form of an additively separable spread-preserving
mean shift on the common popularity shock, used extensively in the lobbying lit-
erature. Specifically, δ in (3) and (5) takes the following form.31
δ = δ̃ + µAg(VA)− µBg(VB), (42)
where δ̃ is distributed uniformly in [−α, α], g(·) is a strictly increasing and strictly
concave valence production function with g(0) = 0, and µj is a parameter mea-
suring individual valence productivities intending to capture any kind of potential
valence advantage that a candidate might possess. Concavity incorporates the
idea of decreasing returns to valence spending, perhaps due to increasing difficulty
of coming up with original and/or non-conflicting campaign messages, or due to
valence-related messages losing their effectivity after a while. Valence campaign-
ing can be thought as any kind of non-policy related political advertising with
the goal of acquiring common support. It is in essence a form of persuasive ad-
vertising that can involve emphasizing one’s character virtues such as leadership,
integrity, competence and empathy as identified by Kinder (1986), associating
one’s image with emotional collective mobilizers such as patriotism, nationalistic
values, etc., attacking approximate-measure zero minorities in highly xenophobic
electorates, or even commissioning researchers to dig into opponent’s past in order
to find material for denigrating his integrity (negative campaigning), which can
make a candidate more popular relative to his opponent in the valence dimension
31Snyder (1989) and Baron (1994) consider instead ratio of expenditures as the variable swinging
uninformed voters. (42) can be thought as valence advertising operating as in Grossman and
Shapiro (1984), where the probability of a voter voting for a candidate increases in the number
of valence-related advertisement messages she receives, with g(·) reflecting the number of
valence messages generated for a given amount of valence spending.
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if successful.
Regarding electoral platforms, the assumption of costless policy announce-
ments is dropped. Instead, commitment to electoral platforms requires spending
resources on policy campaigning, which is assumed to take the form of costly
relocation along the policy space given initial positions. This form of policy cam-
paigning is first employed by Harrington and Hess (1996), who used it in the
context of positive and negative campaigns trade-off in electoral competitions. If
one thinks of the standard spatial policy competition model as a political adap-
tation of the horizontal differentiation framework from industrial organization,
this specification can be considered as the political analogue of costly horizon-
tal differentiation due to marketing costs or redesign costs as in Chang (1992).32
More specifically, it is assumed that both politicians are endowed with initial
locations LA, LB on the policy space [0, 1]. These can be thought as representing
the electorate’s premise on candidates’ default policy positions based on their
party affiliations or past engagements, i.e. their “legacies”. In that case, pol-
icy campaigning should be interpreted as an effort to convince voters by shifting
their perceptions using a combination of rhetorical and factual advertising. Al-
ternatively, they can be interpreted as a commonly known (by informed voters)
pair of policy positions, the implementation of which is familiar to candidates
due to their past experiences or backgrounds. Under such interpretation, pol-
icy campaigning can be thought as detailed outlines, or policy implementation
plans credibly showing that the candidate has “what it takes” to implement his
electoral promise.33 Whatever the interpretation is, it is most certain that pol-
icy campaigning is a non-trivial task which requires politicians to go beyond the
announce and forget strategy in actual electoral competitions. Furthermore, it is
usually the case that political competitors do not come in tabula rasa and it is
reasonable to assume that this fact has an effect on their policy campaign strate-
gies. At worst, the form of policy campaigning employed here should be thought
as a reduced-form approximation to whatever mechanism nudging politicians to
engage in such activity in the first place. One thing to keep in mind is that pol-
icy messages sent as a result of policy campaigning are factual, so post election
credibility is not an issue.34 Returning to the specification itself, the mechanism
32When combined with valence campaigning, the entire electoral campaigning framework can
be seen as the political economy analogue of an industrial organization model of integrated
horizontal and vertical differentiation.
33At the end of this section, an alternative specification of policy campaigning that might be
more suitable for this interpretation is considered.
34Addressing such credibility issues is likely to play a major role in existence of policy campaigns
and the way they are devised. See Banks (1990) and Chappell (1994).
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by which candidates relocate themselves is simple. For each unit of campaign
resources allocated to policy campaigning, candidate j relocates (to right or left)
within a distance of ρj from his initial position. So for a given policy campaign
expenditure Pj, his policy position becomes the following.
Xj = Lj ± ρjPj. (43)
In (43), ρj represents the productivity of candidate j’s policy campaigning tech-
nology. It can be argued that this technology should be characterized by de-
creasing returns rather than being linear, reflecting the increasing difficulty that
the candidate might face in convincing the electorate when proposing a policy
too distant from his legacy. There are two reasons underlying the choice of lin-
earity. First, it simplifies the exposition.35 Second, as it will be apparent later
on, what matters for resource allocation is relative returns between policy and
valence campaigning. Since valence campaigning is already characterized by a
decreasing returns technology, marginal rate of substitution between campaign
types will be decreasing. Furthermore, convexity of voter disutilities already cap-
tures the idea of decreasing returns to policy campaigning, because it becomes
less effective (in terms of increasing the chance of victory) as the politician draws
closer to the bliss point of the swing voter. Let xs = X
∗ , where X∗ denotes
the solution to (22). This is the bliss-point of the old swing voter (henceforth
referred as pseudo-swing voter) under no valence campaigning and costless policy
commitment setting described in the previous section. I assume LA < xs < LB.
Furthermore, following inequalities are assumed to hold.
LA + ρARA < LB,
LB − ρBRB > LA. (44)
So a left-wing politician cannot campaign his way to the right of his right-wing
opponent and vice versa.36 Positions of LA and LB relative to xs, along with
inequalities in (44) imply that candidates will never find it optimal to campaign
35It is possible to introduce decreasing returns to both types of campaign activities at the
expenditure level by using a resource constraint specification Ep(Pj) + Ev(Vj) ≤ Rj with
convex, increasing Ep, Ev and a linear policy relocation technology as in (43), along with a
linear valence generation process δ = δ̃ + µAVA − µBVB . After appropriate substitutions,
this formulation would have a reduced-form representation very close to the current model
without any qualitative impact on conclusions. This is because g(Rj − Pj) is concave in Pj
in the current specification, and Vj = E
−1
v (Rj − Ep(Pj)) is concave in Pj in the alternative
formulation.
36Henceforth, candidates A and B will be referred to as left and right-wing respectively.
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their way to a more extreme position than their initial policy positions.37 So one
can denote post policy campaigning positions as follows.
XA ≡ XA(PA;LA) = LA + ρAPA, (45)
XB ≡ XB(PB;LB) = LB − ρBPB (46)
Timing of the electoral campaigning game is similar to the timing in the previ-
ous section, with politicians simultaneously choosing their campaign allocations
(Pj, Vj) at the first stage.
38 Informational structure also remains the same. I
assume that voters cannot observe campaign expenditures and informed voters
get a perfectly informative signal on policy positions (XA, XB) following policy
campaigning. Ignorant voters vote purely on the basis of valence dimension as
earlier, which is now influenced by valence campaigning.39 One possible objection
to the application of this behavioural framework to a campaign setting can un-
derline selective reception by ignorant voters. The fact that they get influenced
by valence advertising but at the same time remain in the dark regarding policy
might appear odd, especially if the contents of both types of campaigns are de-
livered through the same medium (e.g. mass media). It should be kept in mind
that underlining and backing up a specific policy proposal would usually demand
a lengthier and more elaborated campaign, often requiring a sequence of pre-
sentations and repeated communication, whereas valence issues can be handled
within a much easier package to consume such as simple catch phrases.40 This
difference in the nature of policy and valence campaigning can imply that even
though they use the same medium to reach their audiences, their transmission
rates can greatly vary, making selective reception plausible. Another argument
37This is due to such positions constituting strictly dominated strategies.
38Changing the timing between policy and valence campaigning has no effect on the results due
to the particular specification of probabilistic voting model employed. If one used a stochastic
preference framework where politicians are uncertain about voters’ policy preferences instead
of the stochastic partisanship specification employed in the current model, then the timing
would matter. See Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009).
39One might argue that if uninformed voters are rational, and legacies, as well as other pa-
rameters such as resource endowments are known to them, then they can solve politicians’
problem and deduce their policy proposals from the valence shock they receive, as they ob-
serve g(VA) − g(VB). A way to get around this conceptual difficulty would be to assume
that ignorant voters have neither any information, nor any priors on these parameters, facing
Knightian uncertainty. Another way would be to reverse engineer appropriate priors that
would imply beliefs that put all the mass on identical policy positions. Any post hoc justifi-
cation attempt might be considered a stretch, in which case one can simply interpret them
as boundedly rational voters.
40A nice example of this is the slogan “A Tall Man”, used in Turkish presidential elections in
2014, referring to the height of the Islamist candidate Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, possibly to
emphasize a connection between his physical attributes and leadership skills.
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can be built around the nature of ignorance. If one takes ignorance as a much
more fundamental and cognitive phenomenon, then the distinction reduces to one
between sophisticated voters qualified to judge the content of policy campaigns
and unsophisticated voters who lack the means to do so.41
Turning the attention back to the model, given campaign allocations (PA, VA)
and (PB, VB), a policy aware voter with policy preference x votes for the candidate
A if the following inequality is satisfied.
σxI > D(|XA − x|)−D(|XB − x|)− δ̃ + µBg(VB)− µAg(VA), (47)
where XA and XB are functions of PA and PB respectively, as defined in (45)
and (46). Using the fact that δ̃ is uniformly distributed in [−α, α], for a given
realization of δ̃, the probability that a policy aware voter with preference x votes
for A is given by the following.







D(|XB − x|)−D(|XA − x|) + δ̃ + µAg(VA)− µBg(VB)
}
(48)
Similar calculations show that the probability of an ignorant voter with preference
x voting for A is given by the following.







δ̃ + µAg(VA)− µBg(VB)
}
. (49)
To establish a baseline and to obtain some useful comparative statics, assume
first that informational status and policy preferences are independent and let
P(I = 1|x) = Γ̂ for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Let SA(δ̃) = SIA(δ̃) + SUA (δ̃) denote the total
measure of voters voting for candidate A for a given realization of δ̃. Candidate A
wins the election if he gets at least half of the votes, i.e. SA(δ̃) > 1/2. Calculations
analogous to those made in the previous section show that the probability of an





















41This is the interpretation used by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) in a similar model with
lobbying. It is also a common theme in Turkish literature and cinema attempting to portray
politicians campaigning in rural areas.
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where Γ̃ ≡ Γ̃(Γ̂, β̃) is as defined in (17), with β̃ = βI/βU representing the relative
ideological (non-policy) heterogeneity of informed voters. Victory probability for




























B)) constituting mutual best-responses.
(P ∗A, V
∗
A) ∈ arg max
(PA,VA)∈R2+
s.t. PA+VA≤RA






B) ∈ arg max
(PB ,VB)∈R2+
s.t. PB+VB≤RB




Strict convexity of voter disutilities, along with strict concavity of valence cam-
paigning technologies ensures that the campaign game has a unique pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (Campaign Game - Existence and uniqueness of pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium): The campaign game with costly policy relocation
and valence campaigning has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Strategy spaces, being
{
(Pj, Vj) ∈ R2+ : Pj + Vj ≤ Rj
}
, are convex and
compact. From continuity of D(·) and g(·), P(Sk(δ;Pk, Nk, Pj, Nj) > 12) is con-
tinuous in (Pj, Nj) for any (Pk, Nk) and vice versa for k, j ∈ {A,B} and k ̸= j.
Since D(·) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, −D(·) is strictly decreasing
and strictly concave. Furthermore; |B + ρP − x| is convex in P for any x. It
follows that −D(|B + ρP − x|) is strictly concave in P for any x. Integral of
(strictly) concave functions is (strictly) concave, and g(VA) is strictly concave
as well. So P(Sk(δ;Pk, Nk, Pj, Nj) > 12) is strictly concave in (Pk, Nk) for any
(Pj, Nj) for k ∈ {A,B} and k ̸= j. Thus, from Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan theorem,
the electoral game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, characterized by






B)) satisfying (52). 
Since problems of candidates are symmetric, I focus on the problem of can-
didate A for the subsequent discussion. At any optimal campaign allocation, all
resources should be spent, i.e. constraints in (52) should bind. If one of them was
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slack, then that politician could unambiguously increase his probability of victory
by increasing Vj, as g(·) is strictly increasing. Substituting for VA = RA−PA, the
necessary and sufficient first-order condition for an equilibrium strategy becomes












g′(RA − PA) (= if PA > 0).
(54)
An immediate fact visible from (54) is the no-longer-neutrality of the fraction of
informed voters, even if there is no statistical dependence between informational
status and policy preferences. This is because the trade-off between policy and
valence campaigning implies a competition between these two activities for scarce
campaign resources. Under such competition, fraction of informed voters have an
effect on campaign structures because it directly affects relative productivities of
different campaign activities.
There are two types of corner solutions that can arise from (54). Analysis of
these reveals under what conditions candidates might focus exclusively on policy
or valence campaigning.
1. Pure Valence Campaigning (PA = 0, VA = RA):





D′(LA − x)dF (x) +
∫ 1
LA




Notice that the left-hand side of (55) is strictly positive, as it is assumed that
LA < xs. One can see that several factors will play a role in determining whether
candidate A’s campaign will have a pure-valence focus or not. First, relative cur-
vatures of voter disutility and valence technology will matter, since these have a
direct impact on relative marginal gains from both activities in the corner. Sec-
ond, relative average productivity of valence campaigning with respect to policy
campaigning (µA/ρA) will be important. If one thinks of high µA as a potential va-
lence advantage and low ρA as a comparative disadvantage when designing policy
campaigns, then a candidate whose valence related consolidation skills greatly
42Inequality (54) is the optimality condition when PA ∈ [0, RA). See (56).
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outmatching his policy explaining skills might go for a purely valence focused
campaign. Third, both a high fraction of ignorant voters, and a strong rela-
tive heterogeneity of informed voters can tip the scales towards a valence only
campaign. While the former reduces marginal returns to policy campaigning by
decreasing the size of its target audience, the latter has the same effect by de-
creasing the effective size of the policy aware electorate. Finally, proximity of s
candidate’s initial position to the preferred policy of the pseudo-swing voter is
also an influencing factor. The closer LA is to xs, the smaller the left-hand side
of (55) will be, reflecting the effect of decreasing marginal returns to policy cam-
paigning kicking in when the candidate is already close to the centripetal core in
the policy dimension.
2. Pure Policy Campaigning (PA = RA, VA = 0):
Candidate A’s electoral campaign will have an exclusive policy focus if the fol-













Same factors that might encourage a candidate to conduct a valence only cam-
paign can also lead him to conduct an exclusively policy based campaign if they
come in opposite forms. For instance, a low potential valence advantage, a high
fraction of informed voters, or a combination of high policy campaigning effi-
ciency and a relatively homogenous policy aware electorate might lead to low
relative returns for valence campaigning in terms of marginal gains in the prob-
ability of an election victory even if the candidate is not spending any resources
on it, and this can nudge the politician towards an exclusively policy focused
campaign. Another important factor is the effective size of campaign resources
in terms of policy campaigning (ρARA). If this is already large in the sense that
LA+ρARA > xs, then the candidate would never spend all his resources in policy
campaigning because he can relocate to xs by spending a lower amount of re-
sources, and any resources spent on policy campaigning over and above this level
would have a negative gross marginal return, excluding the opportunity cost in
terms of valence loss. So a necessary condition to conduct a pure policy campaign
is to either have limited campaign resources, or a relatively extremist legacy (fur-
ther away from xs).
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Henceforth, I assume that politicians have interior solutions for their campaign
problems. For candidate A, this implies that the first-order condition should be















g′(RA − PA). (57)
First thing to notice from (57) is that even if candidates have sufficient resources,
they would never relocate to the preferred policy of the old swing voter (pseudo-
swing voter).
Lemma 5 (Tragedy of the old swing voter): In any interior optimum,
candidates’ final policy positions should be in between their initial positions and
xs, i.e.
X(P ∗A) = LA + ρAP
∗
A < xs < X(P
∗
B) = LB − ρBP ∗B. (58)
Proof: The right-hand side of (57) is strictly positive for any PA < RA, and for
any LA + ρAPA ≥ xs, the left-hand side of (57) is non-positive. 
This result might appear slightly odd at first, as xs refers to the position of the
swing voter when the valence dimension is not taken into account. If, say, a
politician has sufficient funds for relocating to xs, why doesn’t he get the best
of both worlds by positioning himself in accordance with the centripetal force
arising from electorate’s policy tastes and spend the rest of his resources for va-
lence campaigning? In fact, there is a reason why the voter preferring xs is called
the pseudo-swing voter, and that reason is precisely the fact that xs is no longer
swing, but an inframarginal voter. Holding opponent’s valence fixed, any re-
sources spent to valence campaigning introduce an electoral bias in favour of the
politician, which implies that the ex ante decisive voter shifts to a position closer
to the legacy of the politician. As a corollary, presence of valence campaigning
introduces policy divergence, and this divergence is not necessarily a byproduct
of candidate characteristics (except initial positions) as long as both candidates’
solutions are interior. Presence of legacies, opportunity to campaign for valence,
along with the policy-valence trade-off act as a centrifugal force, pulling politi-
cians back to their initial policy positions. This is because the marginal cost of
a slightly higher (or lower if its candidate B) policy no longer consists solely of
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the marginal probability loss of victory due to increasing disutilities of voters to
the left, but also reflects the opportunity cost of a lower valence advantage. If
one takes the view that valence campaigning (at least partially) operates through
a partisanship effect that has no material implications for ex post well-beings of
voters, then the outcome in (58) constitutes a wasteful divergence from the egal-
itarian planner outcome.
Next proposition presents the way campaign structures respond to changes in
politician and demographic characteristics.
Proposition 5 (Comparative statics for the campaign game): Compar-







































Candidate B will have the same comparative statics, except for opposite signs
regarding the effect of LB. This is because an increase in LB takes candidate
B farther away from xs rather than taking him closer to it as an increase in LA
does for candidate A. First thing to notice is that for almost all derivatives, those
involving Vj have opposite signs compared to their Pj counterparts. This is a triv-
ial consequence of the fact that Vj = Rj − Pj. Second, both types of campaign
allocations are increasing in available resources Rj. If all of the resource increase
was allocated to one type of campaign activity, its’ marginal benefit would exceed
that of the other. In analogy with consumption theory, both campaign types are
normal goods for politicians.43 Comparative statics effects of both Γ̂ and β̃ are
intuitive. Policy campaigning increases in the former as the audience responding
to it gets larger, whereas it decreases in the latter because the more heterogenous
policy aware voters become, the harder it becomes to satisfy them as a group
via policy proposals. Resources allocated to policy campaigning decrease in the
43Which type increases more depends on parameters governing productivities of these two
activities, as well as relative curvatures of valence production function and voter disutility.
A high µA, a low ρA or Γ̃, as well as a more concave −D relative to g makes the share of
valence campaigning going up more likely. Of course if the politician is at a corner solution,
all of the resource increase is absorbed by one type of campaign activity.
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valence productivity parameter µA, since an increase in the latter imply higher
opportunity costs in terms of foregone valence advantage per unit of policy cam-
paign spending. On the other hand, an increase in policy campaign productivity
has an ambiguous effect on the campaign composition. The ambiguity stems
from the fact that while an increase in ρA increases the relative appeal of policy
campaigning with respect to valence advertising, it also implies that any policy
position can be reached by allocating a smaller amount of resources. Finally, an
increase in LA increases policy campaigning. This has to do with the proxim-
ity effect mentioned previously.44 The less extreme a candidate’s legacy is, the
closer he is to the bliss point of the pseudo-swing voter. This implies that the
marginal gain in probability of victory from converging to a platform closer to
xs falls. If one considers negative campaigning as a form of valence campaigning,
then Brueckner and Lee (2013) provide some empirical support for the idea that
proximity to center has an increasing effect on the valence campaigning.45
Within this framework, any divergence between candidates regarding cam-
paign structures can be traced back to differences in candidate characteristics,
campaign technologies and resources. However, such divergence can also arise un-
der an otherwise symmetric setting purely due to a statistical dependence between
informational status and policy preferences. This is because such dependence, un-
der costly policy campaigning and politician legacies, gives rise to an asymmetry
in the respective audiences of candidates. To show this, I start by constructing a
symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 6 (A special symmetric campaigning equilibrium): Suppose
µA = µB = µ, ρA = ρB = ρ, RA = RB = R. Assume a symmetric F (·) and
suppose that LA +LB = 1. Then the strategy profile in the unique Nash equilib-
rium consists of PA = PB = P
∗ and VA = VB = V
∗.
Proof: Under the stated assumptions, the first-order necessary and sufficient














44Note that proximity to pseudo-swing voter should not be taken as the absolute distance
between candidate’s initial position and xs. It is rather the effective distance taking the mass
of voters in between two policies into account, i.e.
∣∣F (xs)− F (Lj)∣∣.
45They find that in US Senatorial elections between 1992 to 2002, centrist candidates tended
to invest more heavily in negative campaigning, controlling for other factors.
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Same condition for candidate B is given as follows.{∫ LB−ρPB
0










For any interior P in accordance with lemma 5, the following equality should
hold.∫ LA+ρP
0
D′(LA + ρP − x)dF (x) =
∫ 1
LB−ρP
D′(x− (LB − ρP ))dF (x). (62)
To see this, fix some k > 0 and take two preferences LA+ρP−k and LB−ρP +k.
Then their marginal disutilities are equal, being D′(k). Moreover, symmetry




legacies ensure that these two preferences are supported by the same mass of
voters, as the following equality shows.
f(LA + ρP − k) = f(LB − ρP + k) = f(1− (LA + ρP − k)), (63)
where the third equality follows from LA + LB = 1. Varying k in 0 < k <
LA + ρP = 1− (LB − ρP ), equality in (62) follows. By an analogous argument,
one can show the following equality.∫ 1
LA+ρP
D′(x− (LA + ρP ))dF (x) =
∫ LB−ρP
0
D′(LB − ρP − x)dF (x). (64)
Since P was arbitrary, (63) and (64) imply that equations describing first-order
conditions in (60) and (61) are identical. Since D is strictly convex and g is
strictly concave, there is a unique P ∗ which solves both of them, so in equilib-
rium, PA = PB = P
∗ and VA = VB = V
∗. 
One interesting implication of lemma 6 is that no candidate ends up with a va-
lence advantage in the symmetric equilibrium, as valence effects of their campaign
efforts cancel each other out. Next, I introduce some positive dependence between
ignorance and policy preferences by holding the total measure of ignorant voters
constant, and consider the asymmetric impact of this on candidates’ campaign
strategies.46
46This exercise, and in particular proposition 7 can be informally interpreted as “partially
differentiating” with respect to the second moment, holding the first moment constant.
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Proposition 6 (Asymmetric impact of correlated ignorance on cam-
paign allocations): Starting from the symmetric setting in lemma 6, introduce
some positive dependence between ignorance and policy preferences in the as-
sumption 1 sense while keeping the mass of ignorant voters constant. Then
letting (P cj , V
c




∗ = PB ≤ P cB, and consequently, V cB ≤ VB = V ∗ = VA ≤ V cA.
Proof: Under the symmetric setting given in lemma 6, candidate A’s first-order
condition can be rewritten as follows.
−F (LA + ρP ∗)E
[
D′(LA + ρP ∗ − x)|x ≤ LA + ρP ∗
]
+(1− F (LA + ρP ∗))E
[







As before, assumption 1 implies the following inequalities.
F (LA + ρP
∗|I = 1) ≥ F (LA + ρP ∗), (66)
F (x|x ≤ LA + ρP ∗, I = 1) ≥ F (x|x ≤ LA + ρP ∗), (67)
F (x|x ≥ LA + ρP ∗, I = 1) ≥ F (x|x ≥ LA + ρP ∗). (68)
The last two, along with the facts that D′(LA + ρP ∗ − x) is decreasing in x for
x in 0 ≤ x < LA + ρP ∗ and D′(x − (LA + ρP ∗)) is increasing in x for x in
LA + ρP
∗ < x ≤ 1 imply the following inequalities.
E
[













D′(x− (LA + ρP ∗))|x ≥ LA + ρP ∗
]
. (70)
So when evaluated at P ∗, candidate A’s first-order condition under correlated
ignorance does not hold, but rather reflects the fact that marginal benefit of
policy campaigning is below that of valence campaigning. This is shown in the
inequality below.
−F (LA + ρP ∗|I = 1)E
[
D′(LA + ρP ∗ − x)|x ≤ LA + ρP ∗, I = 1
]
+(1− F (LA + ρP ∗|I = 1))E
[







Left-hand side of (71) is strictly decreasing in P due to strict convexity of D,
and right-hand side is strictly increasing in it due to concavity of g.47 It follows
that P cA ≤ P ∗, where P cA is the allocation at which (71) holds with equality. This
directly implies that V cA ≥ V ∗. By similar steps, one can deduce that the first-
order condition of candidate B under correlated ignorance becomes the following
when evaluated at P ∗.
F (LB − ρP ∗|I = 1)E
[
D′(LB − ρP ∗ − x)|x ≤ LB − ρP ∗, I = 1
]
−(1− F (LB − ρP ∗|I = 1))E
[






It follows that P cA ≤ PA = P ∗ = PB ≤ P cB, and consequently V cB ≤ VB = V ∗ =
VA ≤ V cA. 
For both politicians, the rationale behind spending resources on policy campaign-
ing is to moderate their initial positions assuming that the population is relatively
more concentrated at the center. At any allocation, by spending slightly more on
policy campaigning, politicians gain the support of some voters at the center, lose
the support of some tail voters, and also fail to obtain the support of some vot-
ers in the entire population due to foregone opportunity of valence campaigning.
The symmetry of the environment before taking the dependence between pol-
icy preferences and informational status into account implies that the marginal
calculus reflecting these gains and losses are the same for both politicians. Conse-
quently, they each adopt the same campaign structure and end up as center-left
and center-right candidates when the voting day arrives. Once the statistical
dependence is taken into account, this picture changes. The shift in the mass of
distribution strengthens the centrifugal force (valence) for the left candidate and
the centripetal force (policy) for the right candidate. Technically, this is due to
decreasing returns to moderation. Keeping in mind that only the policy prefer-
ences of informed voters are taken into account for policy proposals, a left-shift
in the mass of the preference distribution due to dependence implies that while
candidate A’s legacy becomes more moderate, candidate B’s legacy becomes less
moderate. Another way of expressing this would be to point out that candidate
A’s initial proximity to pseudo-swing voter’s bliss point increases and candidate
B’s initial proximity to it decreases. Both reflect the simple fact that while
47To see this more clearly, just differentiate (57) after conditioning on I = 1 with respect to
PA, recognizing the fact that variations at the boundary of the integral does not matter due
to D′(0) = 0
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marginal losses (gains) due to diverging (converging to) from left are weighted
more heavily, marginal gains (losses) due to converging to (diverging from) right
are weighted less. As a result, relative marginal returns to policy campaigning
are much higher (and stay higher up to a significant level of resource allocation)
for candidate B, which manifests as diverging campaign structures. Note that
proposition 6 and the above discussion assume an interior solution under statis-
tical dependence. In fact, if such dependence is strong, it is possible that one,
or even both candidates end up in corner solutions. Naturally, if such corner
solutions were to occur, they would imply a pure valence campaigning candidate
A and/or a pure policy campaigning candidate B.48
The result in proposition 6 might appear counter-intuitive at first, as the
politician whose support base favours ignorant voters (candidate B) invests more
in policy campaigning, whereas the candidate with a relatively more policy aware
support base conducts a more valence oriented campaign. Intuitively, politicians
would like to design their campaign structures in order to establish a balance
between policy support and valence support. Politicians whose natural base con-
sists mostly of ignorant voters have to engage in a much more policy intensive
campaign in order to obtain a satisfying level of policy support, as they require
the support of voters at the opposite end of the policy spectrum.49 Conversely,
politicians whose legacies are already more or less aligned with the policy-relevant,
informed segment of the electorate can get away with a much higher level of va-
lence activity, aiming to obtain support indiscriminately. This kind of reasoning
offers a potential explanation for a pattern which emerged during the Turkish
national elections in 2002. The current incumbent party AKP, a newcomer back
in 2002, conducted a much more policy oriented campaign consisting of a variety
of well-defined projects and detailed feasibility plans. This was in stark contrast
to its main opponent CHP, whose campaign was almost exclusively dedicated
to valence issues with numerous invocations of nationalistic themes and devo-
tion of a significant amount of resources to negative campaigning.50 While most
analysts argued that this was indicative of AKP’s campaign team being better
organized and more professional, many observers remained puzzled due to two
reasons. First, AKP is the heir of a political tradition that is frequently labelled
as “Islamic left”, yet its campaign was quite moderate, with privatization, lib-
48If the association between ignorance and policy preferences was instead negative, then the
opposite conclusion would prevail.
49Natural base refers to voters at the vicinity of legacies in the context of the current model.
50Due to Islamist heritage of AKP, negative campaigning efforts mainly revolved around themes
of Islamic fundamentalism. This pattern repeated itself during 2007 national elections. See
Dinç (2008).
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eralization and other market-based themes playing prominent roles. Second, its
natural base consists of relatively undereducated voters compared to the popu-
lation average, and according to many, this fact appeared hard to reconcile with
the almost-policy-exclusive nature of AKP’s election campaign. The folk wisdom
of associating less educated people with relative policy unawareness is no doubt
a simplification, but a simplification possibly containing a grain of truth. If it
contains that grain of truth, then as the model shows, there is no reason for
puzzlement. It is perfectly reasonable for parties to set their target audiences
outside their natural bases. Mapping the model to reality, AKP can be thought
as the candidate B, trying to accommodate the policy tastes of relatively more
educated, urban voters by moderation and CHP as the candidate A targeting the
electorate by valence campaigning.51
Returning back to the model, one does not need the symmetry in lemma 6
to show the asymmetric impact of correlated ignorance on campaign composi-
tions. In fact, with an argument analogous to proposition 3, one can show that
a stronger positive association between ignorance and policy preferences might
imply a stronger campaign divergence under any parameter configuration.
Proposition 7 (Asymmetric campaign monotonicity): Let F be a fam-
ily of absolutely continuous and smooth conditional distributions F (x|I = 1, θ)
continuously indexed according to a parameter θ measuring the strength of the
positive association between ignorance and policy preferences as in assumption
2. Furthermore, assume that this family of conditional distributions is associated
with a family of joint probability distributions of (I, x) that possess the same
marginal distribution for I. Then assuming interior solutions, following describes
the effect of strengthening the positive association on campaign allocations.
∂PA(θ)
∂θ





≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ∂VB(θ)
∂θ
≤ 0.
Proof: Similar to proposition 3. Details are in the appendix. 
Proposition 7 is just an extension of proposition 6. It states that holding ev-
erything else constant, a stronger monotonic dependence between informational
status and policy preferences makes the candidate whose is initially more aligned
51The former is even more apparent when one reflects upon AKP’s strategy of allying itself
with liberal columnists to market itself to urban upper middle class.
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with ignorant voters devote less resources to valence campaigning and vice versa.
Corollary 2 (Increasing campaign divergence): If PB(θ) ≥ PA(θ), then
d(PB(θ)−PA(θ))/dθ ≥ 0.
Note that proposition 7 does not imply an increasing campaign divergence per
se, because differences in campaign technologies, candidate characteristics and
legacies could imply PA(θ) ≥ PB(θ) to begin with. However, if candidates were
more or less symmetric before taking the dependence in account, or candidate
B was conducting a more policy oriented campaign under the given dependence
strength despite asymmetry, then an increase in θ would imply a further cam-
paign divergence.
Next subsection explores same ideas under an alternative policy campaigning
specification that allows for costless policy announcements.
2.2.1 Ambiguity Reducing Policy Campaigning
The assumption that ignorant voters are unable to condition their votes on any-
thing policy-related is maintained and notation remains unchanged. Again, can-
didates have certain amounts of campaign resources which they must allocate
between policy and valence campaigning and the latter generates universal sup-
port in an additively separable fashion via a valence-production function g(·).
The novelty is twofold. First, politicians can costlessly announce a policy, but
given the announcement, there is some black-box commitment issue which in-
troduces a random element to the ex post policy to be implemented in the eyes
of policy aware voters. Upon seeing the policy announcement Xj and after ob-
serving the campaign process, these voters believe that the ex post policy to be
implemented is a random variable X̃j described as follows.
52
X̃j = Xj + ϵ, (73)
where ϵ ∼ [−k, k] is a zero-mean random variables with variance ν and 0 <
k ≤ min {LA, 1− LB}.53 The variance of these beliefs are assumed to depend on
two factors: distance of announced policy platforms to legacies: LA, LB, and the
amount spent on policy campaigning: PA, PB.
ν ≡ ν(Dj, Pj), (74)
52For simplicity, I assume that beliefs are common across policy aware voters.
53The restriction on the support of ϵ makes sure that no positive probability is assigned to
policies outside [0, 1].
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where Dj = |Xj − Lj|. It is further assumed that ν is twice continuously differ-
entiable with ν ′D > 0, ν
′
P < 0, ν
′′
DP ≤ 0 and that ν is convex. These assumptions
imply that the uncertainty surrounding the post election policy decreases in pol-
icy campaigning, but increases as the politician positions himself further away
from his legacy.54 The expression in (73) states that politically aware voters find
the policy announcement credible enough to believe that it will be implemented
“on average” but they don’t rule out the possibility of a post election deviation.
Furthermore, this possibility is evaluated as being more likely when the policy
announcement is further away from politician’s legacy. Nevertheless, politicians
can engage in policy campaigning to address this commitment issue to some ex-
tent, partially convincing the voters. This ad hoc way of specifying a connection
between beliefs, platforms and campaigning can be thought as an approximation
to a reduced form representation of some underlying model with ex post institu-
tional elements and politician preferences (and priors on these preferences) deter-
mining the scope of ex ante signalling and a rule governing Bayesian updating.
While microfounding this connection would be an interesting (and a non-trivial)
exercise, it is beyond the scope and outside the focus of this subsection.55 For
my purposes, it is sufficient in the sense that it provides a cheap and tractable
way of analysing the impact of correlated ignorance on campaign allocations in
a setting that captures the near-consensual view that a major purpose of elec-
toral campaigns is to establish credibility, and the obvious implication that less
resources being devoted to this activity would hinder the likelihood of achieving
this goal. The mechanism depicted in (73) and (74) is in fact a combination of
two specifications popular in positive political theory literature. Austen-Smith
(1987) and Hinich and Munger (1989) are among first papers assuming that con-
tributors or candidates themselves can spend resources to achieve a reduction in
voter uncertainty in the form of variance a decrement. On the other hand, Bern-
hardt and Ingerman (1985) construct a model where variance of voter beliefs are
increasing in the distance between candidate’s current and past positions. The
mechanism can be justified along the lines of two stories. First, one can imagine
that policy campaigning is a credible demonstrator of learning, decreasing the
54The last one, ν′′DP ≤ 0 says that if more resources to policy campaigning are allocated, then
the increase in uncertainty due to announcing a policy further away from the initial legacy is
not as dramatic.
55This is an active area of research initiated by Banks (1990) who devised a mechanism of
campaigning as costly signalling to generate information transmission in order to address
commitment issues. Later research focused on establishing information transmission via re-
peated elections (e.g. Aragonès et al. (2007)), via costly affiliation with screening political
parties (e.g. Snyder and Ting (2002)), and on establishing the conditions under which cheap
talk might be informative (e.g. Kartik and Van Weelden (2014)).
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likelihood of a mistake by well-intending politicians when implementing the an-
nounced policy. Second, one can assume that policy campaigning takes the form
of “ideological” campaigning. Establishing ideological positions might require
repeated engagements in polemical discussions, allocation of significant amounts
of time and resources for delivering speeches, appearing in media etc., and the
nature of this process might make it quite hard to lie consistently without raising
red flags. If there is some well recognized underlying mapping associating ide-
ologies with policies, then the environment can be represented by a specification
akin to that described above.56
Policy disutility is assumed to be quadratic in its distance from the bliss
point. This allows for an easy characterization of the disutility associated with
post election ambiguity. For any ex post policy implementation Xj, it is given by
the following for a voter with bliss point x.
U(Xj; x) = −D(
∣∣Xj − x∣∣) = −(Xj − x)2. (75)
Given a policy proposal Xj by a candidate having a legacy Lj and a policy
campaigning effort Pj, an informed voter will hold the belief that ex post policy
to be implemented if j is victorious is a random variable X̃j with mean Xj and
variance ν(Dj, Pj).
57 It follows that ex ante, expected policy disutility from a







(X̃j − x)2|Bj, Pj
]
= −(Xj − x)2 − ν(Dj, Pj). (76)
Given the assumption of sincere voting, her bias towards candidate A, and valence
expenditures VA, VB, she votes for A if the following inequality is satisfied.
58
σxI − (XA − x)2 − ν(DA, PA) + δ̃ + g(VA)− g(VB)
> −(XB − x)2 − ν(DB, PB). (77)
56The term “ideology” in the second story is used differently from when it was used before as
describing idiosyncratic biases parametrized by σ. It rather refers to “an internally consis-
tent set of propositions that makes both proscriptive and prescriptive demands on human
behaviour“ (Hinich and Munger (1993)), having well-defined policy implications. See Hinich
and Munger (1996) for a detailed framework considering the place of ideology in formal models
of political choice.
57Higher order moments of the belief distribution will be irrelevant, since disutilities are
quadratic.
58For simplicity, I assume that no candidate has inherent valence or policy campaigning advan-
tage.
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Ignorant voters vote as before, purely on the basis of valence and idiosyncratic
biases. The same condition for an ignorant voter with preference x is given below.
σxU + δ̃ + g(VA) > g(VB). (78)




A (δ̃) denote the total measure of voters
voting for candidate A for a given realization of δ̃. Candidate A wins the election
if SA(δ̃) > 1/2. Calculations analogous to those made before, as well as some








































Candidate B’s objective function is the mirror-image of (79), with indices A and
B switched. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium will be a pair of mutually best-





A) ∈ arg max
XA∈[0,1],(PA,VA)∈R2+
s.t. PA+VA≤RA








B) ∈ arg max
XB∈[0,1],(PB ,VB)∈R2+
s.t. PB+VB≤RB





The problem in (81) will have a solution because ν and voter disutility are convex
and g is concave. If these are strictly convex (voter disutility already is) and
strictly concave, then the solution will be unique. The timing assumption is
that candidates announce policies and conduct campaigns simultaneously. One
could have made the more natural assumption that candidates announce policy
platforms before engaging in campaign activities, as a result of which informed
voters observe a noisy signal inducing the specified beliefs. Results would not
189
change due to additively separable effect of campaigning on politicians’ objectives.
In what follows, I focus only on the effect of a negative correlation (and a stronger




A, simplified first-order necessary (and sufficient) conditions











∂ν(XA − LA, RA − VA)
∂PA
, (83)
where Γ̃ is as defined in (17). For X∗B < L
∗












∂ν(LB −XB, RB − VB)
∂PB
. (85)
An immediate implication of these first order conditions is policy divergence.
This is consistent with Bernhardt and Ingerman (1985), and with the results in
the previous section. It is also clear that as long as the environment is symmetric
(and informational status is independent so that E[xΓ(x)]E[Γ(x)] = E[x]), both candidates
choose identical campaign allocations. The important thing is, (82) and (84)
allow one to easily deduce the impact of a stronger negative correlation between




















If there was no ambiguity associated with policy proposals, then (86) and (87)
together represent the familiar mean-value theorem under quadratic disutilities.
Since there is ambiguity, an extra term pulling the swing voter towards the di-
rection indicated by the correlation appears. The strength of this latter force is
also what leads to differences in campaign tones.
59It is not hard to show that if LA <
E[xΓ(x)]
E[Γ(x)] < LB , then X
∗
A > LA and X
∗
B < LB . So assume
that this condition holds.
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Proposition 8 (Stronger correlation, policy proposals and campaign
allocations): Holding total number of ignorant voters constant, a stronger neg-
ative correlation between x and I leads to both candidates proposing lower policy
platforms, candidate A devoting more resources to valence campaigning and can-
didate B devoting more resources to policy campaigning.
Proof: Appendix. 
Proposition 8 is quite intuitive. As the positive correlation between ignorance and
policy preferences gets stronger, there is less and less informed people who hap-
pen to have high policy preferences. So the average preferred policy of informed
voters (which represents the centripetal core in a quadratic framework) shifts
left. Since these are the voters whose preferences matter for policy proposals,
both candidates accommodate this shift by announcing lower policies. Relative
to initial positions, this implies less moderation by candidate A, and more mod-
eration by candidate B. Consequently, B has to campaign harder in order to
disperse the ambiguity surrounding his ex post policy implementation, whereas
A can allocate more resources to valence campaigning as he ends up announcing
a policy closer to his initial position. Once again, asymmetric returns to different
campaign activities lead the candidate with a relatively more ignorant voter base
to conduct a more policy focused campaign.
3 Conclusion
This chapter began by constructing a unidimensional probabilistic voting model
featuring two purely office motivated candidates, a continuum of sincere voters
with a fraction being ignorant, and statistical dependence between policy prefer-
ences and ignorance. This was motivated by the possible existence of factors that
may coinfluence political awareness and policy preferences, e.g. education, which
can be important especially in places with relatively low social mobility, or geog-
raphy, which might matter particulary in countries with large regional disparities.
Building on this framework, it then developed a model of electoral campaigning
where candidates allocate their limited resources between two distinct types of
campaign activities: policy promotion or valence campaigning. The former was
assumed to allow candidates to announce and commit to policies unsupported
by their legacies, the latter was assumed to generate universal electoral support
via a partisanship effect. As an addendum, it considered an alternative formula-
tion where candidates are free to announce any policy, and policy campaigning
serves the purpose of partially addressing a commitment problem arising from
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an announcement-reputation mismatch via ambiguity dispersal. Inspired by a
persistent observation characterizing the last decade of Turkish campaign poli-
tics, the motivation was to assess the potential impact of an audience effect on
campaign strategies, and to see whether a systematic relationship between policy
preferences and policy awareness within an electorate can ceteris paribus lead to
campaign divergence among different candidates.
Several conclusions were obtained. In the probabilistic voting model with no
campaigning, politicians only take policy preferences of the informed/politically
aware segment of the electorate into account when proposing platforms, and frac-
tion of ignorant voters never matters by itself for policy proposals. These have
two implications. First, if there is no systematic relation or statistical depen-
dence between policy preferences and informational status, then the electoral
outcome coincides with an egalitarian planner outcome where preferences of the
entire electorate is taken into account, no matter how prevalent ignorance is.
Second, if there is such dependence, then no matter how large as a group they
are, policy preferences of ignorant voters are completely ignored and a tyranny
of well-informed prevails.60 As a corollary to the latter, a monotonic association
between these two in a statistical sense implies a policy bias towards right or
left depending on the context and the direction of association.61 When policy
commitment requires costly campaigning, which also provides an opportunity to
capture the support of ignorant voters, neutrality of the size of ignorant pop-
ulation disappears. Even if the likelihood of lacking political awareness has no
connection with policy preferences, a higher fraction of ignorant voters incen-
tivizes both politicians to devote more resources to valence campaigning. This
limits their ability to moderate their platforms and lead to policy divergence. In
Lind and Rohner (2013), a similar conclusion appears due to intrinsic policy pref-
erences of candidates. Here, it arises as a consequence of the interaction between
legacies and policy-valence campaign trade-off giving rise to a similar centrifugal
force. Differences in terms of responsiveness to policy campaigning among an
electorate has also a more interesting effect in a campaign framework. In partic-
ular, when voter ignorance is correlated with policy preferences and candidates
are positioned at opposing segments of the policy spectrum at the beginning of
the campaign, an alternative channel for campaign divergence appears, leading
otherwise symmetric candidates to follow asymmetric campaign strategies. For
demonstration purposes, this chapter assumed positive correlation between igno-
60Of course this still requires a non-zero measure of informed voters.
61Lind and Rohner (2013) provide state-level evidence of a strong correlation between income
and information leading to less redistributive platforms in U.S. House and Senate elections.
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rance and preferences. Introduction of such positive correlation has a moderating
effect on the left candidate’s initial position and an extremizing effect on the right
candidate’s legacy. Consequently, the right candidate conducts a more policy ori-
ented campaign in order to remoderate his position, whereas the left candidate
can afford to conduct a campaign with a heavier valence focus. From a normative
perspective, the model does not have much to say on efficiency aspects of cam-
paigning under correlated ignorance, as all policies are efficient in a Pareto sense
and potential issues about post election implications of campaign outcomes are
swept aside by assuming credibility of campaign messages. Yet, it is still possible
to unambiguously say that correlated ignorance reduces political representation
of the less informed, and that possibility of valence campaigning worsens this
underrepresentation.
There are several promising paths to follow from where this chapter has left
off. First, the chapter has adopted a very simplistic view of political awareness
by assuming that some people are completely in the dark regarding policies. One
can bring the model a step closer to reality, for instance, by assuming varying
signal strengths coupled with explicit belief formation. However, such an ana-
lytical detour would yield additional insights only if one had a solid framework
picturing how the post election stage would play out. The latter would not only
form a basis for Bayesian beliefs, but would also reveal potential sources of in-
efficiencies introduced by campaigns relying on partisanship effects, for instance,
by limiting the screening ability of relatively better informed voters. Relatedly,
channels through which campaigns operate were treated within a black-box ap-
proach and their effectiveness was taken as given. One can attempt to reconcile
the correlated ignorance framework with a micro-founded campaigns framework.
For instance, policy campaigning can be costly due to necessity of spending re-
sources in order to transmit one’s platform to the electorate, and it can also be
informative due to party affiliations, which can make it costly for candidates to
renege on their platforms post election, especially if parties have long horizon
utilities.62 This could also make valence cheap talk informative (as signalling a
lack of commitment), which can provide rational incentives to uninformed voters
at one end of the policy spectrum to vote for valence campaigning candidates at
the opposing end of the spectrum. In a setting with correlated ignorance, this
can imply cheap talking/ambiguous right versus policy campaigning/hard com-
mitting left or vice versa.63 Second, one implication of the model presented in
62On this latter point, see Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008)
63This line of reasoning has its roots in the relatively small “strategic ambiguity” literature.
See for instance Aragonès and Neeman (2000).
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this chapter was that the candidate whose initial position is aligned with policy
aware voters has a ceteris paribus competitive advantage. A legitimate question
is then, why does any candidate, or any political party aligns itself with policy
interests of ignorant voters in the first place? One possible answer is normative
considerations by party founders. Another one can be constructed from a com-
bination of changing demographics and institutional rigidity. A more interesting
one, where correlated ignorance would also play an important role, considers
costly party formation. Within the spirit of the current model, forming a party
representing interests of informed voters can be costly, requiring a large coalition
and time and resilience to establish credibility. Relative to this, one can argue
that a right combination of idiosyncratic elements, e.g. charisma, oratorical skills
etc. might be sufficient to form a loyalty base among informationally disadvan-
taged voters. Under correlated ignorance, this entry costs argument would also
have implications of asymmetric political fractionalization. Finally, this chapter
treated valence campaigning as a technology allowing politicians to generate ex-
pected universal support. One can instead assume that politicians have to direct
such campaign efforts towards specific subgroups, with possible negative reper-
cussions in the form of loss of support from other groups. Such subgroups can
be thought as representing preexisting ethnolinguistic divisions or sociocultural
fault lines. If the partition implied by such divisions roughly overlaps with the
ignorant/informed segregation, correlated ignorance can generate asymmetries
with respect to conciliatory/divisive campaign discourses. These issues are left
for future research.
Appendix
Probabilistic Voting with Correlated Ignorance and Single-Crossing
Voter Utilities:
Suppose that voters are indexed in some unidimensional type space [ρ, ρ]. Assume
that their policy preferences are represented with the following value function.
U(X; ρ). (88)
Further, suppose that U(X; ρ) is submodular in (X; ρ) and lower semi-continuous
in X ∈ [0, 1] for each ρ. One can imagine ρ representing gross incomes and X
representing a linear income tax. From Topkis (1978), we know that X∗(ρ) which
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maximizes (88) should be decreasing in ρ due to submodularity. With (88), the


















U(Xi; ρ)− U(Xj; ρ)
]
dF (ρ|I = 1, θ)
}
,
where θ orders F (ρ|I = 1, ·) in terms of increasing first-order stochastic domi-
nance, i.e. for any θ′ > θ;
F (ρ|I = 1, θ′) ≤ F (ρ|I = 1, θ) ∀ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ]. (89)
In other words, an increase in θ corresponds to a distribution where informed
people are more likely to have higher ρ’s and thus lower policy preferences. Max-
imizing (89) will be equivalent to maximizing the following objective function.
Φ(Xi, Xj; θ) =
∫ ρ
ρ
U(Xi; ρ)dF (ρ|I = 1, θ). (90)
The game will have a pure-strategy equilibrium from Tarski (1955), as Φ(Xi, Xj; θ)
does not depend on Xj, so it is a submodular game, and lower semi-continuity
is preserved under integration (Yannelis (1990)). Moreover, because U(X; ρ) is
submodular in (X; ρ), and because F (ρ|I = 1, ·) is increasing in the first-order
stochastic order, Φ(Xi, Xj; θ) is submodular in (Xi, θ) as shown by theorem 14 in
Van Zandt and Vives (2007). So the equilibrium policy platform X∗i (θ) = X
∗
j (θ)
will be decreasing in θ. 
Proof of Lemma 3 (Monotonicity of Γ(x) and LR-dominance):


















where Γ̂ is the unconditional probability of being informed. So (91) is increasing
















which is true if and only if Γ′(x) ≤ 0. More generally, LR-dominance is equivalent
to Γ(x) being non-increasing, i.e. for any x′ > x, Γ(x′) ≤ Γ(x). 
Proof of Corollary 1 (Negative correlation between informational sta-
tus and policy preferences):










(I − Γ̂)P(I|x)f(x)dx, (95)
where P (I = 1|x) = Γ(x) is the conditional probability of being informed given
policy preference x and Γ̂ = E[Γ(x)] = E[I], which is also its unconditional





(I − Γ̂)P(I|x) = (x− E(x))
{
(1− Γ̂)Γ(x)− (1− Γ(x))Γ̂
}





(Γ(x)− Γ̂)(x− E[x])f(x)dx = cov(x,Γ(x)). (97)
Assumption 1 (F (x|I = 1) is LR-dominated by F (x|I = 0)), was shown to be
equivalent to Γ(x) being monotone decreasing by lemma 3. As shown by Schmidt
(2014), this implies cov(x,Γ(x)) ≤ 0. 
Proof of Lemma 4 (Stronger correlation):
Assumption 2 implies the following first-order stochastic dominance relations for
any θ′ > θ.
F (x|I = 1, θ) ≤ F (x|I = 1, θ′) ∀x ∈ [0, 1], (98)
F (x|I = 0, θ) ≥ F (x|I = 0, θ′) ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. (99)
Using Bayes’ rule and assuming that total measure of ignorant voters remains
fixed, covariance between x and I under θ and θ′ respectively are given as follows
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after opening up the summation in (95).
covθ(x, I) = Γ̂(1− Γ̂)
{∫ 1
0




(x− E[x])dF (x|I = 0, θ)
}
, (100)
covθ′(x, I) = Γ̂(1− Γ̂)
{∫ 1
0




(x− E[x])dF (x|I = 0, θ′)
}
. (101)
Regarding the terms in the brackets, from (98) and (99), first term is bigger and
second term is smaller in (100), as (x− E[x]) is increasing in x. So covθ′(x, I) ≤
covθ(x, I) ≤ 0 follows. 
Proof of Proposition 5 (Comparative statics for the campaign game):












g′(RA − PA) = 0. (102)
Required conditions for the implicit function theorem are satisfied due to twice
continuous differentiability of D, g, strict convexity of D and strict concavity of











. Using the implicit function theorem, one gets the following (on


















where signs of the numerator and the first term of the denominator follow from
the chain rule, strict convexity of D, Leibniz rule and the fact that D′(0) = 0.
























































































where the sign of the first term in the numerator follows from the chain rule,























































. Substituting for VA in (103) and applying the implicit function





∂Z(RA − VA;LA, ρA)
∂PA









where the minus sign in front of the first term in the denominator follows from
the chain rule. 
Proof of Proposition 7 (Asymmetric campaign monotonicity): As a




fθ(x|I = 1, θ)
f(x|I = 1, θ)
]
≤ 0, ∀F (·|I = 1, θ) ∈ F . (111)
In addition, same marginal distributions for I implies that the fraction of ignorant
voters is the same under any θ, so that Γ̃ is independent of θ. For any given θ,
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assuming an interior solution, candidate B’s first-order condition becomes the
following.{∫ LB−ρBPB
0








g′(RB − PB) = 0.
(112)
Let ZB(PB, θ) denote the left-hand side of (112). Since D is twice continuously
differentiable and F (·|·) is smooth, the implicit function theorem implies that
(112) defines PB as a function PB ≡ PB(θ) on an open neighbourhood around







Strict convexity of D and strict concavity of g implies ∂ZB(PB ,θ)/∂PB < 0. So
dPB(θ)/dθ will have the same sign as ∂ZB(PB ,θ)/∂θ, which is in turn given as follows.{∫ LB−ρBPB
0
D′(LB − ρBPB − x)
fθ(x|I = 1, θ)
f(x|I = 1, θ)




D′(x− (LB − ρBPB))
fθ(x|I = 1, θ)
f(x|I = 1, θ)
dF (x|I = 1, θ)
}
. (114)
(114 ) is non-negative due to (111) and (112). It follows that ∂PB(θ)
∂θ
≥ 0 and thus
∂VB(θ)
∂θ
≤ 0. An analogous argument establishes ∂PA(θ)
∂θ
≤ 0 and ∂VA(θ)
∂θ
≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 8 (Stronger correlation, policy proposals and cam-
paign allocations):













P (XA − LA, RA − VA) = 0, (116)
where ν ′D(·) and ν ′P (·) are short-hand notations for partial derivatives with respect
to first and second arguments (distance and positive campaigning) respectively.
Holding the total number of ignorant voters fixed while strengthening the corre-
lation implies that Γ̃ and E[Γ(x)] stay constant while cov(x,Γ(x)) becomes more
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ν ′D − E[x] + c = 0, (117)
g′(VA) + Γ̃ν
′
P = 0. (118)
Reducing cov(x,Γ(x)) (making it more negative) and increasing c will have same
effects on X, up to a proportion. What is important is that differentiating with
respect to c will represent the directional impact of a stronger negative correlation
between being informed and policy preferences while holding E[Γ(x)] constant.
Holding all parameters besides c constant and totally differentiating the above





















Calculating the determinant of ΩA, one can see that it will be non-positive (I

















where the sign of the first term follows from strict concavity of g and convexity
of ν, which implies ν ′′DD ≥ 0 and ν ′′PP ≥ 0. Sign of the last term follows from the



















where the sign in (122) follows from the assumption that ν ′′DP ≤ 0. Similarly,




ν ′D(LB −XB, RB − VB)− E[x] + c = 0, (123)
g′(VB) + Γ̃ν
′
P (LB −XB, RB − VB) = 0. (124)
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where det(ΩB) < 0. 
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[66] Strömberg, D. (2004), “Mass media competition, political competition,
and public policy”, Review of Economic Studies, 71(1), 265-284.
[67] Tarski, A. (1955), “A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applica-
tions”, Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 5(2), 285-309.
[68] Todorov, A., A. N. Mandisodza, A. Goren and C. C. Hall (2005),
“Inferences of competence from faces predict election outcomes”, Science,
308(5728), 1623-1626.
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